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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Issue and the Argument
The Constitution does not now prohibit a death penalty., Legisla-
tures may define crimes, conviction of which may lead to death,2
'Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). It is im-
portant to say "now" because the reasoning the Court used to uphold the penalty
permits an opposite result if public attitudes change, or possibly if the penalty is
shown not to deter. See note 6 infra.
2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (murder). Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (same). Legislative power to allow execution as a penalty for a
crime Is limited by the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977) (plurality opinion) (capi-
tal punishment unconstitutional for crime of rape of adult woman). Homicide has
been the only crime, after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), to survive an
explicit test under the eighth amendments prohibition. It may be that not all
homicides may constitutionally result in death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
621 (1978) (White, J., concurring) (violation of eighth amendment to impose
death penalty without a finding that defendant possessed a purpose to cause vic-
tim's death). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death
Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. Rxv. 356 (1978). In Eberheart v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 917 (1977), the Court summarily vacated a death sentence for kidnapping,
citing Coker. The kidnapping, however, was incidental to a rape; the death sen-
tence for the rape was also vacated. Other crimes remain to be tested in the
Supreme Court. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 1976) (sex-
ual battery of child under 12); GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2534.1(a) (1978) (aircraft
hijacking and treason); Upshaw v. State, 350 So.2d 1358 (Miss. 1977) (death for
rape of child under 12 upheld but sentence reversed on other grounds). All states
with death penalties authorize it for some form of homicide. See Appendix I,
Analysis of Current State Death Penalty Statutes [hereinafter cited as Appendix
I], infra, for an analysis of state death laws. My discussion here is principally of
homicide.
According to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as of
October 20, 1980, there was a death row population in the United States of 691, all
but one of whom had been convicted of homicide and one of rape of a child.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (October 20, 1980)
(unpublished compilation). The size of the death row population may be smaller
at the time this Article is published, depending on the effect in their respective
states of three Supreme Court opinions issued in May and June of 1980. The
cases are Gdfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 100 S.
Ct. 2382 (1980); and Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980). By the start
of the Court's 1980 Term, Godfrey and Beck had already resulted in the vacation of
nine and ten judgments, respectively. The nine cases vacated after Godfrey are
Patrick v. Georgia, 49 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980); Hardy v. Georgia,
49 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980); Thomas v. Georgia, 49 U.S.L.W.
3371 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980); Brooks v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2937 (1980); Collins
v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2936 (1980); Baker v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2936 (1980);
Hamilton v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2936 (1980); Spraggins v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct.
2935 (1980); Davis v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 2934 (1980). The ten judgments va-
cated following Beck are Bracewell v. Alabama, 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 20,
1980); Coon v. Alabama, 101 S. Ct. 58 (1980); Mack v. Alabama, 100
S. Ct. 3044 (1980); Bitter v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 3044 (1980); Thomas v. Ala-
bama, 100 S. Ct. 3043 (1980); Baldwin v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 3043 (1980); Cade
v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 3043 (1980); Horsley v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 3043 (1980);
Wilson v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 3042 (1980); and Williamson v. Alabama, 100
S. Ct. 3042 (1980). In addition, the Supreme Court has vacated two judgments in
light of Adams. Both were on state petitions from California court decisions
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so long as death is not mandatory.3 Persons convicted of these
crimes have a right to a hearing4 at which a sentencer 5 decides
whether the sentence will be death. A constitutional death penalty
law0 must therefore contain procedures for choosing who will
vacating death sentences on Witherspoon grounds. California v. Lanphear, 101
S. Ct. 57 (1980); California v. Velasquez, 100 S. Ct. 3042 (1980). For post-
Beck activity in the Fifth Circuit, see note 48 infra.
3A legislature may not, with a possible exception, mandate death on convic-
tion of a particular crime, no matter how narrowly it defines the crime. Roberts v.
Louisiana (Roberts 11), 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam) (invalidating statute
requiring death penalty for intentional killing of fireman or peace officer engaged in
performance of lawful duties). The Supreme Court has reserved the question
"whether or in what circumstances mandatory death sentences may be constitu-
tionally applied to prisoners serving life sentences," Roberts 11, 431 U.S. at 637
n.5, but stated earlier that a life prisoner or escapee who commits murder
"presents a unique problem that may justify such a law." Roberts v. Louisiana
(Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976) (plurality opinion). Accord, Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604 n.1. The cited reservations suggest that mandatory death
laws may also be permissible in other narrow circumstances.
4 The right to a hearing follows necessarily from the defendant's right to have
the sentencer consider mitigating factors--"any aspect" of his or her "character or
record" and any of the circumstances of the offense that the "defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality
opinion) (footnote omitted). This language envisions some hearing at which the
described information can be heard. There are two possibilities: at the guilt trial
itself, or at a separate hearing, before the same or a different jury or before a
judge, after guilt is found. The second alternative, because it envisions two hear-
ings as part of one case, is called a bifurcated proceeding. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion). See generally Note, The Two-Trial System in
Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 50 (1964). The holding in McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U.S. 183, 220-222 (1971), that the Constitution does not require a
bifurcated proceeding, has not been explicitly overruled, and the Court has declined
to find that a bifurcated proceeding is required by the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion) (concerns for nonarbitrary use
of capital punishment "best met by ...bifurcated proceeding"). But see Roberts
I, 428 U.S. at 356 (White, J., concurring) (reading the cases to require bifurca-
tion). As a practical matter, however, given the scope of the information the de-
fendant may constitutionally choose to make known to the sentencer, see text
accompanying notes 125-29 infra, separate sentencing hearings were perhaps in-
evitable. Every current nonmandatory death penalty statute envisions them. See
Appendix I, infra.
Since the Constitution requires the hearing and governs what the defendant
may prove there, it also, not surprisingly, determines at least some of the rules of
evidence that apply. Id. (meaning of "irrelevant"); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S.
95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (application of hearsay rule exception).
5 I use the word "sentencee' because, although ambiguous, it is descriptive of
current statutory law: the sentencer may be a judge, a jury or a jury recommending
to a judge, depending on the state and on whether the defendant entered a guilty
plea, had a bench trial or had a jury trial. See Appendix I, infra; notes 48-58.
infra & accompanying text.
6 it is unlikely that substantive attacks on the death penalty will succeed for
some time. Only two Justices believe it is unconstitutional under all circumstances.
See, e.g., Moore v. Zant, 100 S. Ct. 2176 (1980), one of about five dozen death
penalty petitions during the 1979 Term of the Court in which certiorari was denied
over the dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall, both of whom cite adherence
to their views in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153; 229, 231 (1976). After Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), invalidated capital punishment laws as they then
1980]
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be executed from among those who may be.7  This Article is
about certain of the procedures for deciding who dies. Its subject
is who decides who dies. It concludes that the reasoning in United
States Supreme Court decisions in capital punishment cases in the
twelve years between Witherspoon v. Illinois S and Adams v. Texas 9
requires, first, that the death penalty be imposed by a jury, not a
judge, unless a jury is knowingly waived, 10 and second, that persons
who will not vote to impose death under any circumstances may
operated, 35 states and the federal government passed new ones, Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 179-80 (plurality opinion), and 460 people were sentenced to death in less than
four years, most by juries. Id. 182. Given this response, the Gregg plurality was
unwilling to say, in the language of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion), that capital punishment did not reflect the "'evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 428 U.S. at 173. The
maturing society had spoken for itself.
The plurality's eighth amendment analysis in Gregg leaves it free to invalidate
capital punishment on substantive grounds in the future if, for example, a sufficient
number of state legislatures repeal capital punishment statutes or, even if they do
not, a sufficient number of sentencers refuse to impose the death penalty. Both
arguments were relied upon in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality
opinion), to support rejection of capital punishment for the crime of rape of an
adult woman.
It is also unclear what the Court will do should it ever be established that
capital punishment has no deterrent effect. See generally note 237 infra. Justice
Stewart, a member of the Gregg plurality, wrote in a separate concurrence in
Furman that "retribution" may be a constitutionally permissible "ingredient in
the imposition of punishment." 408 U.S. at 308. Whether it may constitute the
whole recipe is unclear. The Gregg plurality left the question open when, after
stating the Georgia legislature's view that the death penalty deterred, it wrote that
it was "require[d] . . . to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence,
that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification
and thus is not unconstitutionally severe." 428 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
On the substantive constitutionality of the death penalty under the eighth amend-
ment, see generally Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncon-
stitutional, 83 HAiv. L. REv. 1773 (1970); Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
Evolving Standards for the Gruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 989 (1978).
7 It has been at least part of the litigation strategy prior to and since Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), to challenge capital sentences by challenging
the procedures for their imposition. See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUsuAL: ThE Supr.EME CourT AND CA ,TAL Punsnm4EN (1973). After Gregg,
it is likely to be the major, if not the only, strategy. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner,
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and the six post-Lockett cases discussed in
Appendix H, Summary of Supreme Court Capital Punishment Decisions Since
Witherspoon v. Illinois [hereinafter cited as Appendix II], infra. If a capital de-
fendant does not receive the death penalty, the states provide different alternate
sentences ranging from life imprisonment to imprisonment for varying minimum
terms. For convenience, I shall generally assume that a life sentence is the alterna-
tive to a death sentence.
8391 U.S. 510 (1968).
9 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980).
10 See notes 18 & 344 infra. I also discuss whether the jury's sentence must be
unanimous and, if not, whether there is a minimum majority. See text accompany-
ing notes 412-45 infra.
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not be challenged from the sentencing jury for cause,1' nor may
their penalty views be elicited on voir dire.
12
The issues posed in this Article are timely for several reasons.
First, and perhaps most dramatically, an average of one person
every three days is currently added to the death row population in
the United States.13 Procedural rights at capital sentencing hearings
will influence the number and identity of condemned defendants.1
Second, judicial inquiry has shifted in the last few years from the
substantive constitutionality of the death penalty to the procedures
used to determine who shall be executed.15 During its 1979 and
1980 Terms, the Supreme Court underscored this shift when it
granted review in five state death penalty cases raising predom-
inantly procedural questions.16 Finally, the particular questions
addressed here have practical importance. A requirement of jury
sentencing after a jury has determined guilt will upset the capital
punishment scheme in eight states,17 with a total death row popula-
tion in the fall of 1980 of 224 people.18 Acceptance of my second
11 See notes 392-411 infra & accompanying text.
12 See notes 446-52 infra & accompanying text.
13 In October 1978, there were 453 persons on death row in the United States.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (Oct. 20, 1978) (un-
published compilation). Eighteen months later, in April 1980, there were 642
persons on death row in the United States. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (April 20, 1980) (unpublished compilation). This rep-
resents a net increase, after reversals, vacations of sentence, commutations and
suicides, of 189 people, or about ten additions to death row monthly. The current
death row population may be lower than it was in April 1980, for the reasons given
in note 2 supra. In the 45-month period between June 1972, when Furman v.
Georgia vacated every death sentence in the United States, and March 1976, a
total of 460 persons were sentenced to death, or about ten persons each month.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182.
14 For example, jury sentencing is likely to result not only in fewer capital sen-
tences but in a substantially different condemned group. See note 318 and text
accompanying notes 314-19 infra.
15 See note 7 supra and note 43 infra & accompanying texts.
10 Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct.
2382 (1980); Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980); Estelle v. Smith, 602
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1311 (1980) (No. 79-1127);
Bullington v. Missouri, 594 S.W.2d 908, cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980).
'7 See notes 51 & 52 infra & accompanying text.
18 NAACP Legal Def. & Edue. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (October 20,
1980) (unpublished compilation). Florida was the state with by far the greatest
number of death row inmates: 142. Recognition of a right to a jury sentence will
not, of course, mean that current judicial death sentences must be vacated. The
right may be applied prospectively. Cf. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968)
(denying retroactive effect to right to jury trial on culpability). If guilt is deter-
mined by plea or in a judge trial, substantially more than eight states deny jury
determination of penalty. See notes 53-58 infra. My argument on the right to jury
determination of penalty is limited to those cases in which a jury determines guilt. I
do not consider whether a state may condition a guilty plea or court trial on waiver
1980]
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argument-that persons unalterably opposed to the death penalty
may not be challenged for cause from sentencing juries-will affect
nearly all jurisdictions that, under Witherspoon, now allow these
challenges.19
The Supreme Court has not suggested that the Constitution
requires either of the rules for which I argue. Its opinions have
pointed the other way. In Lockett v. Ohio,2 0 it did not "address" a
claimed right to a jury determination of penalty in capital cases.21-
Prior cases have affirmed judicial death sentences without discussion
or with an assertion that they violate no rights.
22
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court held that a prospective
juror could be challenged for cause if he or she was "irrevocably
committed" to vote against the death penalty regardless of the
evidence.23 The Witherspoon Court also held that a prospective
of the right to a jury sentence. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (no constitutional right to plead guilty); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 38 n.11 (1970) (same); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (no
constitutional right to a court trial); note 344 infra.
'PAnnot., 39 A.L.R.3d 550 (1971), reviews state cases with Witherspoorn
challenges. See also note 391 infra, for discussion of collateral benefits of abandon-
ing Witherspoon. South Carolina appears to be the only state which forbids chal-
lenges for cause of persons unalterably opposed to the death penalty. By statute,
South Carolina prohibits the exclusion of a person from a capital jury "by reason of
his beliefs or attitudes against capital punishment," unless they would render nim
"unable to return a verdict of guilty according to law." S.C. CoDE § 16-3-20(E)
(Supp. 1979).
20438 U.S. 586 (1978).
21 Id. 609 n.16. Lockett reversed a death sentence on the ground that the
defendant was forbidden, by statute, to proffer mitigating evidence to the sentencer.
This disposition made it unnecessary to "address" the right to a jury determination
of death. Justice ReBhnquist, dissenting, addressed the claimed right and found it
absent. Id. 633. See also Richmond v. Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323, 1325 (1977)
(Rehnquist, Cir. I.).
22 See, e.g., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 287 (1977) (trial judge "over-
ruled" a recommendation by a majority of the jury of a life sentence); Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242 (1949) (death sentence imposed by judge upheld
despite nonbinding jury recommendation of life imprisonment). The Court in both
cases affirmed the death sentences against challenges on other grounds. In Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976), the plurality stated that Florida's provision
for a nonbinding jury recommendation of sentence violated no rights. This state-
ment was dictum. The petitioner did not challenge the constitutionality of an
advisory jury. See Brief for Petitioner. Under Florida law, the jury's recommenda-
tion of mercy could not be ignored by the trial judge, unless "'the facts suggesting
a sentence of death [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ."' 428 U.S. at 249 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908,
910 (Fla. 1975)).
The absence of a right to a jury sentence in capital cases can also be inferred
from the denial of certiorari in Westbrook v. Balcom, 49 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S. Nov.
17, 1980); id. (White, J., dissenting) (expressing view that there is no right to
jury sentence in capital cases). See note 112 infra.
23 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. This conclusion is arguably dictum since the case
could have been disposed of on the narrower "scrupled juror" ground, stated in the
next sentence of the text. Justice Douglas, concurring, rejected the conclusion. Id.
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juror who simply "voiced general objections to" or had "scruples"
against the death penalty, but who was "willing to consider all of
the penalties provided by state law," could not be challenged for
cause.24  The Witherspoon distinction between those "irrevocably
committed" against the death penalty (whom I call "death penalty
opponents") and those who do not favor but will "consider" the
death penalty (whom I call "scrupled jurors") is important. It has
been restated, though not reexamined, as recently as Adams v.
Texas.2 5 I will argue that the distinction may no longer be made.
28
523. See also Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. at 2525, which restates the Witherspoon
conclusion regarding a state's power to exclude death opponents, but nevertheless
characterizes Witherspoon as merely "recogniz[ing] that the State might well have
power to exclude jurors . . . Ewho say] . . . 'that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment."' (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 522, n.21) (emphasis omitted). But see 100 S. Ct. at 2528-29.
24 391 U.S. at 522 & n.21.
25 100 S. Ct. at 2525-29. I discuss Adams at note 166 infra. The Adams Court
invalidated a Texas statute which permitted challenge for cause of prospective
capital jurors based on their attitude toward the death penalty. The Court con-
cluded that the statute's challenge was broader in favor of the state than Wither-
spoon permitted because it resulted in exclusion of scrupled jurors. Id. 2528-29.
26 Witherspoon had a unitary trial. The jury determined guilt and punishment
in the same deliberation. 391 U.S. at 512. I discuss Witherspoon at length at
text accompanying notes 345-91 infra. Here, some background and implications
from my argument may be useful.
In addition to his argument about the composition of the sentencing jury,
Witherspoon argued that the absence of death penalty opponents or scrupled jurors
from the culpability determination increased the chance of conviction. 391 U.S.
at 516. The Court was not persuaded that "jurors not opposed to the death penalty
tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt." Id. 517 (footnote
omitted). But since the proceeding was unitary and scrupled jurors could not be
excluded from the penalty determination in any event, this decision affected death
opponents only. The Court added that should some future defendant be able to
prove that exclusion of death opponents made the jury "less than neutral with
respect to guilt," it would be necessary to choose between "the State's interest in
submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment [and]
the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence."
Id. 520 n.18. The Court hinted that victory would go to the defendant, "given
the possibility of accommodating both interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using
one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment." Id.
Since Witherspoon, the Court has not held that juries from which death penalty
opponents have been excluded are "less than neutral with respect to guilt." Id.
(emphasis omitted). See also Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1 (1980)
(rejecting, after an extensive analysis, the defendant's contention that a death-
qualified juror in the State of California is less than neutral with respect to guilt).
For other reasons, however, every state death law now adopts bifurcated procedures,
see note 4 supra and Appendix I infra, and Witherspoon has been applied to these.
Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. at 2524 & n.3. Despite bifurcation, all states envision
using the same jury at the penalty stage of the proceeding as at the guilt stage.
Therefore, the exclusion of death penalty opponents at the guilt stage as an
accommodation of the state's interest in the exclusion of those jurors at the penalty
stage remains important. Should this Article's argument that death penalty
opponents may not be challenged from the penalty jury be persuasive, a state
would have to accept the presence of these opponents at the guilt stage, too, unless
1980]
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B. The Judicial and Legislative Settings
1. Confusion in the Court
This Article assumes familiarity with the sequence of Supreme
Court capital punishment decisions since Witherspoon. I do, how-
ever, summarize the major and some minor holdings in an ap-
pendix, 27 which less familiar readers might turn to before proceed-
ing. Most of these cases will be discussed throughout the text.
Although I do not assay their facts and reasoning now, I do want
to say a preliminary word about their shifting focus and doctrines.
The line we trace is not straight. The Court's thrusts and retreats
may be understandable, given the gravity of the consequences of
its views, but this fact does not make our task easier.
In the years since Witherspoon, the Court has caused great
change and some confusion in the administration of the nation's
capital punishment laws. 28 The constitutional theories used to
force these changes have themselves changed, as the Court's shifting
it were willing to forego the efficiency of having the same jury make both guilt and
penalty determinations.
The state might anticipate a risk of "jury nullification," if death opponents may
not be challenged for cause from culpability hearings. But jury nullification-
refusal to vote for guilt in order to avoid death, see, e.g., McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 199-200 (1971)-is much reduced. If the same jury that decides
guilt decides penalty, there is no need for the death opponent to be "dishonest" at
the culpability stage, because he or she will have an opportunity to vote against
death at the penalty stage. Furthermore, whoever sentences, conviction does not
inevitably or even usually lead to the death penalty. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion); H. KALVEN & H. ZErsEL, TIM ANM.cAN
JuRy 436 (1966). See note 274 infra. Prospective jurors generally may not be
challenged for cause simply because of their beliefs, if these do not interfere with
their ability to take an oath and follow it. See generally ABA, TrAL BY JURY 67-70
(1968). A dealth penalty opponent therefore could be challenged for cause at the
guilt stage only if she said that under no circumstances would she follow the court's
instructions or vote for guilt given any possibility that a death sentence may follow
on conviction.
2 See Appendix II, infra.
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), resulted in invalidation of the
death penalty laws of 39 states and the United States and reversal of more than 600
death sentences. 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. 417 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Within four years, at least 35 states and the federal government passed
new death penalty laws, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality
opinion), some of which were invalidated for reasons not apparent under Furman.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (defendant not permitted to introduce all
relevant mitigating factors). Invalidation of the Ohio death penalty statute in
Lockett resulted in reversal of 98 death sentences in Ohio alone. Comment, New
Direction for Capital Sentencing or an About Face For the Supreme Court?-
Lockett v. Ohio, 16 Am. Cam. L. REv. 317, 334 (1979). It is too early to know
the number of death sentences, other than those of the individual petitioners, that
will be vacated as a result of the three capital cases decided in the 1979 Term.
See note 2 supra.
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pluralities,29 its dissenters, 80 and commentators 31 have conceded or
emphasized. The changes have not won consensus within the
Court. Only five capital punishment opinions since 1971 command
a majority.32 The important ones have been decided by pluralities
of three or four. 3
The uncertainty started early. In McGautha v. California,
4
the Court rejected a fourteenth amendment attack on two states'
procedures for capital sentencing. One year later, a controlling
plurality of three Justices, each writing separately in Furman v.
Georgia, appeared to find procedural content in the eighth amend-
ment's clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments. Furman
resulted in the invalidation of all death penalty laws and sentences.35
29 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 602 (plurality opinion).
3 0 Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. at 346-7 (White, J., dissenting);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 629 (Relmquist, J., dissenting); Godfrey v. Georgia,
100 S. Ct. at 1772 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value
of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1187, 1195 n.21 (1979); Comment, New Direc-
tion for Capital Sentencing or an About-Face for the Supreme Court?-Lockett v.
Ohio, 16 Aif. Can,. L. REv. 317, 336 & n.148 (1979). See also the discussion of
Godfrey v. Georgia at note 108 infra.
32 Aside from decisions routinely applying Witherspoon, see, e.g., Davis v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976), only five death penalty cases reviewed by the Court
since McGautha were decided by a majority. They are Roberts v. Louisiana (Rob-
erts II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977), in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Powell
and Stevens joined in a per curiam opinion reversing a mandatory death sentence
on the basis of an earlier decision concerning the same statute; Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282 (1977), which affirmed a death sentence against a claim that its
imposition would violate the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Con-
stitution, U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, amend. XIV § 1; Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979) (per curiam), which prohibited use of a state hearsay rule to exclude evi-
dence relevant under Lockett; Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980), which
invalidated a capital conviction obtained under a statute which did not permit the
jury to consider lesser included offenses and which appeared to be mandatory; and
Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980), which vacated a death sentence when
state law required exclusion of a juror unless he could swear that the possible
penalties would "not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact." Id. 2524.
3 3 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality of Douglas, Stewart &
White, JJ., in separate opinions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (same); Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(same); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (same); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality of Stewart, White, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality of Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (same); Godfrey v. Georgia, 100
S. Ct. 1759 (1980) (plurality of Stewart, Blackmun, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
34402 U.S. 183 (1971).
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The plurality, Justices Douglas, Stewart and White,
did not say what that procedural content required be done, perhaps out of a re-
luctance to provide a blueprint for a "Model Capital Punishment Statute." The
then administration of capital sentencing was found unconstitutional because of its
results-it resulted in a system that was "pregnant with discrimination," id. 257
(Douglas, J., concurring), it permitted the death penalty to be "wantonly" and
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Perhaps wishing in 1972 to place firmer limits on capital punish-
ment administration, the Court may have found amendment-switch-
ing the only alternative.36  Following Furman, except in a few
cases that do not raise critical capital sentencing issues,37 the Court
"freakishly" imposed, id. 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and it provided "no mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death was] imposed from
the many cases in which it [was] not," id. 313 (White, J., concurring). In dis-
sent, the Chief Justice, without making a "definitive statement," did suggest the
kinds of death statutes that might fall within "the parameters of the Court's ruling."
Id. 400-01.
None of the plurality Justices joined in the others' opinions. But Justices
Stewart, Powell and Stevens later suggested that the three separate opinions had a
common basis, which they characterized as a "holding": "Furman held that [the
death penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. It was a "holding of the Court," the Justices explained,
because it represented "that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds .... ." Id. 169 n.15. Notably, Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who in Lockett v. Ohio joined the Gregg plurality, used different
language to describe Furman. There are "judgments" and "conclusions" contained
in Furman, the Chief Justice wrote, but he does not use the word "holding." Sub-
sequently, Justice Stewart again had opportunity to characterize the common de-
nominator of Furman as a "holding." Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1764
(1980) (plurality opinion). See also Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. at 2390 (Fur-
mars conclusion characterized as a holding). See generally Note, The Preceden-
tial Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 756, 760-61
(1980).
Justices Douglas, Stewart and White prevailed in Furman over the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Burger for himself and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist because justices Brennan and Marshall voted to invalidate all death
penalty laws under the eighth amendment on substantive grounds, a position re-
jected by seven Justices in Gregg and ever since. See Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct.
2521 (1980).
36 It received strong criticism from the dissenters, however. Chief Justice
Burger wrote:
Although the Court's decision in MaGautha was technically confined to
the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would be disin-
genuous to suggest that today's ruling has done anything less than overrule
McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication. It may be
thought appropriate to subordinate principles of stare decisis where the
subject is as sensitive as capital punishment and the stakes are so high,
but these external considerations were no less weighty last year. This pat-
tern of decisionmaking will do little to inspire confidence in the stability
of the law.
408 U.S. at 400.
37 Other than cases routinely applying Witherspoon, the four capital sentencing
cases turning on other than an eighth amendment analysis are Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (due process right to know information
relied upon by sentencing judge who gave the death penalty); Dobbert v. Florida.
432 U.S. 282 (1977) (challenge to death sentence under ex post facto and equal
protection clauses); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam) (invali-
dating hearsay rule exclusion of mitigating evidence); and Adams v. Texas, 100
S. Ct. 2521 (1980) (invalidating capital sentence because jurors were challenged
for cause under a state law on a basis broader than permitted by Witherspoon).




or controlling pluralities have adhered to eighth amendment analy-
sis.3 8 The amendment has stayed the same, but the theory of its.
operation has changed as three- and four-member pluralities have
had to confront the logical but disquieting consequences of earlier
decisions. 39
These theoretical shifts first to and then within the eighth
amendment4" were accompanied by continued emphasis on pro-
cedural rather than substantive questions. Except for Gregg v.
Georgia's refusal to invalidate all death penalty laws as cruel and
unusual 41 and Coker v. Georgia's subsequent invalidation of the
death penalty for rape of an adult woman, 42 capital cases since
Furman have invoked the eighth amendment's procedural con-
straints. 43  They are the first to do so. Prior Supreme Court
3SGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Roberts.
v. Louisiana (Roberts II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382
(1980).
39 The mandatory capital punishment statutes passed by ten states after Furman
were predictable, see, e.g., 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); 428 U.S. at
346 (White, J., dissenting), but unacceptable responses to Furman, a three member
plurality concluded in Woodson and Roberts I. In Lockett the Chief Justice joined.
this plurality to invalidate Ohio's death statute, though it differed little from the
one he had voted to sustain in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (plurality opinion), and even
enjoyed a similar state court gloss favoring the defendant. Compare Jurek, 429
U.S. at 272-74 (plurality opinion) with Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (same). Twc
years later, the Court again encountered the Texas statute in Adams v. Texas, 100
S. Ct. 2521 (1980). One must read carefully between the lines in Adams to find
hints of the Court's awareness of the impact of Lockett on Jurek. See note 166
infra.
The Court's unwillingness to be as deferential to the Ohio law as it had earlier
been to the Florida and Texas laws was emphasized in the separate Lockett opinion
of Justice White, who concluded that the plurality "strains very hard and un-
successfully to avoid eviscerating [its] handiwork in" Proflitt and Jurek, 438 U.S.
at 623, and in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist, id. 630-31. One reason for the
plurality's retreat is easy to suggest. The facts of Lockett would make all but the
most resolute capital punishment adherent hesitate. Lockett, a 21-year-old woman,
438 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring), who waited in a car while three men
robbed a store, received the death penalty though there was no proof she had a
specific intent to kill. Id. The killing occurred when the store owner attempted
to grab a gun used by one of the men. It went off in the struggle. Id. 590
(plurality opinion). Two of the three men received life sentences, one of these,
the "triggerman," for testifying against Lockett. Id. 591. The defendant had not
previously been convicted of a "major" offense. Id. 594.
40Throughout, my use of the words "eighth amendment" refers to the portion
of the amendment prohibiting the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
41428 U.S. 153 (1976).
42 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
43 In addition to Gregg and Lockett, the cases are Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,.
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treatment of the cruel and unusual punishments clause examined
its substantive limits on official power."
The history of the eighth amendment has been repeatedly and
well told.45  So has the history of and current attitudes towards
capital punishment in the United States.46  I do not retell either
story except as it may bear on my purpose: to propose a partial
theory of the eighth amendment's procedural content in capital
cases and then to argue the implications of that theory for sentenc-
ing of capital defendants.
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
637 (1978); Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); and Beck v. Alabama,
100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980).
44 The major pre-Furman eighth amendment cases in the Supreme Court are:
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (shooting not a prohibited mode of carry-
ing out the death penalty); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (eighth amend-
ment does not bind the states, but electrocution is not cruel and unusual in any
event); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (eighth amendment does not bind
the states); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (penalty of cadena
temporal disproportionate to crime of falsifying public record); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (upheld constitutionality of second elec-
trocution attempt after first one failed; application of cruel and unusual punishments
clause to states assumed); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation for
wartime desertion is cruel and unusual punishment); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment applies to the states and forbids sentence of
90-days imprisonment for violation of California law making it a crime to "be
addicted to the use of narcotics"); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (fine of
$20 for public drunkenness conviction not cruel and unusual).
Although I characterize these decisions as dealing with the "substantive" limits
of the cruel and unusual punishments clause, its substantive content, I will argue,
influences its procedural demands.
Since Furman, the Supreme Court has ruled in three important but noncapital
eighth amendment criminal cases. It has ruled that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes . . . 'unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain,' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). Four years later, the Court construed a
cause of action in the eighth amendment for violation of its prohibitions. Carlson
v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). The Court, in Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct.
1133 (1980), held that the eighth amendment was not offended by a mandatory
life sentence imposed upon a three-time felon. The first felony was obtaining $80
worth of goods through the fraudulent use of a credit card; the second was passing
a forged check for $28.36; the third was obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id.
1134-35.
45 For the history of the cruel and unusual punishments clause prior to Furman,
see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAi-v.
L. REv. 1773 (1970). For its history prior to adoption in the eighth amendment,
see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CALI'. L. REv. 839 (1969).
46 See, e.g., CArrAL PUMsMAENTr IN TI UNITED STATES, H. Bedau & C.
Pierce, eds. (1976); H. BEDAU, THE COURT, THE CONsTrruTIsON AND CAPITAL
PUNISMENT (1977); W. BowEns, EXECUnTONS IN AMmuCA (1974). For a history
of recent efforts to have the death penalty declared unconstitutional, see M. MELTS-
ER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PtNI MENT (1973).
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2. The Sentencer in Capital Trials Today
I canvass the identity of capital sentericers in state legislation
because legislative choice is one source to which the Court has
looked in assessing- other eighth amendment requirements. 47 I shall
argue that it should likewise do so in addressing questions posed
here.
There are death penalty laws in thirty-seven states, thirty-five
of which will be discussed in this Article and Appendix I. s The
47 See notes 186-207 infra & accompanying text.
48 In addition to the 37 states, there are death penalty statutes in the District
of Columbia and in the United States Code. I do not discuss the death penalty laws
in these two jurisdictions or the ones in New York or Vermont. In each case, the
,death statute was passed before either Gregg or Furman and has serious constitu-
tional problems or is otherwise uninstructive. The New York statute was declared
unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d
17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), except for one section, not raised
in that case, mandating death for murder by a person serving or having escaped
from a life sentence. Id. at 34 n.3, 371 N.E.2d at 465 n.3, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 745
n.3 (construing N.Y. PNAL LAw §125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975). The
Vermont law was passed in 1957 with nominal amendments in 1965, 1971 and
1979. It has never been used. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (Supp. 1980).
In recent years, dealth penalty statutes in Colorado, Massachusetts, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island were declared unconstitutional, in each
case, except Ohio, by state courts. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); People
v. District Court, 196 Colo. 401, 586 P.2d 31 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cassesso,
368 Mass. 124, 330 N.E.2d. 209 (1975); State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d
688 (1976); Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978); State v. Cline, 397 A.2d 1309 (1979). Colorado,
Massachusetts, New Mexico and Pennsylvania have since passed new death laws,
'vhich are summarized in Appendix I, infra. As of the fall of 1980, Ohio and
Rhode Island had not enacted death laws to replace those declared unconstitutional,
though efforts were made. See, e.g., Ohio H.R. No. 74, Reg. Sess. 1979-80; R.I.
H.B. 79-H 5763, Jan. Sess. 1979; R.I. H.B. 80-H 7650, Jan. Sess. 1980.
The Alabama death statute was criticized on two counts in Beck v. Alabama,
100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the
law did not permit capital juries to be charged on lesser included offenses and be-
.cause the jury was made to think that a guilty verdict would lead to a mandatory
death sentence. See Appendix I, infra, and text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
I am informed by John Carroll of the Southern Poverty Law Center that on re-
mand, the Attorney General's Office in Alabama has urged the state supreme court
to save the statute by severing the offending portions. The matter was taken under
advisement on October 6, 1980. Whether or not the state court saves the current
statute, Mr. Carroll informs me that the Attorney General is planning to introduce
a new death penalty law, modeled on Florida's, in the state legislature in 1981.
There has been an interesting post-Beck development in the Fifth Circuit,
Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400, 401 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Evans had
been sentenced to die in Alabama. He sought to have his conviction and sentence
overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. The state argued that
Evans could not take advantage of Beck because, even if the Alabama statute had
'permitted a jury to convict on lesser included offenses, in fact the evidence at
Evans' trial presented no basis on which to find him guilty of a lesser included
,offense. Since Evans could, therefore, only be guilty of the capital offense or
innocent, the state argued that the infirmities the Supreme Court cited in Beck did
not prejudice Evans. The court rejected the state's argument. The majority
'wrote
that it offends the most fundamental notions of fairness for the state first
to tell Evans that [the statute does not permit the jury to find guilt of a]
.1980]
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sentencer may vary depending on how guilt was determined. Irk
twenty-seven of the thirty-five states, a defendant convicted by a
jury of a capital crime has a right to jury determination of penalty.49"
In two of these twenty-seven states, the judge has discretion to re-
duce the jury's death sentence.50 In six other states, the judge
decides penalty.5 ' In the two remaining states, the jury makes a-
recommendation which does not bind the judge.5 2 If a defendant
pleads guilty to a capital offense, ten states permit jury deter-
mination of penalty,53 fifteen have the judge decide,
4 while ten_
either do not permit guilty pleas or make no statutory provision.5 ,
If conviction follows a bench trial, eight states provide a jury on.
penalty5 6 nineteen have the judge sentence,57 while eight either do,
not permit bench trials or have no statutory provision.
5 8
lesser offense and then later urge that his death sentence should be upheld
because he failed to present evidence which could prove a lesser included
offense.
Id.
I assume for purposes of this Article that the Alabama capital punishment
statute continues in effect. If the Evans decision stands, however, the validity of
the convictions of every capital defendant in Alabama will be in doubt.
A recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invalidates&
that state's re-enacted death law under the state constitution. See Appendix I,.
infra, at note 20. I nevertheless include the Massachusetts law in my analysis.
49 They are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,.
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nev-
ada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyom-
ing. For the citations for the death penalty laws of all states discussed in this.
Article, see Appendix I, infra.
50 They are California and Virginia. See Appendix I, infra.
51 They are Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska and Oregon. See-
Appendix I, infra. For the Alabama law, see also Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640-
(Ala. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979); note 48 supra.
52 They are Florida and Indiana. See Appendix I, infra. In Florida, for a.
judge to disregard a jury recommendation of life, "the facts suggesting a sentence-
of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
53 They are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi,.
New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Washington. As in jury trials,.
California allows the judge to reduce a death sentence. See Appendix I, infra.
54 They are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota and.
Wyoming. As with jury trials, Florida provides an advisory jury, even if the de-
fendant pleads guilty. See note 52 supra. See Appendix I, infra.
55 Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Texas.
apparently do not permit guilty pleas in capital cases. Missouri, Tennessee, Utah.
and Virginia make no explicit provision. See Appendix I, infra.
56 They are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi,.
Pennsylvania and Tennessee. See Appendix I, infra.
57They are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,.
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. In Florida there is a provision.
for an advisory jury. See note 52 supra. See Appendix I, infra.
58 Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas and Washington
apparently do not permit bench trials in capital cases. See Appendix I, infra.
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Jury sentencing is uncommon.59 Why is it prevalent in capital
-cases? One explanation is that it responds to "jury nullification." 1o
When death sentences were mandatory, jurors would sometimes
vote to acquit to avoid a penalty they believed too harsh.61 Giving
juries power over both guilt and penalty removes this motive.
6 2
A second explanation is the belief that not all capital defendants
,deserve to die. 3  These explanations, as has been pointed out,64
are not inconsistent. But neither do they fully explain jury sen-
tencing in capital cases. The harshness of mandatory death laws
could have been alleviated through judicial discretion. Perhaps
lawmakers believed that juries would refuse to convict in some
-cases if there were even a chance that a judge would impose death.65
Modern support for this explanation may be inferred from the fact
that many states dispense with jury sentencing after a bench trial
or guilty plea.66 This pattern suggests that juries are given power
over penalty to keep them honest on guilt.
There is a less cynical explanation. Lawmakers may have de-
cided that only a defendant's peers should make a choice so grave
as life or death.67 Until the introduction of discretionary capital
sentencing in the nineteenth century,68 lawmakers did not need to
North Carolina and Virginia make no explicit provision for sentencing juries fol-
Jowing bench trials. Id.
59 See generally ABA, STANDAnnS REx&Twc TO SmCING ALTEnNATEs AND
PsocEu nEs 43-47 (1967) (highly critical of jury sentencing in noncapital cases);
Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 969 & n.2 (1967); Note,
Should the jury Fix the Punishment for Crimes?, 24 VA. L. REv. 462 (1938).
60 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 199-200; Andres v. United States, 333
U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Knowlton, Problems of jury
Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (1953).
61 Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,
in CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT IN T UNITED STATES 49, 52 & 53 n.20 (H. Bedau &
•C. Pierce eds. 1976).
62 Knowlton, supra note 60, at 1130.
03 Id. 1103 & n.19.
64 Id.; Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. at 753 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
65 ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PsiOCEnunES
§ 1.1(c), at 47 (1967); Knowlton, supra note 60, at 1131 n.187; see Michael &
-Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLum. L. REV. 1261, 1267
n.19 (1937). See also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion), 311 (Rehn-
-quist, J., dissenting).
66 See notes 54-58 supra.
67'This sentiment has been expressed in modem times. See, e.g., GREAT
BmRTAIN, RoYAL CoMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PuNISmMENT 1949-53, 11549, at 193-94
(1953); F. FANEFuRTERi, OF LAw AND MEN 82-83, 87 (1956). See note 208
-infra.
68 See generally Bowers, supra note 46, at 8. Table 1-2 contains the dates
.each state adopted discretionary sentencing. In 1838, Tennessee was the first to
do so for murder. When Furman was decided in 1972, the only mandatory death
statutes were for murder or assault by a life prisoner. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292
-n.25.
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decide who would decide who dies. 9  Death was mandatory. A
discretionary-sentence solution to the jury nullification problem
introduced another problem: Whose discretion?
Legislative activity suggests there is something about this sen-
tencing decision, unlike others, that caused legislatures to give dis-
cretion to jurors, not judges. There are several indications. First,
if the penalty jury is unable to agree on sentence, all but one of the
twenty-seven states that use juries require a life sentence.70 The
exception permits the judge to sentence. If there were not a strong
interest in having the jury make death sentence decisions, we would
expect more lawmakers to have given the power to the court follow-
ing jury disagreement. Second, of the twenty-seven states that re-
quire a jury to agree on death before it may or must 71 be imposed,
twenty-three explicitly require unanimity.72 Statutes in the remain-
ing four take no clear position, but imply that unanimity is re-
69 There were early isolated exceptions for crimes other than homicide. 428
U.S. at 291 n.24.
70 The 27 states are those in note 49 supra. I do not include the two states
where the jury recommends. See note 52 supra. The exception is Nevada. See
Appendix I, infra.
71 1 say "may or must," because two states allow the court to reduce a jury
death sentence. See note 50 supra.
72 They are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington. See Appendix I, infra. Georgia's require-
ment is contained in case law. Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 229 S.E.2d 376
(1976).
Nine states require unanimity for any sentence, but since all but Nevada require
a sentence less than death if the jury is not unanimous, the dual unanimity require-
ment in the other eight is meaningless. One of the nine states, California, requires
the judge to empanel a new jury if the first jury deadlocks. See Appendix I, infra.
Texas requires unanimity on the presence of three aggravating circumstances for
death; at least a majority of ten on the absence of at least one aggravating circum-
stance for a lesser sentence. The statute is unclear on whether a new jury may be
called if neither number is reached, but it is clear that death may not be imposed.
Tnx. CODE Cmm. Pnoc. Ae. art. 37-4071(d) & (e) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
The adoption of a unanimity requirement for death represents a significant
departure from the practice in about a dozen states, before Furman, of requiring
(or enabling) the judge to impose death unless the jury urged mercy. Brief of
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund as Amicus Curiae at 54 & n.103, McCautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); note 76 infra. The new development reverses
the "presumptive death" laws in these states. Whether these states adopted a
unanimity requirement for death because they believed Furman required it (al-
though this is by no means clear) or because of a desire to assure clear community
support for a death penalty decision is unimportant. Either explanation supports
the assertion that lawmakers want juries to make death penalty choices. If law-
makers felt compelled, under Furman, to require unanimous jury sentences, it is
noteworthy that the great majority remained with jury sentencing even under this
perceived compulsion. See also notes 79 & 207 infra. If the choice was a matter




.quired.73 No state says it will permit a nonunanimous jury to
impose death. Third, this pattern occurs despite Witherspoon's
holding that scrupled jurors may not be challenged for cause from
the penalty panel 74 and despite the consequent reduction in a state's
-ability to control the composition of the sentencing jury. After
Witherspoon, there was no movement to reduce the unanimity re-
quirement, as a dissenter had suggested, 75 or to shift the penalty
decision to judges.76 Fourth, juries have been retained by three-
quarters of states with death laws 77 even though it is no longer
possible to control, as a matter of state law, the evidence the sen-
73 They are Connecticut, Missouri, South Dakota and Wyoming. Laws in
Missouri and Wyoming say the judge must impose a life sentence if the jury cannot
"agree" on the punishment. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006(2) (Vernon 1979); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-4-102(e) (1977). Laws in Connecticut and South Dakota speak of jury
"findings." CoNe, Gm. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f) (West Supp. 1980); S.D. Com-
PmD LAWS ANNi. §§ 23A-27A-4 & 23A-27A-5 (1979). Cf. Andres v. United States,
333 U.S. 740 (1948) (construing federal death penalty statute to require jury
unanimity on penalty). But cf. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (sixth
amendment does not require that 12 person jury be unanimous to convict for
felony). Some of the states cited in this note may eventually require unanimity
based on general state constitutional or statutory provisions. See, e.g., Mo. CONST.
art. 1, § 22(a) (recognizing nonunanimous verdicts in civil cases only).
74 391 U.S. at 522.
75 391 U.S. at 542 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the pre-
Witherspoon law, see MoDzLr PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comments at 78-9 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
76 There were virtually no substantive changes in capital punishment sentenc-
ing procedures between the 1968 Witherspoon decision and the decision in
McGautha v. California, three years later. See generally Brief of United States as
Amicus Curiae at 132-37 (Appendices C & D), MfcGautha v. California; Brief of
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund as Amicus Curiae at 51-54, MeCautha v. Cali-
fornia.
It is true that before and for a while after Witherspoon about a dozen states
required death, unless the jury recommended a lesser sentence. Id. 54 n.103;
Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, supra. While these "presumptive death"
laws may be seen as providing the state with a means of diluting Witherspoor's
holding, in reality they did not because any juror who wished to hold out against
the death penalty could refuse to vote to convict. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. at 312 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Virtually all of the states with presumptive
death laws assured that a lone opponent of the death sentence would be able to
use this leverage, because each state, before and after Witherspoon, had a unified
rather than a bifurcated procedure while their "presumptive death" statutes were in
force. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, supra. Today, the presumptions
have been reversed, with unanimity for death required in probably all states using
juries. See notes 72 & 73 supra and text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
77 In 1971, 41 states had capital punishment statutes for some form of homi-
cide. Of these, 39 involved the jury in the sentencing decision. North Dakota and
Rhode Island did not. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 76,
at 132-35. Today, of the 35 states with death penalty statutes (excluding New
York and Vermont, see note 48 supra), 27 give the jury power to impose death
after jury trial, but two of these give the judge the power to reduce a death
sentence. Eight states give the judge capital sentencing power, but two of these
provide for a jury recommendation. See notes 49-52 supra & accompanying text.
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tencer hears in mitigation of penalty.7 Fifth, each of the eight
states currently opting for judge sentencing made that choice after
Furman. Each had previously embraced jury sentencing in some-
form.79  Their adoption of judge sentencing is an apparent attempt
to meet Furman's unclear commands.8 0
This legislative pattern suggests that lawmakers chose jury sen-.
tencing in death cases not simply because they did not trust jurors,
otherwise to be honest on culpability, but predominantly because
of the kind and gravity of the sentence.8 ' Although jury sentencing.
has been adopted by every state legislature at one time or another 2'
and in recent times by a substantial majority of the states, 8  it is not
for that reason constitutionally compelled. But its broad acceptance-
is instructive in the interpretation of an amendment whose content
78 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428"
U.S. 280 (1976).
79 The eight states, Alabama (1976), Arizona (1973), Florida (1972), Idaho,
(1977), Indiana (1977), Montana (1973), Nebraska (1973) and Oregon (1978),
adopted judicial sentencing in the years parenthetically indicated. Previously, each
state had given the jury a role in the sentencing process. See note 207 infra
Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 76, at Appendix C, contains.
a list of state death penalty laws as of 1971 and the extent to which each usedi
juries for sentencing. See also Comment, The Unanimity Requirement of a Jury's-
Determination and the Witherspoon Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 46, App. I
(1969).
8o Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 299 (acknowledging confusion.
over Furman's "multi-opinioned decision"). Oregon was the only state to adopt-
judicial sentencing after Lockett denied the states power fully to control informa-
tion the jury could consider. The Oregon adoption was made in a popular referen-
dum, held November 7, 1978, four months after the decision in Lockett. 1979
Or. Laws Ch. 2, § 3 (amending OR. Bxv. STAT. §§ 163.005-.145). Oregon had
been without a death penalty statute since 1964. 1963 Or. Laws Ch. 625, § 4.
On the constitutionality of the Oregon death statute, see Kanter, Dealing with.
Death: The Constitutionality of Capital Punishment in Oregon, 16 WrL. L. 11Ev.
1 (1979).
83 If lawmakers wished to have jurors rather than judges make life or death
decisions, how do we explain that in bench trials and after guilty pleas, a sizeable
number of states, which otherwise use juries to determine penalty, permit judicial
sentencing? See notes 54 & 57 supra & accompanying text. There are several ex-
planations. First, it is improbable that a capital defendant will plead guilty to a
crime carrying a possible death penalty, unless the plea bargain includes imprison-
ment. Second, since in some circumstances juries are statistically less likely to
impose a death sentence than judges, H. ZsmEL, Somr; DATA ON JuRon ATrrruxs
TowAm CAx'rrAxL PuNrsHENT 35-38, 41-46 (1968), text accompanying notes 314-18
infra, one would expect most capital cases to be jury trials anyway. Third, the
defendant may sometimes prefer to be tried and sentenced by a judge, because it
has been shown that in some cases judges are less likely to impose death. H.
KALvN & H. ZEIsEL, TnE Arm~aucA Jray 434-49 (1966). Fourth, a judge who
takes a guilty plea or sits as factfinder at a trial will already be familiar with the
crime and the defendant. In short, it is likely that legislators did not envision many
guilty pleas or bench trials in capital cases and concluded that, when they did
occur, the decision to dispense with the jury would have been made because it
was to the defendant's advantage, possibly as part of a plea bargain.
8 2 McCautha, 402 U.S. at 200 n.1.
83 See note 77 supra.
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partly depends on "evolving standards of decency," 84 as I shall
-argue.m
C. Factors Influencing The Life or Death Decision
The statutory definitions and structures that can be expected
-to determine the size and identity of the capital population are
.highlighted here. These are the choices lawmakers must make,
,choices that are hemmed by the procedural component of the eighth
amendment. Some of these choices are the subject of the balance
,.of this Article. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Con-
stitution does not envision a particular approach, 6 though one ap-
proach, a mandatory death law, is rejected.8 7 The post-Furman
-cases have set other boundaries to legislative freedom.
Within constitutional limits, 8 a legislature has power to nar-
zowly 89 or broadly 90 define criminal acts punishable by death. If
it uses the death penalty, we are told it must take precautions to
'minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 91
Exactly what the Constitution commands the legislature do to as-
84 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
85 See text accompanying note 186-207 infra.
8 0Various efforts were made to write death penalty statutes that responded to
-Furmarns unclear message. See note 35 supra and text accompanying notes 205-06
infta. One commentator identified "four basic approaches" and concluded in 1974
that "none of the new laws fulfills these [Furman's] demands." Note, Discretion
,and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HtAv. L. Rsv.
1690, 1692 (1974). This pre-Gregg prediction, then wholly reasonable, proved
only partly right. After the Supreme Court approved three statutes in the 1976
-death penalty cases (while rejecting others), the survivors served as models for
lawmakers. Today, most post-Furman death laws copy the skeleton of those ap-
proved in Gregg, Profltt and Jurek. That skeleton, as Appendix I, infra, reflects,
-comprises aggravating and sometimes mitigating circumstances for the sentencer to
consider in deciding who dies. In this way, the sentencer's discretion is presuma-
bly directed by the statute and so less arbitrary. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality
opinion). But see notes 131 & 164 infra. The Gregg plurality did not mean to
"suggest that only ... [the Georgia statute] would be permissible under Furman
or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably
satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an
individual basis." 428 U.S. at 195 (footnote omitted).
87 See note 3 supra.
88 See note 2 supra.
89See, e.g., CoaN. GEN. STAT. ANrN. §§ 53a-46a(g), 53a-54b (West Supp.
1980), representing one of the more focused capital punishment laws. Compare
the New York law, which, except for one section, was invalidated in People v.
Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977). See note 48
.supra.
90 See, e.g., GA. CODE §§ 26-1101, 27-2534.1(b) (1)-(10) (1978).
91 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, also quoted in Godfrey, 100 S. Ct. at 1764. But
-see text accompanying notes 118-23 infra, on the amount of minimization that is
actually required or, in fact, attainable.
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sure this minimization is a lesson not easily inferred and shall con--
cern us briefly in later pages. 92 Once the legislature has properly
identified the class of those who may die and minimized the risk of
caprice (the definition stage), to what extent may it structure the
penalty (or selection) stage of a capital punishment trial to in-
crease 93 the risk that any particular defendant will receive the death
penalty? I suggest there are six principal ways in which this risk
may be affected. The first two involve legislative control of the-
standards used to determine who deserves execution. The last four
describe how lawmakers may arrange the sentencing process to en-
courage a particular result without actually providing standards.
The risk of execution will be affected:
(a) by excluding information which might have influenced the
sentencer favorably toward the defendant; 9-
(b) by telling the sentencer how to weigh the information it
credits; 95
(c) by having a judge determine penalty, because judicial sen-
tencing has been shown to lead to a greater number of
death sentences than does jury sentencing; 96
(d) by controlling who may sit on the sentencing jury; 97
(e) if the sentencer is a jury, by manipulating the number of
jurors needed to agree to a particular sentence. This can
vary from requiring death unless the jury is unanimous for
a lesser sentence 98 to requiring a unanimous jury for a
sentence of death.99  Intermediate positions-permitting a
specified majority to decide penalty-are possible;
92 See text accompanying notes 104-15 infra.
93 We know that, except possibly for one narrow crime, it may not increase the
risk to one hundred percent by making the death penalty mandatory. See note 3
supra. Each of the methods mentioned in the text, which enable the legislature
to increase the risk of a death penalty, may also, obviously, be used inversely to
decrease the risk. I discuss this further at note 115 infra. In this Article, I am
principally concerned with eighth amendment limitations on legislative decisions
that increase the risk of death.
94 This was the situation in Lockett. See text accompanying notes 144-46
infra.
95 See text accompanying notes 147-66 infra.
96 See note 81 supra, and text accompanying notes 314-18 infra.
97 See text accompanying notes 393-411 infra.
98 No state now has such a requirement, although many once did. See note
76 supra.
99 Of the 27 states using juries to sentence, 23 explicitly and the rest im-
plicitly require unanimity for the death penalty. See notes 72 & 73 supra.
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(f) by defining the burdens of production and persuasion of
facts that must be found before death may be imposed or
must be excluded. 00
100This interesting problem is beyond the scope of this Article. Of 35 death
penalty laws studied, 30 require the state to prove an aggravating circumstance,
all but two specifying a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, before death
may be imposed. Five states take no position. See Appendix I, infra. Nearly all
the states say nothing about the burdens of production and persuasion on the
existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance. A few place both burdens
on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Two states, Arkansas and
Washington, seem to require the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, after
all else, that the death penalty is justified in the case before it. Id. For a discus-
sion of burdens at sentencing generally, see Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing:
Burdens of Proof for Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports, 66 GEo. L.J.
1515 (1978).
To the extent that an aggravating circumstance is a matter of fact-which
could have been part of the definition of the offense, but is instead used as a post-
conviction predicate for a heightened sentence, see McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. at 206 n.16; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 270; MODEL PENrL CODE § 201.6,
Comment 3 at 71-72 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)-In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), would require that it be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), does not undermine this conclusion
because even under its limited view of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975),
the state would still, as a matter of its own law, have made the aggravating cir-
cumstance one that must be "proved or presumed" in order to increase the penalty
to death. 432 U.S. at 215.
Mitigating circumstances present a different problem. Their existence will
decrease the likelihood that the sentencer will impose death, but in no state must
the negative of the mitigating circumstances be "proved or presumed" in order to
enable the jury to impose death. This is obviously a matter of definition under
state law. The negative of a mitigating circumstance could sometimes be defined
as an aggravating one. But allocating burdens of production and persuasion in
response to state law definitions did not seriously trouble the Court in Patterson.
See 432 U.S. at 210-11; id. 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). Mitigating circumstances
can therefore be viewed as no different from the "extreme emotional disturbance"
defense in Patterson. Placing the burdens of production and persuasion on the
defendant would then be constitutionally permissible. Indeed, because the existence
of mitigating facts will not (except in Connecticut and, for some mitigating facts,
Colorado) assure a sentence less than death, if an aggravating circumstance is
present, the defendant's interest in the burdens of production and persuasion with
regard to mitigating ones can be seen as less acute than was the defendant's interest
in Patterson, where the existence of "extreme emotional disturbance" necessarily
reduced the crime from murder to manslaughter. 432 U.S. at 198-99.
On the other hand, it can be argued that because we are dealing with the
death sentence, a strict Patterson analysis is inappropriate. Whatever the state's
power where the consequence of a factual determination is measured in length of
prison term and degree of culpability, when a possible consequence is death, the
deference Patterson was willing to give legislative definitions might arguably yield
to the risk-allocation constraints recognized in Lockett. Because burdens of proof
and persuasion reflect tolerance for risk of error, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
423 (1979), and because, according to Lockett, risk of error takes on different
proportions in death cases, 438 U.S. at 605, Patterson may not control this in-
quiry. Cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (vacating death sen-
tence where trial judge may have relied on secret information in presentence report
in overruling jury's recommendation of life sentence) (Court emphasizes that it is
dealing vith "capital sentencing"); Note, Gardner v. Florida: The Application of
Due Process to Sentencing Procedures, 63 VA. L. l~v. 1281 (1977) (discussing
Gardner's implications for sentencing generally).
The "risk" in Lockett was that the sentencer might have given a lesser sen-
tence had it been allowed to consider information excluded by state law. Exclusion
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Except for my footnote discussion of item (f), I concentrate on the
first five and their relation to the proscription against arbitrariness.
I turn first to Lockett. Its holding bears not only on the informa-
tion the sentencer may consider in choosing the penalty (item (a)),
but also on the sentencer's power to determine the weight the
information will receive (item (b)). I then discuss whether a jury
is required for sentencing unless waived (item (c)), 101 who may sit
on the sentencing jury (item (d)),10 2 and whether the Constitution
requires a unanimous verdict for execution or, if less, how much
less (item (e)).
103
The scheme of much of the balance of my argument, then, is
in part II to examine the proper allocation of power between legis-
lature and sentencer in making the decision about who deserves
execution; in part III to consider the permissible balance of
power between the two possible sentencers, judge and jury; and,
in part IV, assuming the sentencer is a jury, to determine who may
sit on it and how many may control it.
of the information made the sentence constitutionally unreliable. 438 U.S. at 605
(plurality opinion). See text accompanying notes 144-66 & 279-88 infra. In death
cases, the risks that burdens of production and persuasion adjust may be more
critical to questions of "reliability" than the risk identified in Lockett. They will
influence whether the factfinder credits a mitigating circumstance which Lockett
tells us the Constitution itself (and often state law as well) gives the defendant
the right to raise. 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion). "[A] standard of proof
represents an attempt to instruct the factflnder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Har-
lan, J., concurring). The "choice of . . . standard . . . should . . . reflect an
assessment of the comparative social disutility," id. 371, of, in the language of
Lockett, imposing the death penalty "in spite of factors which may call for a less
severe penalty." 438 U.S. at 605. I should think that "social disutility" rather
large and that Lockett and Woodson so hold. Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct.
1585 (1980) (holding prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, which did not
result in incarceration, not sufficiently reliable to serve as predicate for enhanced
sentence following subsequent misdemeanor conviction).
Compare Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in
the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979), suggesting that the problem in
Mullaney and Patterson be resolved by recognizing the "existence of constitutional
,constraints on the substantive criminal law," id. 1366, and then requiring that the
state prove beyond a reasonable doubt "facts sufficient to justify penalties of the
sort contemplated." Id. 1365. "In other words," say the authors, "Winship should
be read to assert a constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
-f a constitutionally adequate basis for imposing the punishment authorized." Id.
1365. Interestingly, the authors draw support for their proposal from recent con-
structions of the eighth amendment. Id. 1368-69. The suggestion I make, not
unrelated, is that although the states have not made the absence of a mitigating
factor something that must be proved or presumed in order to inflict death, the
Constitution has imposed the requirement that mitigating circumstances be con-
sidered. Since the Constitution does this to avoid "risk" of error, burdens of per-
suasion, which also deal with risk of error, should amplify, not mute, the consti-
tutional interest.
101 See all of part III infra.
102 See text accompanying notes 345-418 & 446-52 infra.
103 See text accompanying notes 419-45 infra.
[Vol 129:1
DECIDING WHO DIES
II. DECIDING WHO DIEs: LEGISLATURE OR SENTENCER
A. The Definition Stage
My first inquiry concerns the respective power of legislature
and sentencer in establishing substantive criteria for identifying
who dies. The state must decide who may die before a sentencer
decides who will. This is the definition stage, and I wish to dis-
tinguish it from what I hereafter call the selection stage. The
state may eschew capital punishment. If it does not, the eighth
amendment limits the criminal acts for which death may be im-
posed.1 14 From among those crimes, the state has room to select
the acts, singly or combined, punishable by death. The state's
choice is, however, controlled in a second way. It may not define
the culpable acts with words that produce arbitrary results. 05 At
the definition stage, the idea of arbitrariness seems recently to have
metamorphosed. The Court has not expressly held that murder
unaccompanied by aggravating circumstances may not be a capital
offense.' -0 6 It has not required aggravating circumstances. It has
not tested simple homicide against the eighth amendment's sub-
stantive standards, as it has adult rape. Yet its insistence, in God-
frey v. Georgia 07 on definitions that obviate arbitrary results seems
indirectly to yield what the Court has not explicitly held: in order
to punish murder with execution the murder must be accompanied
by aggravating factors clearly stated; and whether the evidence and
the aggravating factors sufficiently distinguish one murder from
another, so that an execution will not be arbitrary, is a federal
question. 0 8
104 See note 2 supra.
105 Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). See note 35 supra and notes 108 & 117 infra. This prohibition also
purports to operate at the selection stage and will be discussed with it. See text
accompanying notes 116-43 infra.
106 At least one prescient--or premature-commentator assumed, in 1978, that
"murder unaccompanied by aggravating circumstances" may no longer be capitally
punished. Comment, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the Death
Penalty for Rape, 78 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1714, 1720 n.34 (1978). Cf. Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 626 (1978) (White, J., concurring and dissenting) (execution
is cruel and unusual where there was not specific intent by "non-triggerman" to
cause death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 n.39 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (fact that death penalty for murder not cruel and unusual does not mean
that it is "appropriate punishment for any or every murderer regardless of" mitigat-
ing circumstances). See note 108 infra & accompanying text.
1071(0 S. Ct. 1759 (1980).
308 1n Godfrey, the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld the death sentence of
a distraught man who, in the presence of his 12-year-old daughter, murdered his
estranged wife and her mother, each with one shot from a .20 gauge shotgun,
killing them instantly, then called the police and surrendered. 100 S. Ct. at 1763.
The trial jury found, as an aggravating circumstance, that the "offense of murder
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman." Id. 1764. The Geor-
1980]
24 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Although execution for simple murder has not been found
cruel and unusual punishment, procedural invalidation may never-
gia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the aggravating circum-
stance was unconstitutionally vague. Id. 1764. Earlier, in Gregg, the United
States Supreme Court had specifically considered a challenge to this aggravating
circumstance on the ground that it was "so broad that capital punishment could
be imposed in any murder case." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976)
(footnote omitted). The plurality recognized that this was true, but concluded
that "this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason
to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended con-
struction." Id. Four years later, in reversing the death sentence in Godfrey, a
plurality of the Court cited the failure to provide the petitioner's jury with stand-
ards that would channel the exercise of its discretion. 100 S. Ct. at 1765. Al-
though the Georgia death law authorized the state supreme court independently to
assess the evidence to assure that it supported the aggravating circumstance which
the jury found, here that was not done. Id. 1765-67. Rather, "the State Supreme
Court simply asserted that the verdict was 'factually substantiated."' Id. 1767.
Notably, the plurality then went on to say that Godfrey's "crimes cannot be
said to have reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any
person guilty of murder. . . . There is no principled way to distinguish this case,
in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not."
Id. 1767. Cf. Proffltt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 245, 255-56 (1976) (plurality
affirmed the finding that the knife-killing of one person in the course of a burglary
was sufficiently different from other murders to fall within Florida's aggravating cir-
cumstance that a crime be "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1980)). The Godfrey plurality reversed the de-
fendant's death sentence; it did not simply send the case back for the Georgia
Supreme Court to decide whether the evidence supported the aggravating circum-
stance or to allow resentencing by a properly instructed jury. As a matter of
federal constitutional law, it seems, Godfrey's murders could not be capitally pun-
ished under the particular aggravating circumstance invoked without being arbi-
trary. Godfrey's case was no different from the "many cases" in which a death
sentence was not imposed. 100 S. Ct. at 1767.
This reasoning, in a low visibility fashion, leads to a rather dramatic result.
It is that execution is no longer a constitutional penalty for unaggravated murder,
not because it is a cruel and unusual punishment for that crime, as for rape, but
because it cannot be imposed without accepting a degree of arbitrariness Furman
found intolerable. A second inevitable consequence of the reversal of Godfrey's
sentence is that the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts can now expect
to be asked to review death sentences to determine whether the facts on which they
rest are so similar to the facts in the "many cases" in which death is not imposed
that the result is arbitrary within the meaning of Furman and Gregg. The dis-
senters were not pleased with this prospect. Id. 1772-73 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. 1779 n.6 (White, J., dissenting). The task will not be made easier by Lockett's
introduction, at the selection stage of capital sentencing, of the idea of uniqueness.
Godfrey is arguably vague. It could be said that the case stands for the
proposition that the Georgia Supreme Court's failure adequately to define the
aggravating circumstance resulted in disparity between the defendant's sentence and
indistinguishable other cases in Georgia. In this view, the vice was merely the
lack of consistency within the state. But I do not believe a fair reading of the
Godfrey decision will allow this interpretation. The plurality discussed the facts
of no state cases, comparable or otherwise, in which the defendant was not sen-
tenced to death. Moreover, the Godfrey plurality stressed that the defendant's
consciousness was not more depraved than that of "any person guilty of murder,"
100 S. Ct. at 1767 (emphasis added), and that his case was no different from the
"many cases in which a death sentence was not imposed." Id. There was no
hint that the comparison was solely to other persons and cases in the State of
Georgia. Finally, the Georgia Supreme Court had evolved a limiting definition of
the "heinous and cruel" aggravating circumstance, which the Supreme Court seemed
to approve. Id. 1766-67 (White, J., dissenting).
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theless be a defensible response to the disparities the Furman v.
Georgia plurality saw in then current capital sentencing patterns."1 9
Having detected the existence of intolerable arbitrariness when all
or most murders were potentially capital, it was reasonable for the
Court to require legislators to inform sentencers which defendants
were rightly eligible for a death sentence and which were not. The
result was to reduce the number of those whom the sentencer would
consider for execution and to increase the chance that members of
this smaller group were alike. This is certainly a way to reduce
the number of people subject to arbitrariness, but just as certainly,
not a way to eliminate it.11 Elimination has been seen to be
impossible. l
I do not pursue much further the utility of arbitrariness as a
tool to hone the definition of capital crimes. Perhaps there is little
more that can be said about it in any event. Its position is assured.
It is the basis for decision in Furman and Godfrey, two cases strad-
dling modern capital punishment litigation. Arbitrariness mainly
operates at the definition stage of capital punishment law, but after
Lockett v. Ohio, it plays a minor role at the selection stage.1 2 My
focus is the selection stage: how do we choose those who will die
from among those who may. I accept the definition of "those who
may" as a given: a group whose members are determined by legis-
lative policy, substantive eighth amendment rules, and Furman-
109 See note 35 supra and note 117 infra.
110 See text accompanying notes 118-24 infra.
Il' See notes 118 & 125-43 infra & accompanying texts. Mandatory death laws,
-vhich theoretically should also eliminate disparity, though in a different way, were
found unsuccessful in practice. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303 (1976).
312 See text accompanying notes 130-43 infra. The death sentences in several
post-Godfrey cases have, on remand, been upheld on the ground that the jury in
those cases had found a second aggravating circumstance, in addition to the one
Godfrey questioned. Westbrook v. Balcom, 49 U.S.L.W. 3371, n.* (U.S. Nov. 17,
1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has recently denied review
in yet other post-Godfrey cases, which also contained at least two aggravating
circumstances. Id. If the Georgia Supreme Court may on remand uphold a death
sentence because the jury found an alternative aggravating circumstance, there is an
implication of no right to jury sentence in capital cases. Otherwise, the case would
have had to have been remanded for resentence so a jury could decide whether,
with only the one remaining aggravating circumstance, it still wished to impose a
capital penalty. The fact that the state supreme court, and not a jury, could
conclude that the alternative aggravating circumstance alone called for a death
sentence implies that there is no constitutional right to a jury decision. Cf. Martin
v. Louisiana, 49 U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(implying that invalidation requires jury resentence, citing Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931)). See also note 22 supra. Of course, a denial of certiorari
has no precedential value. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919
(1950) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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Godfrey arbitrariness limitations with final Supreme Court review
for disparity.
Once a legislature has defined a group of capital defendants in
a manner that avoids arbitrariness at the level Furman and Godfrey
found impermissible, it may affect the identity and number of those
selected for death in ways listed earlier.113  Two of these-control-
ling the information the sentencer receives and telling the sentencer
how to treat the information it hears-would, if permitted, enable
lawmakers to impose their values on the selection decision. I will
argue that the legislature may not use either method to influence
the sentencer. 114 Once the group of potential capital defendants is
appropriately defined, standards for selecting who will die are the
sentencer's, not the legislature's. In making this argument, I am
concerned only with those legislative controls that have the effect of
increasing the probability of a death sentence. I am not concerned
with legislative controls that increase the probability of a sentence
of imprisonment."1
B. The Selection Stage
1. Furman and Lockett: Arbitrariness and Uniqueness
Furman's arbitrariness analysis did not remain the central focus
in capital sentencing decisions. "Arbitrary" in this context means
113 See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
114 See text accompanying notes 125-66 infra.
15 Legislative controls that increase the probability of a death sentence may
do so in several ways. For example, they may prevent the sentencer from hearing
classes of evidence inviting mercy. Or they may instruct the sentencer to vote
death if particular facts are or are not found. Legislative controls that increase the
probability of a sentence of imprisonment may also do so in several ways. For
example, they may keep the sentencer from hearing certain types of negative in-
formation. Or they may instruct that the sentence must be imprisonment if the
sentencer finds particular mitigating facts present. Examples of legislative controls
that increase the probability of a sentence of imprisonment can be found in cur-
rent state law. As Appendix I, infra, shows, many states do not permit the prose-
cutor to introduce evidence of aggravating circumstances not statutorily defined.
Connecticut precludes death if any mitigating circumstances are present. Colorado
does so if certain ones are present. I do not see that the eighth amendment for-
bids this type of control, except possibly in extreme cases where the result of its
operation creates unacceptable disparity between those spared and those condemned.
There is another variation on capital sentencing statutes. A legislature may
attempt to advise or guide the sentencer by pointing out those aggravating cir-
cumstances it considers most deserving of reprobation or those mitigating circum-
stances it considers most deserving of mercy. In this manner, the sentencer is free
to do as it wishes, but it has the legislative suggestion. I see no problem with
legislative guides favoring mercy for the same reason that similar commands are
acceptable. But what of legislative advisories favoring death? No state now en-
visions these. They may be viewed in two ways. Under one approach, they would
be permissible if the sentencer were informed, in a manner it could appreciate, that
it was free to disregard the advisory and choose as it wished. Alternatively, given
Lockett's emphasis on risk avoidance, it could be argued that any such legislative
interference, even if nonbinding, would be unacceptable.
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there are capital defendants whose circumstances are considered
sufficiently comparable that no rational' 16 principle can support a
decision to execute some and not the others. Justices Douglas,
Stewart and White separately expressed this notion in Furman."
17
But Gregg v. Georgia at once echoed and retreated from an "ar-
bitrariness" theory,"8 accepting as not arbitrary "0 statutes that
proposed to narrow the class of crimes for which death may be im-
posed to those crimes in which aggravating circumstances were also
present. This technique potentially reduces the number of persons
subject to arbitrary action simply by reducing the pool of capital
defendants. It may, in other words, reduce the extent of arbitrari-
1 See BLACi's LAw DIroNARY 96 (5th ed. 1979):
Means in an 'arbitrary' manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure;
without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of
things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment;
depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously; tyrannical;
despotic.... Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without
cause based upon the law... not governed by any fixed rules or standard.
This definition also fits the use of the word "arbitrary" in the related context of
the right to jury trial. "The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury
trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement quali-
fies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and must therefore be respected by the States." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968). Accord, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968) (right to
jury trial in contempt case to protect "against the arbitrary exercise of official
power"). See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 1767 (death sentence vacated
because there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death
penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not").
117 See note 35 supra. Justice White also argued that death sentences oc-
curred so "infrequently" that the "threat of execution is too attenuated to be of
substantial service to criminal justice." 408 U.S. at 313. Furman is a puzzlement.
Although Justices Douglas, Stewart and White express their concern about capital
punishment in terms of results of its administration (discriminatory, freakish, in-
distinguishable), see note 35 supra, none provides facts to support his argument.
Justice White comes closest in mentioning his experience of "10 years of almost
daily exposure to ...hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases
involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty." 408 U.S. at 313. One
may guess that these three Justices concluded that execution was being used ran-
domly, not consciously, not as a considered method of social control. States with
death statutes, some passed long ago, may have wanted to retain them or they may
simply have not wanted to repeal them. Luck, it may have appeared, as much or
more than policy and judgment, determined who died. Perhaps Furman was an
experiment: remove all death laws and see if they are re-enacted. If they were
not, or were by only a few states, there would be a basis to conclude that the death
penalty was no longer accepted by society's "evolving standards of decency." The
response to this volley, see note 6 supra, caused Justice Stewart to conclude (or
concede, depending on his original expectation) that "capital punishment ... has
not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people." Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 180-81 (plurality opinion).
118 Gregg said statutes must not present a "substantial risk" of arbitrariness,
accepted the inevitability of discretion, and insisted on avoidance of "wholly arbi-
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ness but not the fact of arbitrary results. Even within the reduced
group, some will die and some not, though their crimes and his-
tories will be as comparable as before; and since the class of capital
defendants is narrower, they will likely be even more comparable.- 20
Some states, while ostensibly limiting the class of crimes deserving
death, appended so many aggravating circumstances 121-any one of
which could make simple murder capital-that it strains the imagi-
nation to think of a homicide that does not contain an aggravating
circumstance. 1 2  To this extent, the pool was hardly limited at all,
and the result of Furman was mainly to increase the use of bifur-
cated procedures.1213 Furman also had the salutary effect, as the
Chief Justice predicted in dissent,124 of forcing states to reconsider
120 Compare Spinkelink v. Florida, 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 911 (1976), with Buckrem v. Florida, 355 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1978). I
suppose it can be said that Furman was concerned only with the number of capital
defendants subject to possible arbitrariness, rather than with the apparently irre-
concilable sentences given to any two capital defendants. The results in Gregg,
Proflitt, and lurek arguably support that conclusion because the statutes approved
there would narrow the pool of defendants subject to capital punishment, although
the potential for arbitrariness would be as great as before within the narrowed pool.
More likely the plurality Justices in Furman did not foresee the problem. See note
117 supra. Nothing in Furman suggests that the plurality's qualms were over the
large number of people subject to arbitrariness as opposed to arbitrariness itself.
Indeed, neither Furman nor any case since has expressly held that the death penalty
is unconstitutional for even simple murder. But notes 106-08 supra & accompanying
text suggest that the Court may have accomplished the same result indirectly. Even
in Lockett, a vicarious liability case, see note 39 supra, the Court did not hold that
the death penalty would have been constitutionally prohibited. The post-Furman
use of narrowing aggravating circumstances was a legislative response to, not an
explicit requirement of, that case. See note 86 supra. In addition, in some states
the list of supposedly narrowing aggravating circumstances includes nearly all homi-
cides one can think of. See note 121 infra. In Gregg, Georgia's law was found
to satisfy Furman not because it reduced the number of defendants subject to capi-
tal punishment, but because it supposedly "focus[ed]" and "channeled" the jury's
discretionary power, 428 U.S. at 206-07, which suggests that the Court was not
concerned with the size of the pool of potential capital defendants but was in search
of a method to reduce the similarities between those who are condemned and those
who are spared. This distinction may seem fine, but in fact it is the line between
substantive and procedural intervention. See notes 106-08 supra & accompanying
text.
121 For example, there are nine aggravating circumstances in Florida. Fr. .
STAT. Ar. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1980). Delaware lists 19 aggravating cir-
cumstances. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(e) (1979). Ten states have ten or
more aggravating circumstances. See Appendix I, infra.
122But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion), where the plurality said, apparently as a matter of federal law, that the de-
fendant's crime could not satisfy the state's aggravating circumstances there at issue.
The plurality "intimate[d] no view as to whether or not the petitioner might con-
stitutionally have received the same sentences on some other basis. Georgia does
not, as do some States, make multiple murders an aggravating circumstance, as
such." Id. 1767 n.15. See note 108 supra.
123 See note 4 supra. Furman saved the lives- of many current death row
inmates as well. See note 28 supra.
124408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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their death laws and define with more precision, as a matter of
legislative policy, whom they really believed deserving of death.
Perhaps recognizing that an "arbitrariness" theory is useful at
the fringes, but weaker at the core, Lockett shifted the inquiry from
the avoidance of arbitrariness to what may be considered its oppo-
site, the recognition of "uniqueness." It says that "[t]he Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 125 The opinion
makes a feeble effort to limit the right to introduce mitigating evi-
dence, but relevance is the only limit mentioned.1 26 The defendant
has a right to introduce all mitigating evidence because the death
sentence is "so profoundly different from all other penalties . .
that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases." 127
Introduction of mitigating evidence serves individualization because
it provides "a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence
is imposed" 128 and because it avoids the "risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty." 120
By resting on the "conclusion that an individualized decision
is essential in capital cases" 130 because of the "respect due the
uniqueness of the individual," Lockett makes an arbitrariness analy-
sis largely inapplicable to the selection stage of capital sentencing.13'
If two defendants who commit similar homicides receive different
sentences, it is not because the sentencing process is arbitrary, freak-
125 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). Lockett chal-
lenged her conviction and sentence. The Court voted unanimously to affirm the





130 438 U.S. at 605.
21 There is still the possibility that different juries or judges will treat the same
case differently. This is supposedly corrected by appellate review of sentences to
determine whether they are "disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases." 428 U.S. at 204. But such review can correct only at the extremes and,
as Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, only at the retributive end of the spectrum.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 319 (Rehuquist, J., dissenting). See also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204 n.56 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, given the notion
of "uniqueness" contained in Lockett, appellate review for unevenness is possible
only in stark cases of sentencer overreaction. Cf. note 108 supra (discussion of
Godfrey v. Georgia). The Godfrey plurality appears to have concluded that
execution of the petitioner, at least based on the aggravating circumstance at issue,
would be arbitrary under any capital sentencing system.
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ish or discriminatory, but because no two defendants-considering
"character, prior record [and] the circumstances of [the] offense" 132
-are the same. A "relevant mitigating factor" 133 therefore enables
a sentencer to decide against the death penalty for one of two de-
fendants, possibly even if it is the only difference between them. A
factor is "relevant" if it represents a rational consideration in choice
of penalty. Consequently, a decision based, in whole or in part, on
a "relevant factor" is by definition not arbitrary.
Whether a fact presents a rational basis on which to determine
penalty will depend on the degree of difference we are willing to
tolerate. Calling a fact relevant means that we accept it in part,
and possibly in whole,'" as the basis for a life or death decision; but
calling a decision arbitrary in this context means that the differences
between it and another decision cannot support a principled oppo-
site result. So long as death is a constitutional penalty, a right to
introduce broad categories of evidence inviting mercy will isolate
the diminishing few who do not have this evidence (or as much of
it) to offer. But it is not then logically possible to argue that the
members of this group have been treated in an arbitrary manner;
the differences between them and those receiving life sentences have
been established to be rational bases upon which the sentencer may
distinguish defendants.3 3 This is why Lockett, while acknowl-
edging the arbitrariness analyses of Furman and Gregg (insofar as
it relied on Furman), had to sidestep both.136
132 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion).
133 Id. 608.
134 Relevance of course does not mean that the relevant fact can alone support
the result. The Court may be willing to call the fact "relevant" for the purpose of
admission but not tolerate a difference in treatment based only on it. It is unlikely,
however, that two cases will ever be so close that only one "relevant mitigating fac-
tor" will distinguish them, or that if they are, that the question will reach the
Supreme Court. In any event, I believe that Lockett envisions that this may occur
and that at least some distinguishing facts can support a difference In result. See
text accompanying notes 135-36 infra.
135 Recourse to the broader argument-that no capital punishment system can
be nonarbitrarily administered-was rejected in Gregg. 428 U.S. at 199-206
(plurality opinion). Id. 226. (White, J., concurring).
136 It sidestepped part of Woodson, too. Lockett relied on the portion of the
Woodson plurality's argument that rejected mandatory death statutes because they
did not allow the defendant to introduce evidence of his "character and record . . .
and the circumstances of the particular offense...." 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). Lockett did not rely on another
part of Woodson that invalidated North Carolina's mandatory death law because'
of "its failure to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to Furman's rejection
of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences." 428 U.S. at
302. In Locket,'s choice of the first and not the second of these arguments there
is further evidence of Furman's limitation.
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Instead, Lockett offers the notion of "uniqueness," amplified
by an assemblage of nouns and adjectives accenting its theme. Its
choice of language, unlike Furman's and Gregg's, affirmatively em-
phasizes the differences between capital defendants. There are
references in Lockett to the "'selection of an appropriate sen-
tence,' "37 the need for a "greater degree of reliability when the
death sentence is imposed," 138 the importance of "an individualized
decision . . . in capital cases," 139 the conclusion that "individual-
ized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement in imposing the
death sentence," 140 and rejection of the "risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors [concerning the "defendant's
character and record and . . . circumstances of the offense"] which
may call for a less severe penalty." 141
This emphasis on the differences between people, their
"uniqueness," 142 when it comes to capital sentencing necessarily
denies legislatures power substantively to determine or to influence
who will be executed. Legislatures may still, of course, decide who
cannot be executed, and subject to eighth amendment limitations,1 43
who may be executed, but they no longer have power to tell the
sentencer how to decide who will be executed. That power, I will
now show, belongs entirely to the sentencer.
2. Lockett's Effect on Sentencing Standards
I earlier 144 suggested that absent mandatory death laws, sub-
stantive legislative control of capital sentencing can conceivably be
exercised in two ways. The first is to limit the information about
the defendant the sentencer may consider. For example, the legis-
lature may conclude that a person found guilty of homicide should
not receive mercy merely because he has no prior conviction. The
legislature, concluding the information is irrelevant, may deny it
to the sentencer. Lockett, however, gives the defendant the right
to inform the sentencer of the absence of prior convictions, or
of other facts "bearing on the defendant's character, prior record
137438 U.S. at 603 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
138 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The word "re-
liability" was earlier used in Woodson. 428 U.S. at 305.
139 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
14Old. (emphasis added).
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 ld.
143 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); notes 104-12 supra &
accompanying text.
144 See text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra.
1980]
32 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
or the circumstances of his offense," 145 so that the sentencer may
give them "independent mitigating weight." 146 The legislature
may no longer influence the sentencer's choice by restricting the
mitigating information that the sentencer hears.
A second, less direct way for a legislature to influence capital
sentencing decisions is to tell the sentencer how to treat the miti-
gating or aggravating information it does receive. Though the
legislature may not prevent the defendant from introducing rele-
vant mitigating factors, may the sentencer nevertheless be told what
weight to give each or some of these factors? Using my earlier
example, the sentencer may be permitted to hear that the defendant
has no prior conviction, but may it also be told that that fact,
standing alone, is not sufficient to justify mercy for homicides when
certain aggravating facts are present? Or the legislature may permit
the sentencer to hear and consider all constitutionally relevant
mitigating factors and even permit the sentencer to decide as it
chooses. But may it also say that, should no mitigating facts be
found, the sentence must be death if a legislatively defined aggra-
vating factor is present? 147 The last formula treats the existence
of an aggravating factor as conclusive. The sentencer is prevented
from independently assessing whether the degree of aggravation
justifies execution.
Textually, Lockett tells us that the Constitution prohibits "a
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's char-
acter and record and to circumstances of the offense." 148 The
Constitution does this because otherwise there is an "unacceptable"
"risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty." 149 The requirement
that the sentencer be able to give "independent . . . weight" to
the mitigating fact is inconsistent with the notion that the legis-
lature can tell the sentencer how to treat the mitigating fact.
Lockett's reasoning and facts support this textual argument.
The Ohio Supreme Court had attempted to save the state's death
statute by interpreting it to allow consideration of the very mitigat-
ing information Lockett raised, but only for the limited purpose of
145 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion).
146 Id. 605.
147 As Appendix I, infra, shows, many states have adopted this model. They
are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, fllionis, Indiana, Maryland,
Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.




helping to answer three statutorily defined questions.150 The Su-
preme Court151 rejected this effort because the sentencer's decision
was nevertheless channeled:
But even under the Ohio court's construction of the
statute, only the three factors specified in the statute can
be considered in mitigation of the defendant's sentence.
. . . We see, therefore, that once it is determined that
the victim did not induce or facilitate the offense, that the
defendant did not act under duress or coercion, and that
the offense was not primarily the product of the defend-
ant's mental deficiency, the Ohio statute mandates the
sentence of death. The absence of direct proof that the
defendant intended to cause the death of the victim is
relevant for mitigating purposes only if it is determined
that it sheds some light on one of the three statutory miti-
gating factors. Similarly, consideration of a defendant's
comparatively minor role in the offense, or age, would
generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing
decision. 52
In other words, a statute which permits the sentencer to consider
all mitigating factors, but then tells it how to treat the information,
is nothing more than a mandatory death law with some play, but
the play belongs to the legislature, not the sentencer. Lockett tells
us that under its theory of "uniqueness" this scheme is unconstitu-
tional. This reasoning, fatal to the Ohio death law, may doom the
capital statutes in fourteen other states, which require the sen-
tencer to vote death if it finds an aggravating but no mitigating
circumstance present. These statutes in effect tell the sentencer
150 Id. 607-08.
151 Justice Blackmun joined the four member plurality on this question to the
extent of requiring that the sentencer be entitled to consider "the degree of the
defendant's participation in the acts leading to the homicide and the character of
the defendant's mens Tea." 438 U.S. at 616.
152 438 U.S. at 508 (plurality opinion). This analysis seems fatal to the Texas
death penalty law approved only two years earlier in Jurek. That law, as Professor
Black has eloquently shown, permits consideration of only three questions, two of
which would likely have already been determined at trial and the third of which
requires a prediction about future violence. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272-73.
Although the state courts permit a broad range of mitigating information to be
admitted, it can be used only to "shed some light" on the prediction about future
violence. Id. C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISH ENT: TnE INEVITABILIT OF CAPMCE
AND MIST.KE 56-68 (1974). This channeling seems impermissible under Lockett.
Oregon's death law, which copies Texas', would seem to suffer from the same defect.
1979 Or. Laws ch. 2, § 3 (popular referendum amending OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.005-
.145). After Lockett, the Court had an opportunity to examine the effect of
Lockett on Jurek. Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980). See note 166 infra.
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what weight it must give to the aggravating circumstances, per-
mitting no independent evaluation of the degree of aggravation.158
Lockett's rejection of what it labels the "risk" of an uncalled-
for sentence :14 and its insistence on "a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed" 155 strengthen the conclusion
that it is the unfettered sentencer who decides whether a capital
defendant deserves execution. There could be no "risk" that a
capital defendant might be executed despite "factors which may
call for a less severe penalty" 156 if the legislature had power to
control the scope of sentencer consideration of those factors. The
very notion of risk presupposes the existence of the sentencer's
power to act upon the legislatively withheld information, or to
consider disclosed information but in a manner the legislature
forbids. There was risk in Lockett because the body that was found
to hold the constitutional power, the sentencer, might have acted
differently had it been free to use the mitigating information to
impose a penalty less severe than death.1 57
Lockett's use of the term "reliability" 158 to describe the sen-
tence is also instructive. An insistence on reliable capital sentenc-
ing influences the permissible allocation of power between legis-
lature and sentencer, whoever the sentencer may be.159 It is
reliability of the sentence, not facts,160 that is Lockett's concern.
15
3 The states are listed in note 147 supra. The correctness of this analysis is
supported by the construction of capital punishment statutes in Mississippi and
Nebraska. Unlike the 14 states listed in note 147 supra, these two states permit
the sentencer to choose a sentence less than death, even if there are aggravating
circumstances and no mitigating ones. But as their statutes read, the mitigating
circumstances they contain are the only ones that may be introduced to win the
sentencer's mercy. This is inconsistent with Lockett's constitutional test for deter-
mining the relevance of mitigating circumstances. The supreme court in each state
agrees and has interpreted its statute to comply with Lockett. Washington v. State,
361 So. 2d 61, 68 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 916 (1979); State v. Holtan,
287 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Neb. 1980).
14 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
155 Id. 604.
156 Id. 605.
157 The Lockett plurality did not say that execution would be cruel and un-
usual if the defendant was found to have had no intent to cause the victim's death.
The Ohio law was unconstitutional because it did not permit "individualized con-
sideration" of this and other factors. 438 U.S. at 606, 608.
18 Id. 604.
159 Compare Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980), invalidating a legis-
lative prohibition on lesser included offense charges in capital cases. The Court,
citing Lockett, emphasized the importance of reliability in guilt determination in
capital cases. Mandatory death statutes, perhaps the most intrusive way in which
a legislature may attempt to control the capital sentencing process, have also been
struck down on the ground that they encourage unreliability. Id. 2389 n.13; Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
160All penalty hearings in capital cases potentially involve proof of facts:
usually aggravating ones and always mitigating ones. The former are recognized
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Lockett makes a death sentence reliable in the constitutional sense
if it is the product of a judgment informed by knowledge of miti-
gating facts. Judgment without this knowledge is not reliable be-
cause the sentencer has no chance to consider the "uniqueness of
the individual." 161 Conversely, knowledge without power to
make a judgment is meaningless. A body must consider the infor-
mation and come to a conclusion. A body must decide if circum-
stances "call for" a death sentence. Legislatures are not institution-
ally able to assure reliability at the selection stage of capital
sentencing systems because they cannot anticipate the myriad factors
that make people and crimes unique. They cannot "individualize"
in advance. If the sentencer's discretion is "directed and limited" 162
beyond the definition stage, we are not going to have the "greater
degree of reliability" Lockett now tells us is needed in death sen-
tencing. Categorization, the instrument of channeling, compromises
"individualization," the touchstone of "greater . . . reliability." 163
Consequently, the Furman-Gregg preference for channeling is
limited to the definition stage.'6
by all state laws for most capital crimes. See also note 108 supra. The latter are,
under Lockett, recognized by the Constitution. This factfinding may entail sepa-
rate constitutional protections, see note 320 infra, but it was not these to which the
Lockett plurality referred when it emphasized "reliability." Aside from rejected
challenges to the conviction, the opinion's concern was with the sentencing choice.
161438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
1,2 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
113 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
164 After Lockett, Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), reversed
a death penalty where the defendant was not permitted to introduce testimony in
mitigation of sentence. Its introduction would have violated an otherwise valid
state hearsay rule. Id. 96. The court found the information relevant under Lockett
and ruled that the due process clause prohibited use of the evidentiary rule to
exclude it. Id. 97.
In Green, the defendant wanted to introduce the testimony of Pasby that
Moore had told Pasby that Green was not present when Moore committed the
crime. Pasby was permitted to so testify at Moore's separate trial because state
law allowed the introduction of a confession against the speaker. But state law
did not recognize Moore's exculpation of Green as falling within a "statement
against penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule. Cf. FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3)
(envisioning admission of exculpatory statements against interest under certain cir-
cumstances). Consequently, it was excluded at Green's sentencing hearing when
he offered it. Green, 442 U.S. at 96-97.
In relying on the due process clause to invalidate Green's sentence, the Court
cited Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 284, 301 (1973). Although the Court
stressed the "unique circumstances" involved, 442 U.S. at 97, Green gives the
Constitution special application to evidence rules in capital sentencing. Cf. Gard-
ner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (defendant must have opportunity to deny or
explain information relied on by judge giving capital sentence).
Once a capital pool is appropriately defined, what is left to direct and limit
the sentencer's discretion as Gregg seemed to require? 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality
opinion). Little or nothing. The Gregg plurality relied on three facets of Geor-
gia's law to distinguish Furman. The jury was first required to "find and identify
at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death."
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At the selection stage, the channel opens on a sea of reasons to
distinguish between offenders, as many as there are differences be-
tween people and between crimes. Coming full circle, we have
constitutionalized Justice Harlan's practical recognition in Mc-
Gautha that once the legislature properly decides which crimes
shall be capital, it is impossible to set down standards in advance
for deciding who among those convicted of these crimes shall die:
In our view, such force as this argument [for legisla-
tive standards] has derives largely from its generality.
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of
actually attempting to draft means of channeling capital
sentencing discretion have confirmed the lesson taught by
the history recounted above. To identify before the fact
those characteristics of criminal homicides and their per-
petrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly under-
stood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability.165
The wisdom of this view lies not only in its refusal to rely on
prescience and the ambiguity of language in a matter as serious as
execution. Channeling at the sentencing stage of capital trials might
initially appear to further consistency over randomness; this, in-
Id. 206. This supposedly "channeled" discretion. Id. But this is not true. Ag-
gravating factors, whether proved at the guilt or punishment stages of the trial,
reduce the power of the sentencer to impose death by limiting the pool of capital
defendants to those whose crimes are found to have one. They do not channel
discretion but rather permit or forbid its exercise. See notes 119-20 supra &
accompanying text.
Consideration of mitigating circumstances was another requirement of Georgia's
death law cited by Gregg. It was part of the "legislative guidelines" that "cir-
cumscribed" the jury. 428 U.S. at 207 (plurality opinion). This is no longer so.
The Constitution defines the scope of evidence in mitigation and does so broadly.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion). All relevant mitigating evi-
dence is admissible and the sentencer may give it any weight or none. This rule,
born of a recognition of the individual's "uniqueness," increases rather than chan-
nels discretion. Finally, the Gregg plurality was impressed with Georgia's provi-
sion for appellate review. 428 U.S. at 207. As I suggested earlier, see note 131
supra, appellate review can in the nature of things, and especially given Lockett's
emphasis on "individualization," correct only in extreme cases where mercy is
denied. See also Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo.
L.J. 97, 160 (1979) (concluding after a review of capital sentences in Georgia,
Florida and Texas that "the failure of appellate review reflects the impossibility of
the underlying task").
165 402 U.S. at 204. In Godfrey, Justice Marshall relied on Justice Harlan's
language to mean that arbitrariness could not be eliminated from capital sentencing.
Whereas this assumption led the McGautha Court to conclude that an effort at
elimination need not be attempted, Justice Marshall reads Furman as "properly
repudiat[ing]" this conclusion and establishing "that the arbitrary infliction of the




deed, was the view the pre-Lockett Court seems to have taken. But
the idea of randomness, or of arbitrariness or caprice, is useful, as I
have said, at the definition stage, when the state first states the char-
acteristics of capital defendants. These things we can decide in
advance. Channeling at the selection stage, however, is not benign,
but a harmful constraint, the willing acceptance of blinders to pre-
vent consideration of information we may have no reason to know
will turn up, and may wish to consider when it does. It is an
advance insistence on tunnel vision, indefensible when the decision
to which it leads is grave and irreversible.266
166 Although the Ohio death law had been interpreted to permit introduction
of all mitigating evidence the defendant might wish to offer, Lockett, 438 U.S. at
608, it was nevertheless invalidated because the sentencer could consider the miti-
gating information only for the limited purpose of answering three factual questions.
Id. Lockett cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Texas statute, upheld only
two years earlier in Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). That statute also contained three
apparently factual questions which the sentencing jury was required to answer, id.
269 (plurality opinion), and as in Ohio, the answers conclusively determined
penalty. Id. The Jurek plurality, presaging the Lockett plurality, recognized that
this scheme seemed to "approach the mandatory laws that we today hold unconsti-
tutional in Woodson and Roberts v. Louisiana." Id. 271 (plurality opinion). In
summarizing the import of these two cases, the Jurek plurality said: "A jury must
be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death
sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed." Id. 271
(plurality opinion).
The Texas law survived because state precedent had construed the second of
its three penalty issues "so as to allow a defendant to bring to the jury's attention
whatever mitigating circumstances he may be able to show .... ." Id. 272 (plu-
rality opinion). The problem with the state precedent, however, is that the miti-
gating information could only be used to aid in answering the factual penalty issue,
id. 272-73 (plurality opinion), not as an independent basis for rejecting execution.
This was precisely the vice that would, two years later, cause the Ohio law to be
seen as "mandat[ing] the sentence of death," 438 U.S. at 608. How then did the
Lockett plurality treat Jurek?
Lockett appeared to reinterpret Jurek to give the Texas sentencer greater power
than either the state law or Jurek itself had suggested it had. The Texas statute
was upheld, said the Lockett plurality, "because three Justices concluded that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted the second question-
despite its facial narrowness-to permit the sentencer to consider 'whatever miti-
gating circumstances' the defendant might be able to show." 438 U.S. at 607. The
plurality then concluded that the Texas statute did not "prevent the sentencer from
considering any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances
of his offense as an independently mitigating factor." Id. (emphasis added).
There the matter rested for two years more. In Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct.
2521 (1980), the Court had a new opportunity to consider the effect of Lockett on
Jurek. Texas law disqualified prospective jurors who could not state under "oath
that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not 'affect
[their] deliberations on any issue of fact."' Id. 2523. Adams argued that the ex-
clusion of jurors under this law violated his rights, under Witherspoon v. Illinois,
not to have jurors excluded simply because they had scruples against the death
penalty. Id. 2525. The Court certified two questions: Did Witherspoon apply to
bifurcated capital punishment trials? It did. Id. 2526. Did the exclusion of
jurors under the Texas law violate Witherspoon here? This question requires a
fuller answer.
Witherspoon, it will be recalled, prohibited exclusion of scrupled jurors from
a panel with discretion to decide sentence. 391 U.S. at 521-23. If Texas law
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were read narrowly, so that the jury's sole role was to answer the three factual
questions in the state statute, Witherspoon would seem inapplicable. See 100
S. Ct. at 2530-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But if Witherspoon were inapplicable
because the sentencer had only this limited task, the Texas law would for the same
reason offend Lockett. 638 U.S. at 608. On the other hand, if Witherspoon did
apply to the Texas procedure, it would be because the jurors in Texas had power
to go beyond the three factual questions and decide, as Lockett required, that the
evidence did or did not "call for a less severe penalty" than death. Id. 605. So,
in deciding whether Witherspoon had been violated at Adams' trial, the Supreme
Court had to have an understanding about the role of the sentencing jury in Texas.
The Adams court read the precedent as establishing that "Texas juries must
be allowed to consider 'on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death
sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed."' 100 S. Ct.
at 2527 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271). This assertion is the strongest
indication in a vague opinion that the Supreme Court reads the Texas law to permit
the sentencing jury to consider, either aside from or as part of the three statutory
questions, whether the defendant deserves death ("should" die). See also the
equivocal sentence: "[Jiurors under the Texas bifurcated procedure unavoidably
exercise a range of judgment and discretion while remaining true to their instruc-
tions and their oaths," id.; note 378 infra; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607. I have
argued in this footnote that this is a necessary construction of the Texas law if it
is to escape the fate of the Ohio statute. See also note 213 infra.
The problem is that the Texas courts may not view their own statute the way
the Supreme Court seems to. The Supreme Court's basis for its reading is the
quotation from Jurek cited above. But that quotation refers to the power the Con-
stitution requires be given to sentencing juries generally, not to the power that
Texas, by construction of its statute, has in fact given to its jury. There is no
authority cited in support of such a state court construction. On the contrary,
immediately after the quoted language, the Jurek plurality cited state precedent
which, as shown above, construed state law substantially more narrowly than the
construction Adams now seems to suggest. The Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing
that Lockett will not tolerate the interpretation of Texas law it earlier, if am-
biguously, upheld in Jurek, is apparently nudging the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals to permit a more active role for the sentencing jury. The Texas court
has yet to take the hint. It seems, despite Lockett, to insist that the jury con-
siders mitigating information, not in deciding whether the defendant "should" live
or die, but only in answering the statutorily defined questions. Quinones v. State,
592 S.W.2d 933, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3251
(U.S. Oct. 6, 1980); Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979), rev'd, 100 U.S. 519 (1980) ("Although the death penalty in Texas is
mandatory upon the return of affirmative answers to the three punishment issues
.. .in answering the punishment issues the jury must consider all the relevant
evidence concerning the particular offense and the individual defendant offered by
the State or by the accused"). Professor Dix, in an article written before the Court
agreed to review Adams, recognized the same apparent division in the interpretation
of the Texas law. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68
GEo. L.J. 97, 142-43, 150-51 (1979).
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Adams, also considered the role of the Texas
jury: "It is hard to imagine a system of capital sentencing that leaves less discre-
tion in the hands of the jury while at the same time allowing them [sic] to con-
sider the particular circumstances of each case-that is, to perform their assigned
task at all." 100 S. Ct. at 2530. Justice Rehnquist did not stress the jury's limited
discretion as a prelude to dicussion of a conflict with Lockett. He accepted the
validity of the limitation. He criticized the Court for holding that Witherspoon
applied to the selection of a jury whose penalty discretion was restricted to factfind-
ing, whereas Witherspoon itself concerned a jury with "complete and unbridled"
penalty discretion. Id. If Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the Adams holding
is correct, it means the Court did not address the inconsistency between Jurek and
Lockett. While one can pick out sentences in Adams supporting Justice Rehn-
quests interpretation of its holding, one can also find sentences opposing it. Solu-
tion to the conundrum awaits future cases.
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III. DECIDING WHO DiEs: JUDGE OR JURY
The preceding section stated the permissible limits to legisla-
tive control of sentencer discretion. I now make three arguments
that Lockett v. Ohio 187 and other decisions require that in death
cases the defendant who is convicted by a jury have a right to a
jury sentence, unless he waives one.
The first argument is from experience. Nearly all states have
accepted jury sentencing in death cases. 168 This has been true since
legislatures began to abandon mandatory death sentences in the
middle of the last century.1 69 In Woodson v. North Carolina,
170
Coker v. Georgia 371 and Beck v. Alabama,'7 2 the Court cited legis-
lative rejection of mandatory death laws, of laws permitting capital
punishment for rape, and of laws excluding lesser-included-offense
charges, respectively, in support of its conclusions that these laws
violate the eighth amendment. 73 If legislative decisions about who
dies (Coker), and about where-the legislature or the courtroom-
and how it is decided who dies (Woodson and Beck), guide us in
assessing eighth amendment requirements, so should legislative de-
cisions about who decides who dies.174
Second, penalty determination is likely to include three tasks.
The sentencer will nearly always 175 have to decide whether an al-
leged aggravating circumstance is present as a predicate for a death
sentence. The sentencer will next have to decide whether to credit
mitigating evidence.176 State law requires establishment of the
first; 177 the Constitution grants the right to introduce the second.178
After the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating facts is
167438 U.S. 586 (1978).
168 See text accompanying note 77 supra and note 203 infra.
169 See text accompanying note 203 infra.
170 428 U.S. 280, 291-95 (1976).
171433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977).
172100 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1980).
173 But see text accompanying notes 322-44 infra, revealing that the Court is
willing to look beyond legislative enactments to the behavior of juries.
174 See text accompanying notes 186-207 infra.
175 1 say "nearly always" because an occasional law will define narrow offenses
that do not require additional aggravating circumstances before the jury may, after
hearing facts in mitigation, impose death. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2534.1(a)
(1978) (no aggravating circumstance needed to impose death for aircraft hijacking
or treason).
178 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604-05 (plurality opinion).
177 The Constitution does not require the use of aggravating circumstances so
long as the underlying crime is one for which the death penalty is not cruel and
unusual. See note 86 supra. But see text accompanying notes 106-111 supra,
suggesting that the Constitution may sometimes require aggravating circumstances.
178 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05 (plurality opinion).
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resolved, the sentencer will then have the constitutional obligation,
under Lockett, of "independent[ly]" weighing those accepted as true
and deciding if the defendant lives or dies.179 The first two assess-
ments involve factual determinations, the third does not. The
third, I will argue, in turn encompasses two inquiries:
* Is it the "community's belief that [the crime is] so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate re-
sponse may be the penalty of death?" 180
* If so, are there nevertheless "aspects of the defendant's
character and record . . which may call for a less severe
penalty?" 181
I argue that the answers to these questions, dependent as they are
on the "conscience of the community," require that a jury give
them.
1 82
Finally, the pattern of jury response is part of the definition of
"cruel and unusual punishments" as applied to the death penalty.
There is no effective way other than through juries of knowing the
179 See text accompanying notes 148-53 supra. Of course, if no aggravating
circumstance is found, state law itself may preclude death. See Appendix I, infra.
Connecticut is unique among states in precluding death sentence if any mitigating
circumstances, statutorily defined or not, are found to be present. Colorado pre-
cludes death if certain statutory mitigating circumstances are found. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §53a-46a(e) (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)
(1973 & Supp. 1979).
180 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also
the statement by Chief Justice Burger in Furman that the jury, as the "'conscience
of the community,'" is "entrusted to determine in individual cases that the ultimate
punishment is warranted." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
Both the plurality in Gregg and Chief Justice Burger in Furman were writing in
cases involving jury sentencing. Neither was considering whether juries must sen-
tence in death cases. I do not suggest, by quoting their words "community's be-
lief" and "conscience of the community," that they intended to say that only a
jury may express these. But since a total of seven Justices concurred in both
opinions, it is fair to say that a majority of the Court has concluded that the role
of the sentencer, whoever it is, is to bring the "community" view to the penalty
determination. This is further explored at text accompanying notes 279-91 infra.
181 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion). Compare the following quote
from the plurality opinion in Woodson:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of
death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as mem-
bers of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind in-
fliction of the penalty of death.
428 U.S. at 304.
182 See text following note 296 infra. I further argue that the sixth amendment
guarantees a jury trial on the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances,
when these are contested. See note 320 infra.
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status of the "evolving standards of decency" on the acceptability
of the death penalty as a punishment.
1 3
Explicitly or implicitly, these three arguments will in turn rely
on two assumptions, both of which will be discussed. The first
assumption is that death sentences are not the same as other sen-
tences, summed up in the statement "death is different." s14 The
second assumption is that there is a difference between capital
sentencing by judges and capital sentencing by juriesls5
A. The Argument from Experience
My arguments overlap. My first argument is that legislative
response to the question of who shall decide who dies is one source
to which we must look in considering whether the jury is constitu-
tionally required. The Justices have done this-as a primary re-
sponse-in answers to other death penalty questions. For example,
in considering whether the death penalty may ever be imposed, the
Gregg v. Georgia plurality looked to legislative enactments since
Furman.8 6 These were said to be "[t]he most marked indication
of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder." 187 In
considering whether the death penalty may be imposed mandatorily
for classes of crimes, the plurality in Woodson emphasized that the
"history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States
... reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons con-
183 See text accompanying notes 320-21 infra.
184 [Flive Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death
is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed
in this country.. . . From the point of view of the defendant, it is dif-
ferent in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of
society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens
also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1138 (1980), where
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said:
This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of Eighth-
Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and time again in our opin-
ions . . . . [citation omitted]. Because a sentence of death differs in
kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our decisions
applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punish-
ment meted out to Rummel.
Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. at 2389 ("there is a significant constitutional differ-
ence between the death penalty and lesser punishments").
185 See text accompanying notes 297-319 infra.
186 428 U.S. at 179-80 (plurality opinion).
187 Id. 179. Four other justices (Burger, C.J., White, Blackmun, & Rehn-
quist, JJ.), concurring in the conclusion that the death penalty was not cruel and
unusual, also relied on the "profound developments" of the legislative response to
Furman. Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325, 353 (1976).
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victed of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and
unworkably rigid." 188 The plurality canvassed American jurisdic-
tions and concluded that by 1963 "all of these ...had replaced
their automatic death penalty statutes with discretionary jury sen-
tencing." 189 "[L]egislative measures adopted by the people's
chosen representatives weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary
standards of decency," 10 the plurality said.
In Coker, the plurality again stressed that "post-Furman legis-
lative reaction in a large majority of the States . . . heavily in-
fluenced the [Gregg] Court to sustain the death penalty for
murder." 191 The Coker plurality then reviewed the history and
status of the use of capital punishment for rape of an adult woman,
found Georgia to be the only jurisdiction authorizing it, and said
that this pattern "obviously weighs very heavily on the side of re-
jecting capital punishment" 192 as a "disproportionate penalty for
[this crime]." 193 Three years later, in Beck v. Alabama, the issue
was whether Alabama's refusal to allow capital juries to consider
lesser included offenses violated the eighth amendment.194 In hold-
ing that it did, the Court stressed that "Alabama's failure to afford
capital defendants the protection provided by lesser included offense
instructions is unique in American criminal law." 195 Various
Justices, in separate opinions, have examined and relied upon legis-
lative action in assessing eighth amendment demands. 196 Every
Justice has now advanced this view or joined in opinions doing so.197
Each of the above cases assessed legislative activity before
answering the question presented, but in each case the question
' 88 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 292-93.
189 Id. 291-92.
190 Id. 294-95.
'91 433 U.S. at 594. See also Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142 n.22
(1980).
192 433 U.S. at 596.
193 Id. 597. In Coker, four Justices joined in a plurality opinion by Justice
White. Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting, agreed with the "reasoning" of
the plurality in support of its holding that death is a disproportionate penalty for
unaggravated rape of an adult woman. He dissented because he was not prepared
to say, as he concluded the plurality did, that death would be disproportionate
even for "aggravated rape." 433 U.S. at 603.
194 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980).
195 Id. 2388. The Beck Court also noted federal and state court unanimity
in requiring jury instructions on lesser included offenses. Id.
196 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 436-38 (Powell, J., dissenting) (legislative
enactments are "the first indicator of the public's attitude"); id. 385 (Burger, C.J.,
Powell, Blackmun, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (no "indicia of contemporary
attitude ...more trustworthy [than legislative enactment] has been advanced");
id. 277-79 (Brennan, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197 See notes 186-96 supra.
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differed. In Gregg, it was whether capital punishment is constitu-
tional for murder.198 In Coker, it was whether the death penalty-
even if constitutional-is disproportionate for adult rape.1' In
Woodson, it was the legitimacy of the manner of determining who
dies.&2 In Beck, it was the tolerance for risk of error in the deter-
mination of guilt of a capital offense.20' Beck and Woodson are
different from Gregg and Coker. They deal not with the permis-
sibility of a particular punishment or of that punishment for a
particular crime, but with a method of identifying those eligible to
receive the punishment and then of selecting those who will.
In Woodson and in the two Roberts v. Louisiana cases,2 02 the
North Carolina and Louisiana legislatures had decided that indi-
viduals convicted of the defined crimes should be executed regard-
less of mitigating facts. It may seem inaccurate to say these laws
provided a method of selecting those to be executed, since they
"selected" everyone convicted of the defined crimes. They never-
theless represented a method of selection in two senses: they gave
the final power of selection to the legislature instead of a jury or
judge; and they selected certain homicides as deserving capital
punishment and rejected others that did not.
Woodson's conclusion that greater individualization was re-
quired in the manner of selection led to a change of sentencing
forum. The courtroom, not the legislative chamber, is the place
individualization can occur. The issue of jury or judge sentencing,
then, simply encounters the selection process one step further along
the way. Once the sentencing decision is moved from legislature
to courtroom, we must ask: Who will sentence in the courtroom?
This question, like the one in Woodson, also concerns the process
for selecting who will be executed and, as in Woodson, can be in-
formed by contemporary community standards reflected in legis-
lative activity. State legislatures have nearly unanimously chosen
jury sentencing as each abandoned the mandatory death penalty.203
Only after Furman v. Georgia did eight states opt for judge sen-
tencing.2°4 Notably, it was also after Furman that ten states adopted
198 428 U.S. at 168 et seq. The issue was also posed as the constitutionality
of the death penalty for any crime. Id. 187.
199 433 U.S. at 592.
200 428 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion).
201 100 S. Ct. at 2389.
2 02 Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Roberts I, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
203 See notes 68 & 77 supra. 428 U.S. at 295 n.30.
204 See note 79 supra.
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mandatory death laws.205  The Woodson plurality did not consider
this development an indication of contemporary standards, attribut-
ing it instead to an erroneous assumption by those states that
mandatory death laws were the only way to comply with Furman's
"multi-opinioned decision." 206 The enactment of judge sentencing
after Furman should be viewed the same way, especially since all
eight states choosing it had for decades used juries in sentencing
capital defendants.
20 7
I do not mean to load more weight on legislative behavior
than this indicator can support. It comes to this: in other cases,
the Court has heavily emphasized legislative patterns to aid it in
interpreting the eighth amendment; it has done this not only where
the question was the legitimacy of the penalty, but also the legiti-
macy of the process of identifying those on whom the penalty could
be imposed and selecting those on whom it would be imposed; the
legislative response is remarkably strong and consistent in favor of
having the jury decide sentence.
B. The Argument from Reason
After mandatory death sentencing was abandoned beginning in
the middle of the last century, lawmakers chose juries rather than
judges to make sentencing decisions in capital cases.208 I have
2 05 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206 428 U.S. at 299 (plurality opinion).
207Each of the states adopted jury discretion statutes in the year indicated:
Alabama (1841); Arizona (1885); Florida (1872); Idaho (1911); Indiana (1881);
Montana (1907); Nebraska (1893); Oregon (1920). W. BOWERs, EXEUTNo IN
AMERICA 8 (1974). In the period between Witherspoon (1968) and MeGautha
(1971), six of these states still provided for jury determination of penalty and none
had a presumptive death statute, that is, a statute requiring death absent a recom-
mendation of mercy. Appendix C, Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae,
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Note, The Unanimity Requirement
of a Jury's Determination and the Witherspoon Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEim. L.Q.
46, 57-8 (1969). Oregon had repealed its death statute in 1964, 1963 Or. Laws
ch. 625 § 4, before reinstituting capital punishment via referendum in 1978. 1979
Or. Laws ch. 2 § 3. See note 80 supra. Developments in the final state, Florida,
are most instructive on the effect of Furman on the decision to use a sentencing
jury. Prior to Furman, Florida provided that a person convicted of an offense
punishable by death would be sentenced to death unless a majority of the jury
recommended life imprisonment. In 1972, shortly before Furman was decided,
Florida amended its death penalty law in various respects, but maintained the
jury's power, by majority vote, to require a life sentence. 1972 Fla. Laws ch.
72-724, § 1. After Furman was decided, Florida amended its death laws again.
This time it provided for jury recommendation to the judge, who was given final
sentencing discretion. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-724, § 9.
206 See text accompanying notes 68 & 77 supra. Consider the following quote
from GREAT BRITAIN, RoYAL CoMMIssION ON CAPITAL PUNISIMENT, 1949-53,
§ 549, pp. 193-94 (1953):
The sentence of death differs absolutely, not in degree, from any other
sentence; and it would be wholly inconsistent with our traditional approach
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argued that the lawmakers did this because, given the kind and
gravity of the decision, they favored giving it to a defendant's
peers.209 I now examine the death sentencing decision in detail and
conclude that the nature of the decision, in light of Supreme Court
death penalty cases, gives a capital defendant a constitutional right
to a jury sentence. Some of my arguments in support of this con-
clusion may also explain legislative motives for the prevalent, at
times ubiquitous, acceptance for more than a century of jury in-
volvement in capital sentencing. If so, we have an example of
experience and reason leading to the same result.
In considering whether a capital defendant is constitutionally
entitled to a jury decision on penalty, we must know something
about the decision. The sixth amendment right to trial by jury in
criminal cases is a right to have a jury decide the facts, apply the
law to them, and reach a verdict.210 Because the penalty decision
may (but need not-211) also entail determination of facts-the
presence or absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances-
the defendant may have a sixth amendment right to have a jury
find these.212  With respect to the death penalty decision itself-
whether, given the facts, death should 213 be imposed-requiring a
to such issues to lay on the shoulders of the Judge a responsibility so
grave and so invidious. It is more in accord with the instinct of our people
to entrust to the men and women of the jury a joint responsibility for de-
cisions which will affect the life of the accused.
209 See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
210 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977).
See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The right to jury trial binds the
states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). It applies where imprison-
ment could exceed six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 68 (1970). In
state court criminal proceedings, the jury must be composed of at least six persons.
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The due process clause permits a twelve
member jury to convict if nine agree on a verdict. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972). The sixth amendment right to jury trial is not offended if a convic-
tion is based on the votes of ten members of a twelve person jury. Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Six person juries must be unanimous to convict.
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979). See generally Sperlich, Trial by Jury:
It May Have a Future, 1978 Su. CT. REv. 191.
211 I say that the decision "need not" entail the determination of factual issues
for the following reasons. States may not be required to use death penalty laws
containing a list of aggravating circumstances. But see notes 106-08 supra & accom-
panying text. All states, after Lockett, must permit the defendant to introduce
evidence of mitigating circumstances. See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra.
But even these may not create factual issues since the parties may agree on what
they are or that there are none. Finally, a state may have a hearing on the exist-
ence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then hold a separate hearing
at which the penalty decision is made. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1-190.5 (West
1980).
2 12 See note 320 infra, on the right to jury determination of aggravating and
mitigating facts. See also note 100 supra.
213 1 use the word "should" in the sense that Lockett's plurality used the
words "call for," 438 U.S. at 605, which I believe is the same sense for which
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jury to answer this question would seem to wrench sixth amend-
ment theory. My argument for locating this right in the eighth
amendment, however, evolves from the Court's recent death penalty
cases. 214
1. The Nature of the Death Decision
What does the sentencer do when it decides whether a capital
defendant should live? What do we mean when we speak of "fac-
tors which may call for a less severe penalty" 215 or of the need for
"a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is im-
posed?" 216 And how does all this tie in with the conclusion that
death is "profoundly different from all other penalties," 217 a con-
clusion cited as the "predicate" 218 for the requirement of greater
"reliability" in death cases and used to relieve noncapital sentencing
from the same requirement? 219
Death is different, the Court has told us, for several reasons. A
sentence of confinement can be "modif[ied]" through "probation,
parole [or] work furloughs" or the underlying conviction can be
challenged through "various postconviction remedies." 220 These
"corrective or modifying mechanisms" 221 are not available to an
executed defendant. So death is different because it is "final." 222
This finality makes it "qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long." 223
Williams v. New York, 387 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), used the word "appropriate,"
which Lockett quotes. 438 U.S. at 603. I expand on the meaning of these words
at text accompanying notes 281-82 infra. The point here is that the decision to
impose death is not a factual one, but one made after facts are established. See
also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271 ("A jury must be allowed to consider on the
basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed,
but also why it should not be imposed."); Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. at 2527 (quot-
ing same language from Jurek, but ascribing it to what "Texas juries must be
allowed to consider"); note 166 supra.
214 See text following note 279 infra.
215 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
216 Id. 604 (plurality opinion). I have also discussed this language in con-
sidering the relative power of legislature and sentencer. See text accompanying
notes 158-66 supra.
217Id. 605 (plurality opinion). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133,
1138 (1980); note 184 supra.
218 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
219 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n.13 (plurality opinion); Beck v. Alabama, I00
S. Ct. at 2390 n.14.
220 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
221 Id.
222 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion). The
same opinion calls the death penalty different in its "severity." Id.
223 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion). Although each day of a
life sentence is also final in the sense that, after it passes, it cannot be recaptured,
future modification is possible. It is not after execution.
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Aside from finality, the death sentence differs from a noncapital
sentence in the motives for its imposition.22 Rehabilitation is
obviously inapplicable.2m Incapacitation is conceptually possible,
zbut in a limited, artificial way. Imprisonment incapacitates by
making it impossible for the incarcerated criminal to commit crimes
in society at large. Execution supposedly incapacitates by making
it impossible for the criminal to commit crimes while confined or
to escape to do so. Incapacitation, however, has not been empha-
sized or accepted by a majority of Justices as a goal of execution.
2 26
Only five states list risk of future violence as an aggravating circum-
stance.2 27  Given the difficulty of predicting future conduct gen-
erally,2 18 it would seem guesswork to attempt to do so for an in-
carcerated defendant, subject to a range of administrative limitations
on freedom of movement.
229
Two other reasons advanced for punishment are deterrence of
others and retribution. Deterrence is a pragmatic, calculating rea-
son to punish. It is future-oriented and other-directed. The de-
fendant is an instrument used to influence the conduct of others.
Concern for the person of the defendant is discounted. Deterrence
has not succumbed to charges either that it is wrong to punish one
person in order to control the behavior of another or that it is not
2240n the interests served by punishment generally, see H. PAcE, THE
Lm= OF m CnmmrAL SANc ON 35-61 (1968).
225The decision to use capital punishment as a penal sanction is "unique ...
in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal jus-
tice." Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Rummel v.
Estelle, 100 S. Ct. at 1138; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 360 (plurality opinion).
226 Chief Justice Burger supported incapacitation as a basis for capital punish-
ment in his Coker dissent, in which Justice Rehnquist joined. 433 U.S. at 609-10,
citing Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 KAnv. L. REv. 1071, 1080
(1964). Justice White, who wrote the plurality opinion in Coker, mentioned in-
capacitation in Furman, 408 U.S. at 311, and in his dissent in Roberts 1, 428 U.S.
at 354, without endorsing it. Justice Stewart alluded to incapacitation in announc-
ing the plurality opinion in Gregg, calling it a "purpose that has been discussed."
428 U.S. at 183.
222 The states are Idaho, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. IAno CODE
§19-2515(f)(8) (1979); OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §701.12(7) (West Supp.
1979); 1979 Or. Laws Ch. 2, § 3T (popular referendum amending On. RV. STAT.
§§ 163.005-.145); TEx. CODE CGam. Poc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1979); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (Supp. 1978).
228See Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior With Statis-
tical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YAi. L.J. 1408, 1409-11 (1979).
Studies show that paroled murderers very rarely murder again. F. EvRam, Suc-
czssr. PA EOLE 100 (1971); Giardini & Farrow, The Paroling of Capital Of-
fenders, in CA.rrAL PusmmNrT 169 (T. Sellin ed. 1967); Heilbrun, Heilbrun &
Heilbrun, Impulsive and Premeditated Homicide: An Analysis of Subsequent Parole
Risk of the Murderer, 69 J. Cmul. L. & CEmNoLoCY 108 (1978) (and articles
cited at n.16); Stanton, Murderers on Parole, 15 Cnm AND DELINQUENCY 149
(1969).
229 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 237 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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possible to know whether punishment of the former will in fact
deter the latter. In noncapital cases, we accept legislative and
judicial deterrence motives despite these ethical and causation issues.
The fact of the crime itself justifies instrumental punishment that
is not cruel and unusual.230 Woodson and Lockett acknowledge
that in noncapital cases "the prevailing practice of individualizing
sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened
policy rather than a constitutional imperative" 231 and that "legis-
latures remain free to decide how much discretion in sentencing
should be reposed in the judge or jury in noncapital cases." 23
This view, long established,233 explains both the legitimacy of
lengthy mandatory sentences 234 and, in discretionary sentencing,
judicial assessment of the sanction's effect on others.235 Deterrence
may even at times be the sole consideration in a court's decision to
imprison.2
36
230 These summary statements cannot do justice to the contemplative exami-
nation of deterrence scholars have provided. I refer the reader to F. ZmNG &
G. HAwK s, DETERRENCE (1973), for an excellent discussion of the subject gen-
erally and to pages 32-50 for discussion of the ethical issues in deterrence. See
also H. PACKER, Tm LmTs oF THE CwnnirAL SANcTioN 39-45, 63-69, 261-69
(1968); Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72
MicH. L. REv. 1161, 1175-76 (1974).
231 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 324 (plurality opinion).
232 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603 (plurality opinion). The Lockett plurality also
recognized that "in noncapital cases, the established practice of individualized sen-
tences rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into
statutes." Id. 604-05.
233 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949); Pennsylvania
ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
234 See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1091 (1979); United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1121 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369
Mass. 904, 909-15, 344 N.E.2d 166, 170-73 (1976); cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 100
S. Ct. 1133, 1144-45 (1980) (emphasizing the special deterrence justification of a
mandatory life sentence for a three-time felony offender).
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments may be a limitation on
disproportionately lengthy mandatory minimum sentences. Rummel, 100 S. Ct.
at 1138-39 & n.11; Carmona, 576 F.2d at 408-09.
235 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); Fielding v. LeFevre,
548 F.2d 1102, 1108 (2d Cir. 1977).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 1974) ("While
the judge's conclusions as to deterrence may never be so unbending as to forbid
relaxation in an appropriate case, they may nonetheless on occasion justify confine-
ment although other factors point in another direction"). The distinction is made
between general and special deterrence. The latter proposes to dissuade the de-
fendant himself from future criminal conduct. The former makes an example of
the defendant to dissuade others. See generally H. PACKER, THE Limrrs oF TnE
CRmmiNAL SbqcTio, 39-48 (1968). Special deterrence is not an issue in capital
punishment. It should not be confused with incapacitation. See note 226 supra &
accompanying text. My discussion is of general deterrence.
When, as in Foss, appellate courts reject mechanical sentencing, it is not be-
cause the Constitution forbids it, but rather because sentencing statutes are found
to require individual consideration. See note 232 supra. See also, Bowring v.
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The considerations change when the punishment is death. A
majority of the Court has agreed that proof of the death penalty's
deterrent effect is "inconclusive," but defers to legislative judg-
ment that it has one.237 Although deterrence may be an acceptable
legislative motive for the penalty of death, what place does it have
in courtroom capital sentencing?
Individualized sentencing is constitutionally prescribed in
capital cases. The death penalty may not be legislatively man-
dated nor may it come from a sentencer whose wish to spare the
defendant has been legislatively hedged. The sentencer may not
be prevented from considering in mitigation "any aspect of the
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." 238 This information permits individualized sentenc-
ing and, as I shall argue,239 serves the fourth goal of punishment,
retribution. But just as individualization was found incompatible
with mandatory death laws, so is it also at odds with deterrence
as the sole motive for a courtroom capital sentence. For in each
case, the individual is ignored. The Woodson-Lockett theory would
seem to make it as inappropriate for the courtroom sentencer as it
would have been for the legislative sentencer to mandate death
solely to deter future homicides.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Harford, 489 F.2d
652 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1973).
237Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-86 (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); Roberts I,
428 U.S. at 355 (White, J., dissenting with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun & Reehnquist,
JJ.). The plurality in Gregg said that, for some murderers, "the death penalty
undoubtedly is a significant deterrent," giving as examples the killer for hire and
murder by a life prisoner. 428 U.S. at 185-86. Professor Zeisel has challenged
both the general and exemplary statements. Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 Su'. CT. REv. 317, 338-39. Other writers
have attempted to prove or disprove the relationship between capital punishment
and deterrence of murder. See, e.g., Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975);
Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YAIT, L.J. 187 (1975); Bowers &
Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punish-
ment, 85 YAI. L.J. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85
YAIE L.J. 209 (1975); Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further
Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. Po=rn. EcoN. 741 (1977); Passell &
Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 Am. ECON.
REv. 447 (1977); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67
Am. ECON. REv. 452 (1977).
I am not equipped to resolve the debate. I accept as a given the Supreme
Court's current willingness to defer to a legislative conclusion that capital punish-
ment deters at least some potential murderers. See note 245 infra. If the death
penalty is proved to have no deterrent value, the Court will have to decide whether
its retributive function is sufcient to justify it. See note 6 supra.
238 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
2 39 See notes 264-66 & accompanying text and text accompanying notes 279-91
infra.
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If deterrence cannot be a sufficient reason to choose execution,
may or must it be a reason? May the sentencer vote death in part
because it expects execution will deter others, or alternatively, must
the sentencer vote life unless it can conclude that execution will
deter others? The Court has not spoken directly on these matters.
It is, however, apparent from its opinions that the sentencer is not
required to make a finding that executing the particular defendant
will deter others. Rather, the Justices have written on the unstated
but unmistakable premise that the sentencer, and possibly even the
legislature, may act on retributory motives alone.240  The answer
to the other half of the query-whether a death penalty law may
permit the sentencer to consider deterrence-is less clear. Two
factors supporting such a law are, first, that legislators are already
allowed to accept statistical proof that death laws deter 241 and,
second, that lawmakers and judges may both rely on deterrence
in noncapital sentencing.242
When we discuss whether the capital sentencer can be permitted
to assess deterrence, we are wise to examine those stages of the
punishment hearing that precede penalty deliberation: reception
of evidence, argument, and, if the sentencer is a jury, instructions.
If deterrence may be a factor, we must answer three questions: (1)
may the parties introduce expert testimony on whether, statistical
studies aside, the execution of the particular defendant will deter
more murders than would a life sentence? (2) may counsel argue
that issue? (3) how shall the court instruct the jury to assess de-
terrence in deciding sentence? Even amateur social scientists may
quickly see that predictive ability is not nearly so advanced that
experts will be able to say whether execution of a particular defend-
ant will stop others.243 Such a prediction differs from the statistical
basis for a general legislative finding. The courtroom prediction is
a guess, a legislative finding the distillation and projection of a
pattern.244 Furthermore, different standards govern expert prog-
240 See text accompanying notes 251-62 infra. This is true at least so long
as the Court is willing to defer to a legislative conclusion that the existence and
administration of a death penalty deters. See note 6 supra and note 245 infra.
241 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (plurality opinion).
242 See notes 231-36 supra.
248The best that prognosticators have been able to give is the number of
murders deterred on the average for each execution. See, e.g., Ehrlich, note 237
supra, 65 Am. Ecozq. Rsv. at 398, 414-15 (as many as eight murders). The courts
considering the issue have agreed that evidence on the potential deterrent effect
of a particular execution is not admissible. See note 248 infra.
24 4 See note 237 supra.
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nosis in each forum.245 The courtroom test for expert testimony 246
requires more than experts can today deliver, even though the legis.
lative standard is currently satisfied.
Based on what trial evidence may counsel then argue that the
sentencer should find deterrence or the lack of it? Since deterrence
is not a matter on which a jury may take judicial notice,247 the
absence of evidence would seem to preclude reference to it in sum-
mation. 24 8 Judicial instruction to a sentencing jury would also
245 In Gregg, the plurality (Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens) was willing
to use a "clearly erroneous" standard to test the legislative judgment:
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures,
which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own
local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to
the courts ...
In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legisla-
ture to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus con-
cerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to
conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction
of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is
not unconstitutionally severe.
428 U.S. at 186-87 (plurality opinion). A majority of the court accepts this argu-
ment. In Furman, Chief Justice Burger wrote, for himself and Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist:
The case against capital punishment is not the product of legal dialec-
tic, but rests primarily on factual claims, the truth of which cannot be
tested by conventional judicial processes .... Legislatures will have the
opportunity to make a more penetrating study of these claims with the
familiar and effective tools available to them as they are not to us.
408 U.S. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
246 The liberal test for the admission of expert testimony on an issue is stated
in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as follows: "If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." See also C. McCowmuIcx, LAw OF EvmENcE 29-31 (2d ed. 1972),
stating that expert testimony "is not admissible if the court believes that the state of
the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be
asserted even by an expert." Id. 31 (footnotes omitted). Cf. People v. Collins, 68
Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (statistical probability not
admissible to prove identity of defendants as perpetrators of criminal act).
2479 J. WiOmonE, Evinmrcr § 2570 (3d ed. 1940) ("Judicial Notice by the
Jury's Own Knowledge").
248 The proposition that courts should exclude testimony and argument on the
deterrent effect of the death penalty is supported by the few cases and authorities
that have considered the issue. In People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 756-57, 366
P.2d 809, 814, 17 Cal. Rptr. 481, 486 (1961), the Court wrote:
The wisdom and deterrent effect of the death penalty are for the Legis-
lature to determine, and are therefore not justiciable issues. Hence our
holding that evidence thereon was inadmissible. Juries in capital cases
are not legislatures ad hoe, and trials on the issue of penalty are not to
be converted into legislative hearings.
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have to omit reference to evidence on which the jurors might base a
deterrence conclusion. It would acknowledge, instead, that the con-
clusion the jurors will reach will be no less speculative than the
conclusion experts could give or counsel argue. If nothing else,
because different sentencers will speculate differently, allowing
rumination on deterrence will encourage arbitrariness with no pro-
motion of the Constitution's interest in uniqueness.
Still, it is true that in noncapital sentencing we permit court-
room decisions based on speculation about deterrence, despite the
Since evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty may not be intro-
duced, the issue may not be argued to the jury. Love, 56 Cal. 2d at 757-58,
366 P.2d at 814-15, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87. Accord, People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal.
2d 503, 536-40, 381 P.2d 394, 412-14, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 556-58 (1963); Hawkins
v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 389, 400, 474 P.2d 557, 564 (1970). But cf. Bagley v.
State, 247 Ark. 113, 119, 444 S.W.2d 567, 570-71 (1969) (prosecutor and de-
fense counsel may argue the deterrent effect of capital punishment, but without
use of statistics); People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 717-18, 371 P.2d 304, 308,
21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 572 (1962) (prosecutor's discussion of deterrence and death
penalty as "another factor [the jury] can consider" was error, but not prejudicial);
People v. Gardner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 156, 367 P.2d 680, 692-93, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40,
52-53 (1961) (discussion of deterrence only a minor part of prosecutor's appeal
to the jury and therefore not reversible error); Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948, 950
(Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978) (argument concerning death penalty
and deterrence "not so prejudicial as to require a new trial"); McClendon v. State,
196 So. 2d 905, 911-12 (Fla. 1967) (theoretical discussion of death penalty as a
deterrent allowed if statistics, not previously submitted as evidence, are not used).
It has been held that defense counsel may not argue that the death penalty is not
a deterrent. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 395-96, 45 A.2d 43, 44, cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 847 (1946); see Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury With Facts
Not in Evidence: The Fiction Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 159
(1956). But of. Bagley, 247 Ark. at 119, 444 S.W.2d at 570-71 (defense counsel
may make argument against deterrent effect of death penalty, but without use of
statistics); McClendon, 196 So. 2d at 911-12 (trial court allowed defense counsel to
make theoretical arguments against death penalty as a deterrent). At least one
state has prohibited defense counsel from arguing to the jury that capital punishment
is wrong:
The law of the State must be administered as it presently exists, and the
Legislature has provided for capital punishment in appropriate cases. ....
Of course, defense counsel may urge that mitigating circumstances exist
in the particular case before the jury. . . . However, to urge that capital
punishment per se is wrong and should be abolished is to suggest to the
jury that they may go beyond their proper function and invade the
province of the Legislature.
State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 175, 195 A.2d 449, 455 (1963).
Some courts have also forbidden the prosecutor to argue that the defendant,
if allowed to live, is statistically likely to be released on parole. See, e.g., Hawkins
v. Rhay, id. at 400, 474 P.2d at 564; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in
Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1118-20 (1953). The California Supreme
Court initially permitted such argument, see, e.g., People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d
323, 352 n.18, 384 P.2d 424, 443 n.18, 33 Cal. Rptr. 104, 123 n.18 (1963), but
subsequently held otherwise. People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 643-44, 388 P.2d
33, 40-41, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 208-09 (1964). One reason the court gave for
declining to place the matter of future parole before the jury is the fact that the
"questions are unanswerable because they rest on future events which are unpre-
dictable." 60 Cal. 2d at 643, 388 P.2d at 40, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 208. This conclu-




absence of evidence to support these conclusions.2 4 9 This may seem
cause to allow the same kind of speculation in capital sentencing,
so long as the sentencer is told that the need for individualized
capital sentencing means deterrence may not be the sole basis of
decision. I suggest, however, that the idea that deterrence may be
one, but not the only, capital sentencing concern is misleading. If
it may be a concern, it will sometimes be the controlling one. If
not, deterrence is an issue that will make no difference. When it
becomes controlling, that is, when the sentencer would vote life but
for deterrence, we execute on speculation about the future conduct
of others. Though we may imprison longer on deterrence specula-
tion, Woodson and Lockett, with their emphasis on individualiza-
tion and the uniqueness of the defendant, prohibit this impersonal
response in a capital case.
210
The finality of death ought separately to affect our tolerance
for deterrence in capital cases. In noncapital cases, deterrence
speculation will translate into length of imprisonment. A judge
may add two years to a five year sentence because he or she be-
lieves the longer term will prevent other crimes. Imprisonment is
measured with numbers. There are no comparatives in death sen-
tencing. Death is infinite; it is not merely the highest number.
We ought to hesitate before allowing execution to rest solely on a
guess about its consequences, however differently we may strike
the balance in noncapital matters. We ought also to keep in mind
that in noncapital cases the guess can be revised-that is, the term
shortened-if new facts or new attitudes toward old facts, though
not altering guilt, lessen our wish to set an example. Modification
after execution is impossible.
I have shown that three of the reasons generally used to justify
imprisonment do not support capital punishment-rehabilitation is
249 See notes 235-36 supra & accompanying text.
250The Court's rejection of mandatory death laws, while nevertheless accepting
the legislative conclusion that the death penalty deters, is explainable only if de-
terrence is an insufficient reason to execute any class of defendants. It follows
that deterrence is an insufficient, as well as a more speculative, reason to execute
any one defendant.
Although Woodson and Lockett may not, in a particular case, forbid mercy
based on speculation that execution will not deter, problems of proof and argument
remain. It would be difficult for a sentencer to appreciate that it may consider the
unlikelihood of deterrence in weighing mercy, but not its likelihood otherwise. If
the sentencer is told the consequences should it find a fact absent (deterrence), it
will inevitably make assumptions about its own authority should it find the fact
present. Cf. Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 1363 n.4 (1980) ("We
doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between 'enhancing' the punish-
ment imposed upon the petitioner [for failing to cooperate with the authorities]
and denying him the 'leniency' he claims would be appropriate if he had
cooperated").
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inapplicable, incapacitation too conjectural and farfetched to carry
conviction, and deterrence, at the sentencing stage, an uninformed
guess and at odds with the need for individualization and the recog-
nition of the finality of death. This leaves retribution as the ex-
clusive motive for the imposition of the death sentence in each
case.251
The Court, moreover, has recognized and accepted the retribu-
tive motive. In Furman, Justice Stewart expressed his belief that
retribution is a permissible "ingredient in the imposition of punish-
ment." 252 He continued:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of
man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting
the stability of a society governed by law. When people
begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or un-
able to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy--
of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.253
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, in separate dissents in
which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, also accepted re-
tribution as a valid end of capital punishment.254 It is "conceded
on all sides," wrote Justice Powell, "that, not infrequently, cases
arise that are so shocking or offensive that the public demands the
ultimate penalty for the transgressor." 255
Justice Stewart elaborated on the retributive function of cap-
ital punishment in announcing the opinion for the Gregg plurality.
After quoting the Burger and Powell dissents in Furman, he con-
cluded that "the decision that capital punishment may be the ap-
propriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the com-
munity's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death." 256
Retribution has two facets. There is the impulse for revenge,
focused on the person of the defendant and the wish to "get even,"
to redeem in some way the pain of the victim or her family by
251Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CA.. L. REv. 1268, 1410 (1968),
reaches the same conclusion on the basis of California cases.
252408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
253 Id.
254Id. 394-95 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. 452-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
255 Id.
256 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
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causing pain to the aggressor. This purpose of retribution is
sounded in various death penalty opinions 257 and reverberates in
the literature.
258
The Court's opinions speak of another side to retribution, con-
cerned less with the defendant and the victim than with society.
Here, the imposition of the death penalty represents a statement
we make to ourselves about the kind of people we are. In this
sense, an execution is a public testament to a societal bond, a ritual
which through publicity takes on the dimension of spectacle and
states a common revulsion toward the defendant's deed. This view
of retribution is also reflected in the cases and the literature 50,
It was articulately stated by Lord Denning, who is quoted in both
Furman2 8 0 and Gregg2 1 for the following:
Punishment is the way in which society expresses its de-
nunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain
respect for law, it is essential that the punishment in-
flicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the re-
vulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It
is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being
deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else.
... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that
society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-
doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent
or not.
26 2
257Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. 454 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 239-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258 See, e.g., W. BEmNs, FoR C.IrrAL PUNISHMENT 136-38 (1979); F. CAR-
lUNCTON, NErTBER CRumL NoR UNUsUAL 135-38 (1978).
259 For judicial responses to this view of retribution, compare Furman, 408
U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 238-39 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), with Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) and Furman,
408 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment recognizes the
double use of the word "retribution":
Discussion of the principle of retribution is apt to be confused because
the word is not always used in the same sense. Sometimes it is intended
to mean vengeance, sometimes reprobation. In the first sense the idea is
that of satisfaction by the State of a wronged individual's desire to be
avenged; in the second it is that of the State's marking its disapproval
of the breaking of its laws by a punishment proportionate to the gravity
of the offense.
REPORT OF TBE ROYAL Coar mlssIoN ON CAPITAL PUNIsHvENT, 1949-53, 752, at
17 (1953).
260408 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
261428 U.S. at 184 n.30 (plurality opinion).
2 62 R OYAL ComrissIoN ON CAPITAL PUNISMENT, 9 MiNUrs OF EviDENcE
207, December 1, 1949 (1950).
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There are, then, two major ways in which death differs from
other criminal sanctions: it is a final sanction and it is, for any par-
ticular defendant, a solely retributive one. Its retributive feature
reflects both an urge for revenge and the need for an assertion of
moral consensus or, perhaps more properly, an assertion of shared
reprobation.26
3
2. The Questions for the Sentencer
Now that we have identified the unique nature of the death
penalty decision, we can return to the earlier inquiry: the role of
the sentencer at a death penalty hearing. The fact that death is a
retributive sanction means the sentencer, in deciding if aggravating
and mitigating factors "call for" death, considers the degree to which
retribution's two purposes will be served by execution. The fact
that death is a final sanction has been held to require that the sen-
tencer, in weighing the appropriateness of retribution, 264 have access
to all "relevant" information about the "defendant's character and
[prior] record and [the] circumstances of [his] offense." 265 Once
this information is presented, the sentencer necessarily uses it to
answer two questions:
* Is it the "community's belief that [the crime is]
so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death?"
* If so, are there nevertheless "aspects of the de-
fendant's character and record . . . which may call for a
less severe penalty?" 266
263 There are two incidental characteristics of the death penalty deserving
mention. It is, first, the only penalty that rejects the humanity of the individual,
his capacity to experience and change. It treats the defendant as having no moral
worth. Justice Stewart commented in Furman that the death penalty "is unique
m . . in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of human-
ity." 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Execution is also the only occa-
sion when the state commits significant violence against a person in a nonemer-
gency situation.
264 1 refer to the "appropriateness of retribution" for the reasons set out in
note 213 supra. I recognize that even a sentence less than death, life imprison-
ment for example, can be seen as retributive. Therefore, the sentencer's decision
is more accurately described as one in which it considers the degree of retribution.
265 All quoted words in the prior two sentences come from the plurality opin-
ion in Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. In a noncapital case, a sentencing judge will
consider the same kind of information but for different ends. The issues might
then be whether incarceration is needed, for how long, whether work release or
probation is appropriate and the like. ABA, SMETENCING ALTERNATIVEs AM Pno-
cEDunEs, § 4.1(b), at 204-05 (1967). A capital sentencer, however, answers only
one question, to be retributive or not, to vote prison or death. A mitigating factor,
by indicating prison, is simply an argument against retribution (or death).
266 See notes 180-81 supra.
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The first of these questions is, I have suggested, divisible: one part
focuses on society's need for a statement to itself, the other on its
willingness to vindicate the victim's (or her family's) presumed wish
for vengeance. In most cases, both parts are present. The second
question-a response to the finality of death-focuses primarily on
the presence of mitigating and aggravating factors aside from those
revealed in proving the crime. The ensuing discussion amplifies
the nature of the sentencer's task and argues that its features entitle
the defendant to have a jury perform it.
3. The Illusion of Judicial Experience
Although the retributive decision is made at a sentencing hear-
ing, it is misleading to call it a sentencing decision in the traditional
sense. Usually, sentencing decisions entail assessments of many fac-
tors, most of which are better understood by judges than by juries.
They are: the availability of rehabilitative resources in the jurisdic-
ion's jails and prisons; the nature of various diversion programs;
community support services; the competence of probation author-
ities; the probable amount of time that will be served for a given
sentence; sentences imposed by both the sentencing judge and other
judges for similar offenders; and recidivism rates for different
crimes.2 7 Most of these sentencing considerations do not arise in
the death penalty decision, and so the judge's greater knowledge
and experience are not called upon. There is one apparent excep-
tion: it has been argued that consistency will be greater if judges
sentence in capital cases. The Proffitt v. Florida plurality made
this suggestion. It said that "judicial sentencing should lead . . .
to . . . greater consistency . . . since a trial judge is more ex-
perienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases." 268
I will argue that this is wrong, but even if it is right, consistency
can and must be provided through the appellate review procedures
approved in Proffitt, Gregg and Jurek v. Texas.269 There is, how-
2 67 See generally ABA, supra note 265, at 46-7.
268 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote
omitted).269 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 360 & n.11 (plurality opinion) (judge-imposed death sentence under valid
Florida statute vacated because based on undisclosed presentence report; hindrance
to appellate review violated due process). See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct.
1759, 1765-67 (1980) (failure of Georgia Supreme Court to apply a constitutional
construction of an aggravating circumstance). But compare notes 131 & 164 supra,
suggesting that appellate review has limited capacity to assure consistency. As I
will show, however, the consistency we might expect from judicial sentencing is
also slight.
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ever, no way for the judge to equal what a jury can best bring to
the sentencing process-the community view. That, I will argue, is
the touchstone of, and in a sense is, the retributive impulse.
Although a trial judge sentences defendants weekly and may
sentence hundreds in a year and thousands in a career on the bench,
the Proffitt plurality does not seem to have a basis to conclude that
trial judges make enough capital sentencing decisions to develop
"consistency" or that the few capital defendants each may see will
be sufficiently alike that the judge will be able "to impose sentences
similar to those imposed in analogous cases." 270 In the spring of
1980, Florida had a death penalty law in force for seven and a half
years (the oldest death penalty statute since Furman was decided)
and a death row population of about 140,271 the largest in the na-
tion.272  There are about 300 circuit trial judges in Florida,27 3
resulting in an average of about one capital sentence for half the
judges in seven and a half years. It is true, however, that there
are many more capital defendants than there are capital defendants
who receive the death sentence. Therefore, the number of capital
sentencing decisions the trial bench in Florida has had to make
between 1972 and 1980 was greater than the number of defendants
receiving the death penalty. But assuming as few as fifteen percent
of those convicted of murder are sentenced to death,27 4 the number
270FProgitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
271 NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (April 20,
1980) (unpublished compilation).
272Id.
273 FLA. STAT. ANN. §26.031(1) (West Supp. 1980). This provision lists
the number of circuit judges for each judicial circuit in Florida. The total is 302.
In 1974, there were 263 circuit judges. 1973 Fla. Laws 73-329. The relatively
small increase in the number of circuit judges during the life of Florida's death
statute does not detract from the point I am making. Circuit judges have juris-
diction over capital crimes. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§26.012(2)(d), 775.081(1)(a)
(West 1974).
274 Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is thought that from
15% to 20% of those convicted of murder are sentenced to death in States
where it is authorized. See, e.g., McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by
a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob., No. 2, pp. 11, 12 (1964);
Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. I,
30 (1964); Florida Division of Corrections, Seventh Biennial Report (July
1, 1968, to June 30, 1970) 82 (1970); H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The Ameri-
can Jury 435-436 (1966).
Id. 386 n. 11. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 653 & n.41, 493 P.2d 880, 897
& n.41, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 169 & n.41 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972),
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of capital sentencing decisions that each Florida trial judge would
have had to make on the average in the seven and a half years of the
existence of its statute would be about three.275 Investigation has
shown that this rate has resulted in great inconsistency between
those who do and do not receive the death sentence.276 Further-
more, given Lockett's concern with "individualization," it is hard
to understand what theoretical relevance "analogous" cases have at
the selection stage. It was, I suggest, precisely to explain or justify
the different treatment of facially similar capital defendants that
Lockett shifted the focus of eighth amendment theory from arbi-
trariness to uniqueness.2 77 And to the extent that different judges
sentence similar defendants, they will predictably apply different
standards in capital sentencing just as they do in noncapital sen-
tencing.27
8
supports the Chief Justice's estimate. According to Anderson, in 1967, 17 of 88
persons convicted of first degree murder received the death penalty. In 1969, the
ratio was 8 out of 87. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 295 n.31,
where the plurality, citing authority, wrote that "[diata compiled on discretionary
jury sentencing of persons convicted of capital murder reveal that the penalty of
death is generally imposed in less than 20% of the cases."
275A death row population of 140 would reflect 900 capital sentencing deci-
sions or three for each circuit judge. If the percent of capital defendants receiving
a death sentence is greater than 15, as some statistics indicate it might be, see
note 274 supra, then the number of capital sentences for each judge would be
fewer. I am assuming that each trial judge was on the bench for the entire period.
Insofar as this is not so, the average number of capital sentences per judge is
lower. I realize that some Florida judges may have a disproportionately higher
number of capital sentencing decisions, depending on such factors as the number
of homicides in the jurisdiction in which they sit, the number of judges in that
jurisdiction hearing capital cases, and the willingness of the prosecutor in the
jurisdiction to bring capital charges or to plea bargain to lesser charges. Never-
theless, the argument that judicial sentencing will bring greater consistency seems
misplaced. Even if in some counties of some states some judges will have a suffi-
ciently large enough number of capital sentencing decisions so that consistency can
be attempted-a speculative conclusion-it is obvious that in most states and most
counties this will not be so. All states have fewer death row inmates than does
Florida, and many states have far fewer. For example, in Indiana there are five
inmates on death row, in Kentucky five, in Louisiana seventeen, in Mississippi twelve,
in Missouri six, in Pennsylvania nine, in Tennessee fourteen, and in Virginia
twelve. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (October 20,
1980) (unpublished compilation). Given these relatively low figures, it does not
seem supportable to say that judges sentence capital defendants with sufficient
frequency to assure consistency.
276 The Miami Herald, May 27-29, 1979, at Al. The Herald's investigation
noted the following influences on inconsistency in capital sentences: "the county
where the crime is committed, which judge gets the case, which prosecutor tries
it, which lawyer defends it, what kind of jury hears it and . . . the judgment of
the current Florida Supreme Court." Convicted capital defendants have received
sentences ranging from five years to death. Id., May 27, 1979, at Al. See note 120
supra.
2 77 See text accompanying notes 125-43 supra.
278 See, e.g., N. MoRus, THE FUTURE OF I-PRisommwr 45 (1974); Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CiN. L. REv. 1, 54 (1972).
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4. Reduction of Risk:
The Greater Reliability of a Sentencing Jury
Lockett concludes that "greater . . . reliability" at death sen-
tence hearings depends on "individualized consideration." 279 This
conclusion led to evidentiary rules to promote "individualization."
Greater reliability is also affected by who it is that engages in the
"consideration." Under consideration is the decision whether or
not to be retributive.280 "Reliability" and its sister expressions,
"appropriate" and "call for," refer in this context to the accuracy
of the decision to be retributive. Because retribution is an expres-
sion of the community will,281 reliability in the decision to be
retributive is achieved if the body deciding penalty expresses the
community will. Conventionally, when we speak of the "relia-
bility" of an assertion, we mean its accuracy as a reflection of reality.
A reliable assertion is one you can depend on, accept as true. An
assertion's reliability is a function of its relationship to that which
it purports to reflect or construe. Reliability in the death cases
is an expression of a degree of relationship between the penalty
verdict and the conscience of the community. Since the death deci-
sion is a retributive one and since retribution is an expression of
the will of the "public," or the "community," or "society," 282
a "greater degree of reliability" is achieved if the will of that body
is expressed in the sentence with a "greater degree of" accuracy.
If we assume that a jury is substantially better able to convey
the community's wish for retribution than is a judge, does it follow
that a capital defendant is for that reason constitutionally en-
titled to a sentencing jury? I believe other capital punishment
cases suggest that it does. Insistence on reliability is an undercur-
rent in the capital cases. The plurality in Gardner v. Florida va-
cated a death sentence because the trial judge, in imposing death,
"might have considered material" not revealed to the defendant.28 3
279 438 U.S. at 604, 605 (plurality opinion).
280 See text accompanying notes 252-66 supra.
2 81Retribution is repeatedly discussed as a demand that comes from the
"public," Furman, 408 U.S. at 454 (Powell, J., dissenting), or the "community,"
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (plurality opinion); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519, or"society," Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). It seems axiomatic.
The judge is the only other courtroom source. No suggestion has been made that
the retributive impulse is a judicial one. Furthermore, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), has told us that the meaning of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause depends in part on "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society" (emphasis added).
282 See note 281 supra.
283 430 U.S. at 356 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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This possibility was unacceptable because of the "vital importance
to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose
the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion." 284 In Green v. Georgia, the Court relied
on the due process clause to invalidate an otherwise unobjection-
able state hearsay rule in order to assure the consideration of in-
formation Lockett made relevant.285 In Lockett, the plurality was
willing to create a constitutional rule of relevance for death penalty
hearings to promote "a greater degree of reliability" and to avoid
the "risk" of an uncalled for death sentence.28 I translate the
latter to mean a "risk" that the sentencer would be retributive
when excluded mitigating information might have made it merciful.
And in Beck v. Alabama, the Court, after identifying the reliability-
of-sentence theme in prior capital cases, 2 7 concluded that the "same
reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the
guilt determination." 2 88 The risk-reduction goal of Lockett, Green
and Beck, and Gardner's insistence on the fact and appearance
of rational sentencing, both support a constitutional right to a
jury sentence in capital cases if, as I shall argue, there is a sub-
stantially greater likelihood, with a jury sentence, of correctly
ascertaining the community's wish for retribution.
The Witherspoon v. Illinois Court eloquently stated the rela-
tionship in death penalty decisions between the jury and the
community wish for retribution:
[A] jury from which all [scrupled jurors] have been
excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it.
Guided by neither rule nor standard, "free to select or
reject as it [sees] fit," a jury that must choose between
life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little
more-and must do nothing less-than express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death. Yet, in a nation less than half of whose people
284 Id. 358 (plurality opinion).
285442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
286438 U.S. at 604-05 (plurality opinion).
287 100 S. Ct. at 2389.
288 Id. 2389-90. The Supreme Court invalidated the defendant's conviction and
sentence for two independent reasons. The jury was not permitted to consider
lesser included offenses, raising the possibility that it would convict for "an im-
permissible reason." Id. 2392. Second, the jury was given the erroneous impression
that a conviction would inevitably lead to execution. The Court concluded that
"these two extraneous factors may favor the defendant or the prosecution or they
may cancel each other out. But in every case they Introduce a level of uncer-
tainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a
capital case." Id.
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believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively
of such people cannot speak for the community. Culled
of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital
punishment-of all who would be reluctant to pronounce
the extreme penalty-such a jury can speak only for a
distinct and dwindling minority.89
In a footnote, the Court added that
one of the most important functions any jury can perform
in making . . . a selection [to impose the death penalty]
is to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 290
The Court's reference to this "link" is another way of saying that
the jury's job is to speak the community's desire for retribution.
"Contemporary community values" and the degree to which so-
ciety's "standards of decency" have "evolv[ed]" are the primary in-
formants of this desire.291
Despite its language, Witherspoon has a comparatively limited
holding. It is that if a state chooses to use a jury to sentence, it
may not challenge for cause persons scrupled against death but
who could still consider it.292 The state, which at that time could
have made death mandatory,293 was nevertheless constrained to be
neutral with regard to jury composition, if it used a jury to sen-
tence. There was nothing in Witherspoon, however, to prevent the
state, even if it used a jury, from requiring death absent a unani-
mous recommendation of mercy.294 Neutrality was required only
on composition. How can we explain Witherspoon's strong lan-
guage given its modest holding?
It may be that the Court was offended by Illinois's public
declaration of a hands-off position, while behind the scenes, it
allegedly "stacked the deck against the [defendant]." 295 If this
2 s 9 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
290Id. 319 n.15 (citation omitted).
29 1 See text accompanying notes 251-61 supra, for a discussion of the meaning
of retribution.
292 391 U.S. at 522.
293 Id. 519 n.15.
294 Id. Many states then had such a rule. See note 76 supra. The Wither-
spoon Court did not find these unacceptable.
295 391 U.S. at 523. Such offense might explain as well the use of other strong
language in Witherspoon. The Court spoke of the Illinois jury as a "tribunal
organized to return a verdict of death," 391 U.S. at 521 (footnote omitted), and
as a "hanging jury." Id. 523.
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is so, it would have sufficed to say that if a jury is used, its com-
position could not be manipulated in the way Illinois had at-
tempted. There was no need to speak about the jury's "link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system," or
to say that without this link "punishment could hardly reflect
'evolving standards of decency.' "296 This language is appro-
priate only if the Witherspoon Court was requiring a neutral jury
if the death penalty is used and not merely requiring a neutral jury
if a jury is used. Witherspoon should be read for the broader
proposition.
I proceed to argue that juries can, better than judges, reliably
assess the community's values and evolving standards of decency.
My arguments, which overlap, are based on intuition, analogy,
tradition, and empirical studies.
Intuitively, juries, chosen in accordance with rules calculated
to assure that they reflect a "fair cross-section of the community," 297
are more likely to accurately express community values than are
individual state trial judges. This is true because twelve 298 people
are more likely than one person to reflect public sentiment, be-
cause jurors are selected in a manner enhancing that likelihood,299
and because trial judges collectively do not represent-by race, sex,
or economic or social class-the communities from which they
come.300 The response of a representative jury of acceptable size
296 Id. 519 n.15.
29 7 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359 (1979) (exemption, by request, of
women from jury service violates "fair cross section" requirement); Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (systematic exclusion of women from jury selection
violates "fair cross section" requirement).
298 Every state providing for jury determination of penalty in death cases
appears to use a jury of twelve. The Court has not considered whether fewer jurors
are permissible on either the guilt or penalty issue. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970), approved six-person juries in noncapital cases. The Court noted that
Florida used twelve-member juries in capital cases. Id. 103. Cf. Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 364 (1972) (unanimity required under state law in capital
jury of twelve but not in noncapital jury of twelve). The Court rejected juries of
fewer than six members in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (plurality
opinion). This Article does not explore whether, if juries are required in death
sentencing, they must have twelve members. Williams, assessing noncapital trials
and guilt determination, does not resolve the issue.
299 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-33 (1975) (grand and
petit juries cannot be selected so as to systematically exclude women from service);
Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (blacks).
300 Salaries for judges in courts of general trial jurisdiction range from $23,400
in Oklahoma to $54,205 in California, with a mean of approximately $41,000. Nat'l
Center for St. Cts. Survey of Judicial Salaries 1 (September 1979). According
to one recent article, at the general jurisdiction level, in 1977 only 2.5% of 5,155
judges were women, and 20 states had no women on their major trial courts.
Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WommN iN mm CouRTs, 84, 87-88
(Nat'l Center for St. Cts. 1978). A chart prepared by Judge George W. Crockett,
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is consequently taken to be the community response. The jury
does not try to determine what the community would say, but in
giving its conclusion, speaks for the community.301 The judge, on
the other hand, must either assess the community's "belief" or
"conscience" and impose it or must impose his own and assume it
is the community's. Whichever the judge does, the representative
jury would seem to have a substantially better chance of identifying
the community view simply by speaking its mind.
The intuitive expectation that a representative jury of ade-
quate size will convey community values more reliably than will a
single judge finds support in cases treating jury composition at
culpability trials. In this related area, the Court has stressed the
importance of a representative jury as an aid in assuring "mean-
ingful community participation" 302 and has accepted the idea that
different segments of the community will bring to the representa-
tive jury "perspectives and values that influence both jury delibera-
tion and result." 303 In addition, the Court has said that juries
of decreasing size have a reduced chance of reflecting minority view-
points. 304 The Court's conclusions that the size and representative-
ness of juries influence their ability to reflect community values
Jr., indicates that in 1977 there were 197 black judges sitting on state courts of
general jurisdiction. G. W. Crockett, Number and Distribution of Black Judges
(March 1977) (unpublished chart provided by Nat'l Center for St. Cts.). Finally,
the pervasive educational requirements for admission to the bar make it inevitable
that state trial judges will be educated at a level higher than obtains in the com-
munities from which they come. KLEiN, LrLnco & MAvrIY, BAR ADmrssioN Ru.zs
AND STUDENT PRAcncE Ru.zEs 13-17 (1978).
301 No state death law suggests that the jury be instructed to guess community
sentiment. The jury's judgment controls, not its belief of the community view.
See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519, (The "jury can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate ques-
tion of life or death." (emphasis added)) (footnote omitted). See also Furman,
408 U.S. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); note 180 supra.
3 02 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236 (1978) (plurality opinion). The
Court seems unanimous on this effect.
303 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12. The quotation refers to what
women bring to juries, but it is clear from the text that exclusion of an "economic
or racial group" would pose the same problem. Id. 532.
304 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236 (plurality opinion). The Court seems unanimous
on this point Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). In Brown v.
Louisiana, 100 S. Ct. 2214, 2220-24 (1980), the Court applied Burch retroactively to
a case on direct appeal at the time Burch was decided. The plurality emphasized
that reduction in jury size "leads to less accurate factfinding" and reduces the
likelihood of "meaningful and appropriate minority representation." Id. 2222. The
plurality also stressed that "Burch established that the concurrence of six jurors was
constitutionally required to preserve the substance of the jury trial right and assure
the reliability of its verdict." Id. 2223. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun. Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in the
judgment on the ground that new constitutional rules should apply retroactively to
all cases then pending on direct review. Id. 2224-25.
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support an inference that a representative jury of adequate size is
also more likely than a single judge to reflect the community's
retributive sentiment. 30 5 Indeed, since capital sentencing involves
application of community values, whereas guilt-determination pre-
dominantly demands factfinding, the Court's conclusions would
seem to apply with even greater force in the capital sentencing
area. 06
A third argument in support of the proposition that juries are
more likely than judges to present the community view relies on
the Court's reasoning in applying the jury trial right to the states
in the first place. Duncan v. Louisiana and later cases gave the
following explanation in support of the decision to impose sixth
amendment jury trial requirements on the states:
Those who -wrote our constitutions knew from history
and experience that it was necessary to protect against un-
founded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted upon fur-
ther protection against arbitrary action. Providing an
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the com-
mon-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in
the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental
decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of un-
checked power, so typical of our State and Federal Govern-
ments in other respects, found expression in the criminal
805 Cf. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295-96 (plurality relies on the "actions of sen-
tencing juries" in support of its conclusion that "under contemporary standards of
decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion
of convicted first-degree murderers"). It is noteworthy, too, that the Woodson
Court refers at this point to the critical language in Witherspoon describing the
relationship between a sentencing jury and contemporary community values. See
text accompanying notes 289-90 supra. Cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972) (statutory requirement of jury determination in psychiatric commitment
proceedings permits the "jury [to serve] the critical function of introducing into
the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held In the community,
concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the State in confining a person
for compulsory treatment") (footnote omitted).
S06 Insofar as the sentencing process also involves factfinding, see notes 86 &
100 supra, traditional jury trial rights would apply. See note 320 infra.
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law in this insistence upon community participation in the
determination of guilt or innocence.3 7
Two years later, the Court in Williams v. Florida wrote that
"[g]iven this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies
in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the com-
munity participation and shared responsibility that results from
that group's determination of guilt or innocence." 308
This reasoning applies with greater force to the search for
reliability in death sentencing. In death sentencing, unlike tradi-
tional factfinding, there are no advantages to giving the respon-
sibility to the trial judge. In factfinding, the Court has acknowl-
edged that a trial judge may be more "tutored" than a panel of lay
persons,809 that is, more able to assess credibility, put lawyers'
arguments in perspective and apply the law to the facts.310 Despite
these possible advantages, a defendant is entitled to a jury sentence
for the reasons given in Duncan and Williams. The sole function
of the capital sentencing tribunal is to place the offender and the
offense on the scale of the community desire for retribution. Ad-
justing this delicate balance gains nothing from the trial judge's
expertise in finding facts and applying law, but would profit from
the "commonsense judgment" and "community participation" of
a representative jury of adequate size.
Duncan also provided "negative" reasons for imposing a right
to jury trial on the states. It told us that judges can be "compliant,
biased or eccentric." 311 These risks do not disappear at death sen-
tence proceedings. Furthermore, Duncan's reference to the "fear
of unchecked power," which has made us "reluctant" to give a
"group of judges" complete control over factfinding where "life
and liberty" are at stake,312 holds persuasively at capital sentencing,
where life, death and the community will must be reconciled. In
short, the dangers that Duncan saw in judicial control of guilt
0 7
1Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). See also Ballew v. Geor-
gia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978) (plurality opinion).
308 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
309 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
310 Id. 157. See also id. 188-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Untrained jurors are
presumably less adept at reaching accurate conclusions of fact than judges, particu-
larly if the issues are many or complex." (footnote omitted)). The Court did not
finally resolve the relative advantages of judge and jury as factfinders. The result
in Duncan did not turn on a finding or assumption that the jury was more adept
at the job.




determination speak clearly to Lockett's wish for reliability in death
sentencing. 13
Finally, whether a judge or jury sentences has empirical con-
sequence. Professors Kalven and Zeisel's studies show that juries
and judges disagree often on whether the sentence should be death
or prison. 14 The studies also show that judges impose death in
a substantially greater number of cases.3 15 Professors Kalven and
Zeisel report that out of 111 cases studied in which a defendant
was convicted of a crime that permitted a death sentence, the judge
would have sentenced to prison 74% of the time (eighty-three cases)
and the jury 81% of the time (ninety cases). The judge would
have given the death penalty 26% of the time (twenty-eight cases)
and the jury 19% of the time (twenty-one cases). The judge and
the jury disagreed on whether a particular defendant should be
sentenced to death in twenty-one of the 111 cases.316
If we focus solely on the thirty-five cases in which one, the
other, or both of the sentencers would have voted for death, the
extent of disagreement is even more stark. In 40% of these cases,
the judge and jury agree. But in another 40% of the cases, the
judge would impose death where the jury would not, and in the
remaining 20% of the cases, the jury would impose death where
the judge would not. Among cases where the death penalty is im-
posed, then, the judge and jury disagree 60% of the time.31l
Other studies confirm these disparaties.318
313Most judges do not hold life tenure, Tim Boox OF THE STATES 86-87
(1978), and accordingly may try to glean community sentiment before passing
sentence. But the sentencing judge will only be able to assess community senti-
ment in the abstract, not in relation to the facts of the particular case before him
or her. The most visible and vocal sentiment is likely to be in favor of the death
sentence and may erroneously be taken as the predominant community feeling on
the issue. John Carroll, an attorney at the Southern Poverty Law Center in
Alabama, was quoted after the Beck decision as saying:
The death penalty is big politics in the South. If you were down here
in Montgomery and saw the fervor for the death penalty, and heard the
governor's wife at a prayer breakfast saying, "I pray to God we have more
executions in Alabama," you would know the South is in the business of
killing people.
National Law Journal, July 14, 1980, at 8, col. 3. See also note 340 infra &
accompanying text. Lockett's requirement of individualized consideration demands
a discerning community attitude reflected through a jury confronted with a real
crime, a real defendant and a real decision. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-82.
314H. KALVEN & H. ZFasm, THE AamucAN JuRy 436 (1966).
315 Id. See also note 318 infra.
316 Id.317 See H. ZnmsEr, Soam DATA ON JmoR ATTrruDEs Tow ws CAPITAn PUN-
IsmiErr 37 (1968).
318 Florida is a good source of data because it provides for jury recommenda-
tions but judicial sentences. Consequently, both institutions are heard from and
we can learn the extent to which they agree.
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It seems likely, therefore, that we are not talking about al-
ternate routes to the same destination. The results in death cases
are strikingly different depending upon whom we select to sentence.
The Kalven and Zeisel study shows that in as many as 19%/ of
the cases in which death is an option, and 60%/ of the cases in which
it is chosen, either the judge or the jury misread the "community's
belief that [the crime is] so grievous an affront to humanity that
the only adequate response may be the penalty of death."3 19  My
earlier arguments, I believe, persuade that the errors are judicial.
This concludes my second reason in favor of constitutionally
required jury sentencing in capital cases. The jury is substantially
more likely than the judge to reliably reflect community feelings
on the need for a retributive response to the offender and
the offense. This greater likelihood, and the disagreement between
judge and jury, call for constitutional protection on the same risk-
avoidance grounds given in Gardner, Lockett and Beck. Further-
more, the dangers of unchecked power and of judicial bias, com-
pliance or eccentricity-all of which impede a reliable sentence-
Between 1975 and April 1980, trial judges in Florida sentenced 49 defendants
to death, despite jury recommendations of life. Isaly, Life Recommendations
Overridden by Judges (unpublished tally prepared for Jacksonville Citizens Against
the Death Penalty, Inc.). Professor Linda A. Foley studied capital cases in 21 of
Florida's 67 counties, for the period 1972 to 1978. judges overturned jury recom-
mendations about 12.6% of the time, reducing the sentence in 8.9% of the 56 cases
in which juries imposed death, and increasing the sentence in 13.9% of the 158
cases in which juries imposed life. Judges were more likely to be influenced by
the victim's race and socioeconomic status than were juries. With regard to
characteristics of the defendant, Professor Foley concluded:
There was no evidence that characteristics of the defendant influenced the
decisions made by the juries. However, many of these characteristics
(sex, employment status, relationship to victim, and type of attorney)
were related to the final decisions of the judges. In other words despite
the juries' unbiased recommendations the judges imposed the death penalty
in a manner that was biased against males and the unemployed.
L. Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision: Discrimination in the Imposition of
the Death Penalty (unpublished paper at the University of North Florida).
See also Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J.
97, 125 (1979) (Table 2). Professor Dix reviewed the first 66 death penalties to
reach the Florida Supreme Court under a post-Furman death penalty statute
enacted in 1972. Id. 124-25 & n.230. In 18 of these (or 27%), the trial judge
had rejected a jury recommendation of life and imposed death. This pattern
emerged despite a 1975 state supreme court ruling that it would not sustain a
death sentence following a life recommendation, unless "the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam).
The rejection rate would presumably be higher absent this caveat. In 13 of the
18 cases, the Florida Supreme Court overturned the trial judge's sentence. Id.
125 (Table 2).
319 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (footnote omitted).
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prevail at death sentencing hearings as elsewhere, with even more
severe consequences.
3 20
I now turn to my third reason for requiring jury death sen-
tencing. Whereas the second reason focused on the constitutional
value of the jury in an individual case, the third proposes a need
for the jury in death sentencing generally. I argue that the col-
lective sentencing decisions of capital juries are a constitutionally
necessary indicator of-in fact, define-whether the death penalty
in a class of cases or in all cases has ceased to reflect "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 321
C. The Need for a Pattern of Jury Responses
A third discrete argument for jury sentencing in capital cases
is that a jury is needed to gauge the community's "evolving stand-
220 One ancillary point deserves mention. Because most death penalty statutes
require at least one aggravating circumstance before death may be imposed, see
notes 86 & 175 supra, and because the Constitution may too, see note 108 supra, a
traditional "right to jury trial" analysis would require that these state-defined facts,
which could equally have been made a part of the definition of the offense at
the culpability stage, see note 100 supra, be determined by a jury. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979). United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977). Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980) (notice
and hearing required before state prisoner may be transferred to a mental institu-
tion); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1967) (pre-Duncan case re-
quiring that full due process rights be given a convicted defendant before he can
be sentenced under a harsher provision whose invocation depends on a "new
finding of fact"). If so, eight state death laws are now facially unconstitutional.
See Appendix I, infra.
Mitigating circumstances present another problem. Although the right to
introduce them is constitutionally recognized, see text accompanying notes 125-29
supra, the Constitution does not require that the sentencer do more than hear them.
Id. Only Connecticut and to some extent Colorado exclude death if both aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances are present. See Appendix I, infra. Since the
existence of an aggravating circumstance will, in every state but two, be sufficient
to entitle the sentencer to impose death, the absence of a mitigating circumstance
is not "a new finding of fae' that must be made in order to invoke the penalty.
I have argued that the defendant is entitled to have a jury make the final value
choice. It would be practically impossible to do that without considering evidence
in mitigation. I assume acceptance of a right to jury sentencing will therefore
bring with it jury determination of facts in mitigation as well.
On the first day of its 1980 Term, the Supreme Court agreed to review the
decision in Bullington v. Missouri, 594 S.W.2d 908 (1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 70 (1980) (No. 79-6740). Bullington had been charged with a capital
offense, convicted and, in a bifurcated proceeding, sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed his conviction in light of Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357 (1979). On retrial, the prosecutor again wanted to seek the death
penalty, although the evidence and aggravating factors were no different than those
introduced at the first trial. Bullington sought a writ of prohibition against the
trial judge's allowing the prosecutor to do this. The state supreme court rejected
his arguments. In assessing the constitutionality of a heightened sentence on retrial
of a capital case, the Supreme Court may discuss the nature of the factfinding
process at capital sentencing hearings. Its reasoning may elucidate whether the
defendant has a right to a jury determination of the facts.
321 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion).
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ards of decency" with respect to the death penalty, either in gen-
eral or in particular classes of cases. In the last eight years, eight
of the Court's current Justices have written or joined in opinions
that look to the pattern of jury verdicts in support of a con-
clusion about the death penalty's constitutionality, either generally
or for particular crimes. The Justices have told us that the jury
is an "even more direct source [than the legislature] of informa-
tion reflecting the public's attitude toward capital punishment;" 322
that the "jury ... is a significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values because it is so directly involved;" 323 that
"jury determinations and legislative enactments" were "the two
crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the
imposition of punishment in our society;" 324 and that "it is ...
important to look to the sentencing decisions that juries have made
in the course of assessing whether capital punishment is an appro-
priate penalty for the crime being tried." 3- Given this heavy
reliance on the results of jury sentencing, we must ask whether
society's evolving standards of decency, which inform the cruel
and unusual punishments clause, could be known were the jury
not used at all. We would then have only one major indicator
to inform us-legislation.3 2  Can death penalty legislation alone
reveal society's evolving standards of decency?
A strong indication that it cannot comes from the Court
itself. In Woodson, a plurality consisting of Justices Stewart,
Powell and Stevens cited jury refusal to convict in mandatory
capital cases to support its conclusion that these laws do not reflect
evolving standards of decency.327 In Lockett, Justice White was
322 Furman, 408 U.S. at 439-40 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.). See also id. 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
323 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
324 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
325 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (White, J., joined by Stewart,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.). Justice Marshall has not explicitly adopted jury sen-
tencing patterns as one indication of contemporary standards of decency. But cf.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 360-62 (Marshall, J., concurring) (considering opinion of an
informed electorate).
326 There would still be public opinion polls. Opinions have mentioned these
without enthusiasm. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. 385-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (summarizing poll results "without assessing
[their] reliability . . . or intimating that any judicial reliance could ever be placed
on them"). See generally Radin supra note 6, at 1036 & n.186. Cf. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion) (reference to statewide referendum on capital
punishment).
327428 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion). The plurality did not ignore legisla-
tive responses in assessing standards of decency. It noted the fact that between
1828 and 1963, every state had repealed its mandatory capital punishment statute.
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willing to say that the death penalty could not be used if the
defendant did not have "a purpose to cause the death of the
victim," 28 even though at the time "approximately half the States
[had] not legislatively foreclosed the possibility of imposing the
death penalty upon [such defendants]." 39 He relied on statistics
that showed that, despite these laws, defendants in this category
were rarely executed.330 Justice Brennan, in Furman, also relied
on the gap between legislative authorization of capital punishment
and the number of death penalties actually inflicted in support of
his argument that "contemporary society views this punishment
with substantial doubt." 831 "When an unusually severe punish-
ment is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because of
society's refusal, inflicted save in a few instances, the inference
is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it." 332
Finally, in Coker v. Georgia, a plurality consisting of Justices
Stewart, White, Blackmun and Stevens cited Gregg's observation
that the " 'jury . . . is a significant and reliable objective index
of contemporary values because it is so directly involved,' 333
and concluded that "it is thus important to look to the sentencing
decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing whether
capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being
tried." 334 Justice Powell concurred in this "reasoning" insofar
as it supported "the view that ordinarily death is disproportionate
punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman." 335
This discussion reveals that eight 336 Justices, while embracing
legislative judgment as a "crucial" indicator of society's evolving
Id. 291-92. The fact that thirty percent of the states enacting new death laws
after Furman chose mandatory ones was disregarded as a misguided response to
Furman's many opinions. Id. 299.
328 438 U.S. at 624 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
329 Id. 625.
3301d. 624-25. The statistics showed that "out of 363 reported executions for
homicide since 1954 for which facts are available only eight clearly involved indi-
viduals who did not personally commit the murder. Moreover, at least some of
these eight executions involved individuals who intended to cause the death of the
victim." Id. (footnotes omitted).
331 408 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
332 Id. It is unimportant that some of these predictions were proved shakey by
subsequent events or that other Justices disagreed. The Justices cited here were
willing to rely on other indicia of community standards-predominantly the jury-
even where these were seen to conflict with the legislative view.
333433 U.S. at 596 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion)).
334 Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (plurality opinion).
335Id. 601 (Powell, J., concurring).
336 See notes 322-25 supra. Justice Marshall acknowledged in Gregg that the
post-Furman death penalty enactments "have a significant bearing on a realistic
assessment of the moral acceptability of the death penalty to the American people."
428 U.S. at 232. But he argued that this response "cannot be viewed as conclu-
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standards of decency,337 are nevertheless expressly willing to look
beyond those judgments to learn whether they are accurate.
There is reason to do so. Each lawmaker confronts capital
punishment abstractly. No life depends on her vote. Legislative
response tells us the degree to which we are willing to have
laws permitting execution, but sentencing and execution tell us
the degree to which we are willing to carry them out.3 38 A statute,
furthermore, is static. It remains until changed. As public opin-
ion shifts, older statutes become less reliable indicators of current
values.339  Forces influence legislators that do not affect jurors. A
legislator may believe, for example, that death penalty proponents
in his constituency are more likely than its opponents to be single-
issue voters or are more likely to organize against him, if he op-
poses capital punishment, than will opponents if he supports it.
A constituency's willingness to vote based on a single issue and its
degree of organization likely influence a lawmaker's decision and
may skew the degree to which the pattern of legislation reflects
community sentiment.340 Of course, legislative action may ac-
sive" because the "constitutionality of the death penalty turns ... on the opinion
of an informed citizenry" and the "American people . .. if they were better in-
formed . . . would consider [capital punishment] shocking, unjust, and unaccepta-
ble." Id. (emphasis in original).
337 See text accompanying notes 196 & 197 supra. It should be remembered
that assessment of standards of decency is but one test in deciding whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual. The punishment must also comport "with the
basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment," Gregg,
428 U.S. at 182 (plurality opinion), and it may not be "disproportionate in relation
to the crime for which it is imposed." Id. 187. See also Coker, 433 U.S. at 592
(plurality opinion).
338 See Justice Whites statement in Lockett:
The ultimate judgment of the American people concerning the im-
position of the death penalty upon such defendants, however, is revealed
not only by the content of statutes and by the imposition of capital sen-
tences but also by the frequency with which society is prepared actually
to inflict the punishment of death. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). It is clear from recent history that the infliction of death under
circumstances where there is no purpose to take life has been widely re-
jected as grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime.
438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
339See T. SEzrUN, THE DETa PNALTY 11-12 (1959), pointing to the drop
in capital sentencing between 1936 and 1951 and the more rapid decline there-
after. The point is not that juries will so differ with the legislative judgment that
they will never or rarely impose a legislatively authorized capital sentence. Rather,
juries may so consistently decline to impose the death penalty in classes of cases-
felony murder cases, for example-that despite broad legislative authorization of
death in such cases, the pattern of jury response may indicate that standards of
decency have come to reject that use of the penalty.
340 N.Y. Times, July 30, 1980, at Al, col. 5; id. Apr. 27, 1980, § 1, at 31, col.
1; id., July 19, 1978, at 9A, col. 2. See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. RPv. 269, 318-19 (1975) (footnotes omitted):
In Witherspoon, despite evidence of change in attitudes toward the
death penalty, the Illinois law eliminating death-scrupled jurors was cal-
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curately reflect community sentiment on the acceptability of the
death penalty, either generally or in classes of cases. But without
a pattern of jury response, we cannot know whether this is true
or whether, instead, various political factors have combined to
obscure the community view. The jury, "because it is so directly
involved," 41 is needed to avoid guessing wrong.
Even if the legislative response is a useful but insufficient
index of the community view, it may be thought that judicial
sentencing patterns can supply the balance of the needed informa-
tion. But the Court has not relied on the pattern of judicial sen-
tencing as an indicator of society's evolving standards of decency.
Nor has it suggested that it might be one.342 The reasons, I sug-
culated to insulate the official state attitude favoring the death penalty from
changes In public sentiment. Even if an increasing number of citizens
had qualms about the penalty, that change could not be reflected in the
state's juries; only jurors expressing the state's official enthusiasm would be
allowed to serve, even though they represented a dwindling percentage of
the population. One might have hoped that the rules on jury eligibility
would themselves be legislatively altered as anti-death penalty sentiment
broadened and deepened, but the legislative situation seemed essentially
frozen as well. Although the Witherspoon Court did not address the issue
directly, It seems hard to deny that convicted murderers and the ad hoc
groups that coalesce around their dramatic but passing causes make a
singularly ineffective legislative constituency when compared with the con-
tinuing groups--such as policemen's benevolent associations-arrayed on
the other side. However widely or intensely humane opinion may con-
demn the death penalty as cruelly excessive (and however great the per-
centage of death-scrupled jurors), it remains likely that more votes will
be lost than won by the platform of abolition, or even by the platform
of reforming the statutory law to allow death-scrupled jurors to sit on
capital cases. And insofar as the death penalty is carried out too infre-
quently or discriminatorily to generate sustained political pressure for its
repeal, legislative rigidity will be reinforced, much as the rigidity of abor-
tion restrictions in most states seemed likely to be reinforced by the
safety valves available to the well-off.
Part of this excerpt is cited approvingly in Mattiss v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1019
n.27 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattiss, 431
U.S. 171 (1977) (per curiam).
3 4 1 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion). This argument may
be exemplified by the low execution rate for rapists. See Furman, 408 U.S. at
386-87 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This low rate might have led the Court
to invalidate death for rape of an adult woman prior to Furman, even though in
1971 sixteen states permitted execution of rapists. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (plurality
opinion). If legislative response were considered conclusive, or if there were no
pattern of jury response because no jury sentencing, this countervailing, emerging
pattern could not have been weighed in the decision. As it turns out, jury-imposed
rape sentences eventually did influence the court to declare capital punishment
unconstitutional for certain rapes. Id. 596-97.
342The Gregg plurality stressed that, between the 1972 Furman decision and
March 1976, more than 460 persons were sentenced to death. This figure appears
in a paragraph reviewing "the action of juries." 428 U.S. at 182. Many of these
death row inmates were in Florida, which gives final sentencing power to the
judge after jury recommendation. See note 52 supra. Neither in Gregg nor in
Proffltt, the companion case that upheld Florida's death law, did the Court isolate,
discuss or rely on the action of judges in death sentencing.
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gest, are the same as those earlier given for concluding that juries
are more likely than judges to produce reliable capital sentences
in individual cases. 343 If the risk of an unreliable death sentence
imposed by a single judge is equal to or greater than the risk held
impermissible in Lockett, then the pattern produced when weigh-
ing these sentences together cannot be a reliable indicator of
community standards. The Court's failure to weigh them together
is therefore support for an assertion of their individual as well as
their collective unreliability.3 44
IV. COMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCING JURY
A. An Autopsy on Witherspoon
I now discuss the composition of the constitutionally required
jury. I argue that the Court's death cases since Witherspoon v.
Illinois3 45 was decided in 1968 undermine its impractical and il-
logical conclusion 346 that jurors "irrevocably committed" against
death-death opponents-may be challenged for cause, though
scrupled jurors may not be.347 Death opponents, I shall argue, may
not be challenged for cause nor may their attitudes be inquired
into on voir dire.
2
4
8 See text accompanying notes 208-321 supra.
344 Should the defendant be permitted to waive a sentencing jury? As the
chart in Appendix I, infra, shows, some states now allow a defendant to do so;
others require the prosecutor's or court's concurrence. A defendant would pre-
sumably not waive a right to a jury sentence, unless he concluded that for the
category of crime of which he was convicted, judges are more lenient. Because
the eighth amendment protects defendants, not the state, there would be no bar to
allowing a defendant to seek a more lenient, if more unreliable, sentence. Whether
a state would have to give a defendant this option or could instead insist on re-
liability is a question I do not address. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965) (provision requiring concurrence of judge and prosecutor before jury can
be waived on culpability upheld since there is no constitutional right to have guilt
determined by judge); note 18 supra.
345 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
346 The conclusion was arguably dictum. See note 23 supra. I call the con-
clusion impractical for the reasons set out in note 391 infra and illogical for the
reasons discussed at text accompanying notes 348-91 infra.
347 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. Witherspoon involved challenges for cause only, not
peremptory challenges. The Court has routinely applied it. See, e.g., Davis v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478
(1969). The most recent application, in Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980),
is interesting mainly for what it reveals about the Court's revised view of the Texas
capital punishment law. See note 166 supra. Otherwise, Adams mechanically
applies Witherspoon, although in a somewhat different setting. Id. There is,
however, one clue that the Court might be less committed to the dictum in Wither-
spoon, if it is dictum, see note 23 supra, that a state may exclude death opponents
from capital sentencing juries. Adams quoted this assertion in Witherspoon, but
prefaced the quote with the statement that the Witherspoon Court "recognized
that the State might well have power to exclude [death opponents]." Id. 2525.
The use of "might" might be instructive, or it might be illusory.
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I first consider the logic of Witherspoon. An Illinois law 348
permitted the prosecution to challenge for "cause . ..any juror
who shall . . . state that he has conscientious scruples against cap-
ital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same." The Court
first held that it had "not been shown that this jury [from which
scrupled jurors were challenged] was biased with respect to the
petitioner's guilt." m9 But the jury also had the responsibility
for fixing punishment.so The Court said that it was "self-evident
that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this
jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner
was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 3rl
The petitioner was entitled, the Court said, not to have jurors
excluded "simply because they voiced general objections to the
death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction." 352 Then, in a crucial footnote, the Court
explained in detail the kind of inquiry that could be made of
prospective jurors:
Just as veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the
ground that they hold such views, so too they cannot be
excluded for cause simply because they indicate that
there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse
to recommend capital punishment. And a prospective
juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial
whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in
the case before him. The most that can be demanded
of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to
348 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §743 (1959). By the time Witherspoon reached
the Supreme Court, Illinois had passed a code of criminal procedure that did not
explicitly include this statute. Nevertheless, the state supreme court held that "a
section of' the new code incorporated former § 743. 391 U.S. at 512 n.1.
349 Id. 518.
350 At the time of the Supreme Court decision, the jury recommended punish-
ment, but the trial judge could reject the recommendation. This change did not
affect the reasoning in Witherspoon. 391 U.S. at 518 n.12. See also Beck v.
Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980).
351 391 U.S. at 518. Witherspoon was decided two weeks before Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), made the sixth amendments jury trial right bind-
ing on the states. Duncan was subsequently held to apply prospectively only.
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Therefore, Witherspoon cannot logi-
cally depend on the sixth amendments jury trial provision. In addition to the
Witherspoon language quoted in the text, the Court at another point says that the
death sentence in that case "would deprive [Witherspoon] of his life without due
process of law." 391 U.S. at 523. Witherspoon can therefore be seen as a four-
teenth amendment due process decision, informed by the values underlying the
sixth amendments guarantee of jury trial. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1,
616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). See also Adams, 100 S. Ct. 2523 (con-
struing the Witherspoon principle as based on "the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments").
352 391 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted).
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consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and
that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial
has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless
of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the
course of the proceedings.
353
I take this language to mean that a juror may not be challenged
for cause if there is any conduct for which he might vote an au-
thorized capital sentence. It may be that the crimes for which the
juror would consider death are few, but as long as there are any
such crimes he cannot be challenged. This interpretation of
Witherspoon is supported by the Court's statement later in the
same footnote that jurors may be excluded for cause only if they
"made unmistakably clear . .. that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them." 354 Federal and most state courts have agreed that
this is the Witherspoon test, although state courts have not always
been fastidious in its application. 55
353Id. 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
354 Id. (emphasis added). See also id. 516 n.9. This language was repeated
in Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. at 2525, and in Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. at 482.
Adams also restated the language in a manner supporting the textual interpretation:
"'A juror wholly unable even to consider imposing the death penalty, no matter
what the facts of a given case, would clearly be unable to follow the law of Illi-
nois in assessing punishment." 100 S. Ct. at 2526 (emphasis added). Exclusion is
also allowed if the juror's view would prevent an impartial determination of guilt.
391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
355 See, e.g., Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd
on rehearing, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980); note 391 infra.
There is language that would support a different interpretation of Witherspoon.
Under it, jurors would have to promise to consider the death penalty "in the case
before them," 391 U.S. at 514, 515 n.9. This has also been phrased as the obliga-
tion of the juror "to consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in a
particular case." Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. at 484. This language suggests
that the question to a prospective juror would be phrased positively:
Do you agree to consider the imposition of capital punishment in this
case?
rather than the negative question I have inferred:
Do you agree that you will not automatically reject the death penalty re-
gardless of the evidence?
The difference is substantial. The negative question allows a juror who would con-
sider death only in a narrow class of cases to take the oath. The positive question,
however, requires that the juror promise to consider the death penalty in all cases,
including the one on trial.
The ambiguity is not clarified by the composite way in which Justice Stewart
framed the test in Witherspoon. A juror must "be willing to consider all of the
penalties provided by state law, and ...not be irrevocably committed, before the
trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and
circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings." 391 U.S. at
522 n.21 (emphasis in original). The first clause of this test suggests that the juror
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The test is most curious. Consider this homicide: a man
robbing a bank, not planning to use his gun, nevertheless kills a
guard pursuing him. Among the prospective jurors at his trial,
one is a capital punishment opponent. She believes the state
should execute no one. A second juror believes the state should
execute almost no one but might make an exception for mass
murderers. Neither juror would "consider" the death penalty
for the hypothetical defendant. Under Witherspoon, the first
juror could be challenged for cause, but not the second. They
would give different answers when asked if they "would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of the death penalty" re-
gardless of the evidence. The first juror would answer yes. The
second could answer no because the evidence might show a mass
murder, the only case in which he would "consider" death. He
could not be asked his view about "the case before him." Even if
he gave it, he could not be challenged for cause simply because
there were "some kinds of cases" in which he would reject death.
"Some" here means less than all. So long as there is conduct for
which the second juror would consider death, he could say that he
is "not irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote
against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circum-
stances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings."
There are some "facts and circumstances" that might sway him.
must agree to consider the death penalty on the facts of the case before him, while
the second clause says that a juror is qualified to sit if he would ever consider the
penalty.
Other language in Witherspoon is consistent with the negative test. The Court
said that a juror may not be made to say "in advance of trial whether he would
in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him." Id. Further, a juror
is not excludable simply because there are "some kinds of cases" in which he
would "refuse to recommend capital punishment." Id. And finally, the Court
twice repeated the negative version of the inquiry without the positive component.
Id. 516 n.9 & 522 n.21. The negative inquiry was again repeated in Boulden v.
Holman, 394 U.S. at 482.
The language requiring prospective jurors to consider the death penalty in the
"particular case" can be reconciled with the less preclusive negative inquiry if
we do not take the words "particular case" to refer to the case's particular facts.
The juror would be promising to consider capital punishment "in the case before
[him]" depending on what the evidence shows the case to be. The juror need not
consider the death penalty regardless of the facts as long as he is prepared to do
so on at least certain sets of facts, perhaps only "the direst." Witherspoon, 391
U.S. at 515 n.9.
This view, indeed the negative test itself, with its emphasis on an obligation
not automatically to reject a particular verdict, raises other problems, which are
themselves complicated by the notion that even a death penalty opponent may be
able to "subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to
abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State." Id. 514 n.7. How
one manages this intellectual feat a dozen years after Witherspoon, when "the
law of the State" is hedged by a run of new eighth amendment decisions, is not
an easy question to answer. See also note 378 infra.
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At the outset, the facts of any "case before him" are unknown,
as they must be; he can therefore honestly say that he is "willing
to consider all of the penalties provided by state law." This,
Witherspoon tells us, is "the most that can be demanded." 111
This result is complicated by a further holding. Even my
first hypothetical juror may be able to take the oath, for Wither-
spoon also says that a person who does not "believe in the death
penalty" may nonetheless be able to "return a verdict of death." 357
A "juror who believes that capital punishment should never be
inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition" might
be able to "subordinate his personal views to what he perceived
to be his duty to abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law
of the State." 351
What is the "law of the State" in this context? In 1968, the law
of Illinois was (a) that only persons who do not have "conscientious
scruples against capital punishment" were permitted on capital
juries, and (b) that the jury decides the sentence in capital cases.
Witherspoon rejected the first rule (in part because of the second),
but permitted a less restrictive one. The state could challenge for
cause those persons who were unalterably opposed to capital
punishment and would not vote for death regardless of the evi-
dence. Is the Illinois law, as limited by Witherspoon, the "law"
that the juror who subordinates his or her own view is promising
to "obey?" What form does the obedience take? It must neces-
sarily be something that recognizes the state's interest in its power
to exclude death opponents from the jury.
Witherspoon is of little help in identifying this state interest.
It tells us that a state that excludes only those jurors "who would
not even consider returning a verdict of death . . . could argue
that the resulting jury was simply 'neutral' with respect to
penalty." 359 Is the state interest, then, in a "neutral" jury? "Neu-
tral" is a poor word to describe either the composition of the
jury to which the state is entitled or the obedience obligation of
356 See White, Witherspoon Revisited: Exploring The Tension Between Wither-
spoon and Furman, 45 U. CN. L. REv. 19, 20 (1976). An additional anomaly
is that my two jurors may always vote alike. A promise to "consider" a penalty is
not a promise to choose it. Although the second juror might not have foreclosed
the possibility of death for a category of defendant, he may nevertheless vote
against it even for persons in that category-just not "automatically." This state
of affairs puts a premium on not fully making up one's mind.
357 391 U.S. at 514.
358 Id. 514 n.7. The same thought is expressed in Boulden v. Holman, 394
U.S. at 484. Compare the expression of this possibility with the failure to inquire
into it in the cases cited in note 391 infra.
359 391 U.S. at 520.
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each juror. A person who is strongly, but not always, in favor
of the death penalty for murder and one who is strongly, but not
always, opposed to it are not "neutral" in their attitude toward
capital punishment, and neither would be the jury on which either
viewpoint predominated. Yet under Witherspoon neither person
could be challenged for cause. Neutrality is more properly used
to describe the position the state must assume in making rules for
jury selection. A state is neutral if its rules permit jurors willing
to consider the death penalty in fewer than all cases but more
than none. This, in fact, is how the Court uses the word else-
where in the opinion. 60
If a promise to "obey the law of the State" does not carry an
obligation for each juror to be neutral, what does it require? I
attempt a conceptual answer to this question in the next section,361
but a practical one is also possible. It would seem at least that
Witherspoon forbids exclusion of death opponents who can con-
ceivably vote as scrupled jurors. If my first hypothetical juror,
therefore, is willing to "subordinate [her] personal views," even if
only in mass murder cases, she is in the same legal position as my
second juror. Both can say that they will not vote automatically
against death regardless of the evidence, for if the evidence shows
mass murder they will "consider" a capital sentence.3 62
B. The Trouble with Witherspoon
The logic of Witherspoon proves troublesome at both ends-
its justification for requiring Illinois to include scrupled jurors,
and its justification for permitting it to exclude opponents of
capital punishment who cannot subordinate their personal views.
With regard to the former, if Illinois could have written the moral
360 Id. ("But when [the State] swept from the jury all who expressed conscien-
tious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who opposed it in
principle, the State crossed the line of neutrality"). The requirement of neutrality
is appropriately seen as a limit on state authority for the protection of the defendant.
For while it is theoretically possible for the state to pass rules increasing the chance
of a lenient jury-thereby making it not neutral in the defendant's favor-it is
unlikely to do so or to be challenged successfully if it does.
861 See also note 378 infra.
. 62 A factual difference between the two jurors remains. The death opponent
must subordinate her personal view while the other juror need not, since it is his
personal view that death may be an appropriate penalty for mass murder. But
Witherspoon has concluded that the death opponent may be able, in the eyes of
the law, to set her personal views aside and so, for our purposes, the two jurors are
in the same situation. How the death opponent manages "to consider" and choose
a sentence if she may not use her own moral judgment-a judgment that has led
her to the irrevocable opposition to death she has promised to "subordinate"-is a
question the Court does not answer.
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equation to mandate death, or to require death unless the jury
unanimously chose life, why could it not exercise the seemingly
lesser power to restrict the sentencing decision to jurors with a
particular moral bias? The Court's answer to this question-that
Illinois itself did not choose to make death the "'preferred penalty' "
but only an "'optional' " one for the jury to "'select or
reject' "363-is unconvincing insofar as it rests on a suggestion
that the Court was merely deferring to the state's decision. 364
I have suggested 65 that, instead, the Court was offended by the
choice of a jury followed by an effort to control its composition
to predispose it toward death. Language throughout Witherspoon
indicates that it was not considered fair play to leave a life or
death decision to "a tribunal organized to return a verdict of
death," 366 to a "hanging jury," 367 or to a "stacked . . . deck."368
I return shortly to the satisfactoriness of this explanation as a basis
for Witherspoon's conclusion. 69
The Court held, at the other end, that the use of a jury did
not preclude the state from challenging death opponents. Other
than to suggest that a state may be entitled to a jury " 'neutral'
with respect to penalty," 370 or to a juror able "to obey the law of
the State," 371 Witherspoon and later cases 372 do not focus on the
precise state interest that permits exclusion of death opponents.
Illinois, by statute,3 73 had disclaimed a position on the sentencing
outcome in any one case or class of cases. Believing that some
who commit capital crimes should die and some should not, and
363391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (quoting People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 369, 197
N.E.2d 436, 442 (1964)) (emphasis added by Supreme Court).
364 The Illinois court had already said otherwise about the state's decision,
People v. Witherspoon, 36 IMI. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967), and on that issue
it controls, Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). It has not been sug-
gested that Witherspoon would have to be decided the other way if Illinois, on
remand, legislated its intention to make death the "preferred penalty." The use
of a jury conclusively prevented such a decision as a matter of federal law.
365 See text accompanying note 295 supra.
366 391 U.S. at 521 (footnote omitted).
367 Id. 523.
368 Id. Witherspoon makes more sense today, when the state no longer has
the greater power to mandate death, but only the power to authorize its considera-
tion by another.
369 See text accompanying notes 383-86 infra.
370 391 U.S. at 520.
371 Id. 515 n.7.
372 Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122
(1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S.
478 (1969).
373 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3(c) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
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also believing that it was either impossible or unwise statutorily
to separate the two groups, Illinois left the decision to a jury.3 74
The legislative will would not have been frustrated if all capital
defendants received life or if they all received death.375 It is un-
likely that either result was desired, however, for Illinois chose
not to accomplish either goal, as it might have, by adopting a
mandatory death law370 or by abolishing capital punishment.
A capital punishment opponent, who by definition strikes a moral
balance inconsistent with the state's, interferes with the state's
permissible legislative objective by coming to the sentencing in-
quiry committed to the abolitionist position the legislature has
rejected. If unanimity is required for a death sentence, one capital
punishment opponent on the jury makes imposition of one
of the states's authorized penalties impossible.377 This interfer-
ence with a permissible state goal, then, might seem the basis of
a power to exclude death opponents.378
Interference with a more specific state goal-a jury capable of
returning a death sentence in the very case to be tried-did not
3 74 By designating certain offenses and not others as capital, of course, the
state separates out those who may not be executed. Of the capital offenses, it may
make death mandatory for all, some or none. Illinois, along with other states,
chose note to attempt narrow definitions of mandatory death crimes, but made death
discretionary in all capital cases. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-200,
204 (1971).
375 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
376 Mandatory death laws were not declared unconstitutional until 1976. Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
377 The issue of the need for unanimity is discussed at notes 72 & 76 supra &
accompanying text and at text accompanying notes 412-18 infra.
378 In this view, a juror obeys the law of the state by not taking an abolitionist
position in the jury room. Even an abolitionist can do this if he is prepared to
"subordinate his personal views." 391 U.S. at 514 n.7. See also id. 522 n.21.
Adams, which is a mite more expansive on what it means to obey a state's death
penalty law, is in accord. Referring to Witherspoon, the Adams Court wrote:
[T]he Illinois law in effect at the time Witherspoon was decided required
the jury at least to consider the death penalty .... A juror wholly unable
even to consider imposing the death penalty, no matter what the facts of a
given case, would clearly be unable to follow the law of Illinois in assessing
punishment.
100 S. Ct. at 2526. Likewise, Adams concluded that for a juror "to obey his oath
and follow the law of Texas, he must be willing not only to accept that in certain
circumstances death is an acceptable penalty but also to answer the statutory
questions without conscious distortion or bias." Id. Given the need in Adams to
reconcile the approval of the Texas statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976),
with the subsequent plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
see note 166 supra, the Court may have concluded that an appearance of continuity
prevented use of the Witherspoon phrase "consider the death penalty" in describing
the role of a capital jury in Texas. That must nevertheless be what the jury does
or it would not have been necessary to bifurcate its lawful role. That is, it would
not matter whether a prospective juror were unable to "accept that in certain
circumstances death is an acceptable penalty," so long as he could "answer the
statutory questions without conscious distortion or bias." 100 S. Ct. at 2526.
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trouble the Court. The decision to use a jury, Witherspoon held,
prevented the state from pursuing this goal by inquiry into a
juror's views about the case before him or her,370 even though
mandatory death laws were then permissible. Is there a prin-
cipled difference between the general and the specific goals, so
that the decision to use a sentencing jury allows inquiry and chal-
lenge to achieve the former but not the latter? I argue that there
is no such difference and that Witherspoon's holding, that the
use of a sentencing jury prohibits exclusion of scrupled jurors but
not of death opponents, draws an arbitrary38 0 distinction that can-
not pass inspection. Witherspoon might have been seen, at the,
time, as going too far or not far enough. I do not resolve this ques-
tion, for I also conclude that intervening decisions make the
choice clear. A state may exclude neither death opponents nor
scrupled jurors from the required sentencing jury, for reasons
different from those Witherspoon advanced to prohibit exclusion
of scrupled jurors alone.
The distinction between scrupled jurors and death opponents,
for purposes of challenges for cause, is one of degree, not kind.
As we have seen, no juror may be asked her view on the case
before her.88' As the number of classes of cases in which a juror
is unwilling to vote for death increases, approaching all, the pos-
sibility that a death sentence will be returned decreases. As long
as the number of cases in which the juror will not vote death
does not increase to all cases, however, Witherspoon does not permit
challenge for cause. Accordingly, Witherspoon would prohibit a
state, in a single-victim murder case, from excluding a juror who
would consider death only if the facts showed mass murder, but
permit, in the same case, exclusion of a juror who would not
consider the death penalty even for mass murder. On these facts,
the decision to draw a line between the scrupled juror and the
death penalty opponent is just that, a decision to draw a line. It
is no answer to say that the state has a principled right to a jury
conceivably capable of returning one of its authorized penalties
because, even under Witherspoon's distinction, it does not truly
have this right. A jury from which scrupled jurors have not been
removed is conceivably capable of returning a capital sentence
only because Witherspoon does not permit us to ask scrupled
jurors whether they would consider death in the case about to be
M 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
380 See note 116 supra.
381 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
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tried.382 It is our ignorance of each juror's attitude about capital
punishment (except that each does not unalterably oppose it) that
makes the jury conceivably capable of voting for death. Likewise,
if no juror were asked his or her views of capital punishment, we
would not know if any were death penalty opponents, and so the
jury selected would also be conceivably capable of returning one
of the state's authorized sentences. True, if we make no effort
to exclude death opponents (as well as scrupled jurors), the pos-
sibility that the jury will return a death sentence is reduced, but
this supports my argument that we are dealing with a matter of
degree, not principle.
In this view, a principled decision in Witherspoon would
have been either
(a) that the nature of the jury requires states using them
for capital sentencing to permit participation of all views
in the community, as Justice Douglas argued in concur-
rence; 383 or
(b) that a state may challenge jurors who would not con-
sider death in the case before them, for the same reasons
that it may mandate or prefer death.3 4
We may not agree with the rule leading to either result, but
Witherspoon's stopping place is supported by no rule at all. Its
meaning is to locate at some arbitrary point on a spectrum the
degree of risk a state must accept that a sentencing jury will be
incapable of returning an authorized verdict.
Witherspoon's difficulty lies in the fact that its conclusion
rests on slogans about stacked decks and hanging juries,38 5 instead
of on careful reasoning, and in its failure satisfactorily to explain
why a state, which could then mandate or prefer death, could
not require that prospective jurors be willing to consider death
in the case on trial.386 Rejection of Witherspoon's rationale may
thus seem as much an argument for its partial overruling as for
its extension. While this may have been so when the case was
decided, it is no longer. As I try to show in the next section of
this Article, support for an argument that a state may exclude
3821d.
383391 U.S. 510, 523 (Douglas, J., concurring).
384 Mandatory death was then permitted. Id. 519 n.15. A state may have
preferred death in a number of ways. See note 100 supra and text accompanying
notes 94-100 supra.
385 See note 295 supra & accompanying text.
3886 See text accompanying notes 292-94 supra.
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scrupled jurors has been undermined by the same shift in theory
leading to the demise of mandatory death laws and to Lockett v.
Ohio's increase in sentencer authority.8 7 This shift also establishes
that the state is disabled from excluding death opponents. 38  Fur-
ther, aside from its slogans, Witherspoon does contain, mainly in its
footnotes, useful analysis, which the Court then chose not to follow
to a logical conclusion.8 9 This language is worth resurrecting, in
view of the theoretical shifts mentioned above, because it neatly
combines the eighth amendment theory expressed in Trop v.
Dulles390 with the later approaches of Woodson v. North Carolina
and Lockett.391
387 See text accompanying notes 144-66 supra.
388 See text accompanying notes 392-411 infra.
389 See text accompanying notes 289-96 supra.
390356 U.S. 86 (1958).
391 Witherspoon presents four peripheral problems, which are worth noting
here. A revision in Witherspoon's theory will ease or remove each.
First, it has been unenthusiastically received in the lower courts and often
wrongly applied. See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Burns v.
Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1980); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967 (1979). See generally Comment, Jury Selection and the Death
Penalty: Witherspoon in the Lower Courts, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 759 (1970); Com-
ment, Death Prone Jurors: The Disintegration of the Witherspoon Rule in Texas,
9 ST. MARY's L.J. 288 (1977); Armot., 39 A.L.R.3d 550 (1971 & Supp. 1979).
Consider these cases. In Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 607, 626-27 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1977), aff'd, 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979),
following extended questioning, juror Martin was excused for cause after she said:
"I don't think I could sit on ... [the jury] if there's a death penalty.... I would
have to say that I do not think I could vote for the death penalty. I really don't;
because I'm a mother." 361 So. 2d at 626. The court asked: "Let me ask you
this, Mrs. Martin. Is your attitude toward the death penalty such that it would
prevent you from making an impartial decision?" The answer: "I think so, Your
Honor." Id. 627. The trial court's excusal of Mrs. Martin was upheld on appeal.
In Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 21-22, 222 S.E.2d 308, 316, cert. denied, 428 U.S.
910 (1976), a challenge for cause was upheld against a prospective juror who said
he would under no circumstances vote to impose the death penalty, but who also
said that he would follow the judge's instructions. In Arnold v. State, 236 Ga.
534, 537-39, 224 S.E.2d 386, 390-91 (1976), the prosecutor addressed the panel
as a group and asked if any were "conscientiously opposed to capital punishment."
Several prospective jurors stood. The prosecutor then asked whether any of those
standing would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the
evidence. Several jurors were excused for cause and the result was upheld. In
Dobbs v. State, 236 Ga. 427, 431, 224 S.E.2d 3, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
975 (1977), excusal for cause was upheld because the prospective jurors stated that
they were "unalterably opposed to capital punishment under all circumstances."
In none of these cases was Witherspoon's fine distinction explained or an effort
made to go beyond the juror's initial categorical rejection of capital punishment.
In one case, it was enough that the juror did not "think" she could be "impartial."
Opposition "to capital punishment under all circumstances" was sufficient in two
cases to conclude without further examination that the juror would automatically
reject the death penalty, regardless of the instructions and regardless of the
evidence. No effort was made to see if the juror could "subordinate his personal
views." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514 n.7. In the fourth case, individual question-
ing was held unnecessary. Compare with the cases listed in this note, the questions
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C. The Reliability Interest in the Composition of a
Capital Sentencing Jury
1. The Existence of the Interest
Witherspoon's concern with jury composition works better
if seen as a manifestation of Lockett's theory that the Constitution
has a heightened interest in reliability in death sentencing. Cap-
ital sentencing decisions will be influenced by several variables,
which I have listed earlier.3 92 One variable is the identity of the
found unacceptable in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-65 (1970). Assuming
Witherspoon has vitality, these cases and others collected in the authorities cited in
this note show the regard it receives is often perfunctory.
A second problem Witherspoon presents is that it enables prosecutors indirectly
to do what they may not do directly. For Witherspoon says nothing about
peremptory challenges of scrupled jurors. The Witherspoon inquiry spotlights
scrupled jurors who, having identified themselves, are the obvious targets of the
prosecutor's usually adequate number of peremptory challenges. The prosecutor
generally has 10 to 20 challenges in a capital case, enough to "purge" the jury.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. AtN. §913.08(1)(a), (2) (West 1973) (10 peremptory
challenges); CA. CODE ANN. §59-805 (Harrison 1965) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (20 peremptories); Imn. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-30-3 (Burns 1979) (same); To Establish Rational Criteria for the Imposition
of Capital Punishment: Hearings on S. 1382 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
of the U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978) (statement of Hans Zeisel).
Although it is not necessary that a scrupled juror identify himself if the Witherspoon
inquiry is exactly phrased, a reading of many cases with Witherspoon challenges
shows that many jurors do. A jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die," 391 U.S. at 521, though rejected by Witherspoon, is obtained anyway, not
through the state's legislature but through its prosecutor. Cf. Note, The Defendant's
Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 Hnv. L.
REv. 1770, 1781 (1979) (arguing that the sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury prevents the prosecutor from peremptorily challenging prospective jurors based
on "group affiliation").
There are two other dangers. The history of Witherspoon shows that its
application has not been easy. If lawyers have had problems with it, jurors surely
will. Many do not understand its elusive distinction or appreciate that they may
be firmly against capital punishment in nearly all (or even all) cases and still take
the oath. Jurors may believe, when asked if they would consider the death penalty,
that the reference is to the case before them, an outline of which may have been
provided. So there is first a danger that the ambiguity of language and the fineness
of the distinction will cause jurors conscientiously but wrongly to excuse themselves.
Cf. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515 n.21 (recognizing the ambiguity of the phrase
"conscientious or religious scruples" about capital punishment). Professor Zeisel
has empirically shown the ambiguity of the phrase "scruples against the death
penalty." H. ZEisEI, Somm DATA oN JUROR ArrrronDs TowaRDs CprrAL PuNiSH-
mENT7-10 (1968). There is also a danger that a juror who promises to "consider"
the death penalty and not vote "automatically" against it will feel that he has
offered more than Witherspoon requires him to deliver. The prosecutor and fellow
jurors may encourage this belief by recalling the promise on summation and in
deliberations.
392 See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra. Two variables are the informa-
tion available to the sentencer and its permissible use. Lockett disallows legislative
restriction on mitigating information that the sentencer receives and also forbids
legislative directives on how to treat aggravating or mitigating factors. See note
115 supra.
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sentencer. Between judge and jury, I have argued that the Con-
stitution requires a jury because it is better able to reflect com-
munity sentiment.3 93 If so, the composition of the jury is im-
portant.394 If it is constitutional for a state to exclude jurors
based on their views of the death penalty, then by definition the
decision of a jury formed under such state rules cannot be con-
stitutionally unreliable. It is only if the Constitution controls the
composition of death sentencing juries that a more exclusive state
provision could produce a constitutionally unreliable result.
Does the Constitution control composition of the required
sentencing jury? If, as I earlier argued 395 in support of jury over
judge sentencing, reliability is a function not only of the informa-
tion provided the sentencer but of the identity of the sentencer
as well, it follows that there is a reliability interest of constitutional
dimension in the composition of the jury. Given Lockett's re-
quirement that even marginally mitigating information be ad-
missible, 39 6 and Green v. Georgia's subsequent rejection of an
otherwise valid hearsay rule if used to exclude a mitigating fact,
3 97
it would defeat the goals of these cases and those served by a re-
quirement of jury sentencing if a state could limit jury service to,
for example, a dozen death enthusiasts. It is not to honor Wither-
spoon's unfocused qualms about stacked decks and hanging juries,
but rather to support Lockett's quest for a reliable sentence that
the Constitution should be seen to govern not only the information
a sentencing jury may independently weigh but jury composition
as well.
Perhaps the strongest language endorsing this view comes
from Witherspoon itself, which in part sounds very much like a
decision born of reliability concerns. "[A] jury," Witherspoon tells
us, "can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death." 39 8 Witherspoon then cites much-quoted eighth amend-
ment analysis from Trop v. Dulles, a noncapital case, and connects
it with the capital punishment issue:
393 See text accompanying notes 297-320 supra and note 300 supra.
39 4 In the following discussion about jury composition, I am concerned only
with inclusion or exclusion of jurors based on attitudes toward capital punishment
I assume that traditional equal protection and fair cross-section requirements apply
to a capital sentencing jury as any other. See generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
395 See text following note 297 supra.
396 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (plurality opinion).
397442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
398 391 U.S. at 519.
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[O]ne of the most important functions any [capital sen-
tencing] jury can perform in making a selection is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system-a link without which the determ-
ination of punishment would hardly reflect "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 890
This language anticipates Lockett's reliability theme. Con-
stitutional limitations on the manipulation of a capital sentencing
jury based on the capital punishment views of prospective jurors
should be seen as emanating not from the sixth amendment right
to jury trial (as in Witherspoon)400 but, in accord with Lockett
and Woodson, from the eighth amendment's insistence on reli-
ability in capital sentencing.401 An eighth amendment analysis
works better with subsequent capital punishment cases and avoids
the logical difficulties of Witherspoon's "hanging jury" approach.
Concluding, however, that there is an eighth amendment "reli-
ability" interest in the composition of a sentencing jury does not
end the inquiry. What does that interest require?
2. The Content of the Interest
I have argued that the motive for imposition of the death
sentence in a particular case is retribution.40 2  For some crimes
"the public demands the ultimate penalty for the transgressor,"
said Justice Powell in Furman v. Georgia, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.4 3  And Justices
Stewart, Powell and Stevens concluded in Gregg v. Georgia that
"the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanc-
tion in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to hu-
manity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of
death." 404 Justice White has expressed similar sentiments.405
399Id. 519 n.15 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion)). See also
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 & n.7 (1977) (tying the Trop v. Dulles
language to capital sentencing generally).
40oSee note 351 supra, for discussion of the constitutional basis of the decision
in Witherspoon.
401 See also Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2390, 2392 (1980), reversing a
death sentence because the absence of a lesser included offense charge "enhance[d]
the risk of an unwarranted conviction" for an "impermissible reason" and thereby
contributed to the introduction of "a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the
factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital case."
402 See text accompanying notes 251-62 supra.
403 408 U.S. at 454 (Powell, J., dissenting).
404428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (footnote omitted).
405 Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325, 353-54 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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If the reason to permit capital punishment in a particular
case is to give the community an opportunity to express its "belief"
or "demands" that the "ultimate penalty" is required, this reason
would seem to disable the state from excluding from the jury a
significant 406 segment of that community, identified solely by its
view of the very subject on which the jury is expected to speak.
For example, we would not expect to accurately elicit the com-
munity's retributive view if only ardent death penalty supporters
were permitted on the jury. This seems to be a matter of reli-
ability as worthy of constitutional attention as the risks of un-
reliability that led Lockett and Green to apply constitutional rules
of evidence at capital sentencing hearings and Beck to require
lesser included offense charges at capital guilt trials. If, in other
words, we start with the premise that, in a particular case, a cap-
ital sentence gives the public an opportunity to express its retribu-
tive wish,407 the reliability principle underlying other capital cases
should forbid legislative attempts to condition jury service on a
threshold willingness to be retributive. It seems logically to fol-
low that death opponents, as a distinct voice in the community,
408
are included among those who may not be denied jury service
because they are unwilling to be retributive, unless persuasive
reasons counsel otherwise. There are two possible reasons.
The first reason is that inclusion of death opponents pre-
vents the state from having a jury conceivably capable of returning
one of its authorized verdicts. I have already shown this is true
even under a traditional Witherspoon theory, and that we are only
talking about the degree to which the jury will be so incapable.40 9
Under a reliability theory, the possibility that the jury will not be
able to return a death penalty on the facts revealed-either be-
cause death opponents on the jury defeat the penalty or because
some jurors will refuse to vote for death under the circumstances
406 1 conclude that one of six or seven people in the nation are death opponents.
See note 425 infra.
4 0 7 See text accompanying notes 253 and 259-62 supra.
408 The distinctiveness of the death opponent's voice in the chorus of com-
munity retributive sentiment is self-evident, significantly more so than the distinctive
"flavor" or "quality" which the Court has concluded women bring to culpability
juries. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357 (1979). Cf. Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Man-
date for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CArw. L. REv. 776, 780 n.36 (1977) (suggesting
that under-representativeness or discrimination on the following bases raise a
constitutional question: "religious beliefs, sex, age, geography and political beliefs
or values"). See also note 303 supra & accompanying text; Note, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715,
1735-38 (1977).
409 See text accompanying notes 381-82 supra.
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of the case-is irrelevant. The state has no right to mandate that
a death penalty be imposed, only a power to authorize its imposi-
tion by a jury,410 as an expression of the community's retributive
will.411 The stark inconsistency between the idea of reliability
and the notion that the legislature is entitled to a jury capable
of returning one of its authorized verdicts is clearest if we envision
a community, of which there may be several in the United States,
in which more than half the population are death opponents.
Could the state exclude all death opponents from capital juries
in these communities? Reliability-measured by the degree to
which the capital sentence is likely to reflect the community's
retributive will-would be sacrificed if it could. Lockett tells us
that, in a contest between reliability and the power of the legisla-
ture to increase the risk of death, reliability wins.
The second, and more substantial, argument in opposition
to permitting death opponents on sentencing juries is that, given
unanimity requirements, a lone death opponent will be able to
frustrate the will of what may be the overwhelming majority of
the community. Indeed, permitting this veto power seems in-
consistent with the very reliability theory which I have urged to
justify nonexclusion of death opponents. On the other hand, if
we permit states to rewrite unanimity laws to prevent this veto
power, one might rightly ask whether we have engaged in an ex-
tended exercise in futility. My tentative conclusion is that states
may rewrite unanimity laws, within bounds I discuss hereafter,
and that this power does not make the result futile. In discussing
how I arrive at that conclusion, I also describe what I see to be
the constitutionally recognized role of the death penalty opponent
in the jury room.
3. The Effect on Unanimity Rules
Today, all death statutes providing for jury sentencing ex-
plicitly or implicitly require unanimity before the death penalty
may be imposed.412 The Court has not, however, held unanimity
in capital sentencing to be constitutionally required.413  If a state
410 See text accompanying notes 168-344 supra.
411 See text accompanying notes 251-62 supra.
4 12 See note 72 supra and text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
413 It has, of course, held that unanimity is not required in determining guilt
of noncapital defendants. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). And it
has, as a matter of statutory construction, required unanimity in a unitary capital
trial, on both guilt and sentence. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
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may not challenge (or even inquire about 414) death opponents on
the jury, can it then change its unanimity requirement so that a
less than unanimous sentencing jury may impose the death sen-
tence? The same reliability theory used to prohibit exclusion
of death opponents suggests that a state may choose to make this
change. We deal with an uncompromising choice, life or death.
There are no gradations. If unanimity is constitutionally re-
quired in a community most of whose members support capital
punishment, a lone death opponent will be able to prevent a ma-
jority's choice of execution. The reason the death opponent may
not be excluded from the jury in the first place is to make its
verdict reliable in the constitutional sense. A state may, though
it need not, conclude that a unanimity requirement will destroy
reliability by giving a minority of one veto power over what may
be the abiding community view.
Why open the jury to death opponents if states may rewrite
unanimity laws to discount their votes? Elimination of unanimity
does not, of course, mean substitution of a simple majority re-
quirement.415 There is no inconsistency between required inclu-
sion of death opponents and power to repeal a unanimity provi-
sion. The rule against exclusion does not envision that the death
opponent, in the jury room, will convert others to his way of
writing the general moral equation or, barring that, will have
power to veto theirs. Rather, it is intended to assure that de-
liberation over penalty, as applied to the facts of a particular
offense and offender, will not occur without the participation of
an identifiable community voice of significant 416 dimension. To
participate, that voice must be heard and weighed in the only
body constitutionally empowered to impose death-the jury.417 By
excluding the death opponent, we exclude a distinct moral view
about the value of life from a deliberation whose starting point
is the value of the offender's life. Reliability would seem to re-
quire that that view-rejected in the general, legislative debate-
nevertheless be heard during the jury's assessment of a particular
offender and offense.
414 See text accompanying notes 446-52 infra.
415 See text accompanying notes 419-45 infra.
416 See note 425 infra.
417 I do not mean to suggest that every capital sentencing jury must have a
death opponent on it, any more than the Supreme Court was suggesting in Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975), that every criminal jury include women-




In this regard, it seems imprecise to say that a death opponent
may be excluded if he is unwilling to "consider" death.418 It
is likely that death opponents have given death much "considera-
tion," concluding that it is never called for. Other jurors may
have given the matter the same consideration, deciding that death
is rarely, sometimes or often called for. Still, other jurors may not
have considered the issue at all and are prepared to vote as their
emotions and instincts and the arguments of their colleagues move
them. Under a reliability theory, persons who have considered
and excluded death as an acceptable punishment must be im-
mune to challenge from the sentencing jury precisely so that the
values informing their considered conclusion-values shared by
others in the community-can be applied to and argued in terms
of the "unique" facts of the particular offense and offender.
Concluding that unanimity may not be constitutionally re-
quired leaves open the question whether any minimum for ex-
ecution is required. May a simple majority control or is a greater
number needed? The following section identifies constitutional
limitations on the number of jurors that may be allowed to sen-
tence to death.
D. Constitutional Limitations on Nonunanimous
Jury Verdicts
If my argument regarding unanimity is correct, states will
be told that they may not exclude death opponents from the sen-
tencing jury because they represent a significant community posi-
tion on the value of life, which in the interest of reliability, must
be permitted to join the capital sentencing deliberation. Al-
though, contrary to suggestion,419 states did not dilute unanimity
requirements following Witherspoon 420 a state may now choose to
take some steps to prevent a minority voice from becoming a veto.
I have offered my explanation of why a state would be permitted
to repeal a unanimity requirement. The open question is one of
degree. How far may it go? To a simple majority? 421
418 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
419 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 542 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
420 See note 76 supra.
421 In the following discussion, I assume a capital sentencing jury of twelve,
which all states that use juries to sentence now appear to provide. I do not
consider whether a state may have a capital sentencing jury of fewer than 12. See
note 298 supra.
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There are few signposts. We have been told that nine mem-
bers of a twelve person jury may convict of a noncapital offense
without offending the due process clause 42 2 and that ten members
of a twelve person jury may do so without offending the sixth
amendment's jury trial guarantee.423  We do not know if smaller
majorities of a twelve person jury would be tolerated, but a sub-
sequent decision of the Court disallowing a conviction returned
by five members of a six person jury suggests they would not be.
424
Aside from these indicators, we have the evolving constitutional
interest in reliability to balance against the risk of unreliability
as the majority slips toward bare.
We should discount at the outset one solution which casual
examination might suggest. That solution would identify the
minimum majority by reference to the community's percentage
of death opponents 4 5-using a majority of eight, for example if one-
422 johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360-62 (1972).
423 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972).
424 Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979). The Court has also held
that conviction of a nonpetty offense by a unanimous five person jury denies the
accused the constitutional right to trial by jury. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,
228 (1978). In Burch, the Court emphasized that it was expressing no opinion on
"the constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts rendered by juries comprised of
more than six members." 441 U.S. at 138 n.11. This may refer to juries larger
than six but fewer than 12. Rejection of the five-sixths (.834) verdict of a six
person jury is some evidence that the Court would not accept a two-thirds (.667)
verdict of a twelve person jury. It is true that Johnson accepted a 9/12 (.75)
verdict under the due process clause, but the Court emphasized, as did Justice
Blackmun in concurrence, that this was a "substantial majority of the jury." 406
U.S. at 362, 366. One wonders whether an 8/12 majority is still "substantial" when
a 7/12 majority is only bare. See generally Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling
to Determine an Optimum jury Size and Fraction to Convict, 1975 WAsH. U. L.Q.
933.
425 It is not easy to identify the number of death penalty opponents. In the
last two decades the number of Americans answering "no" when asked if they
"favor" the death penalty for murderers has fluctuated from substantial minorities
(above 25%) to, on occasion, a majority of those having an opinion. In G. GALLup,
ThE GAL.rLu POLL 754 (1978), answers to the question "Are you in favor of the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" were: yes, 65%; no, 28%; no opinion,
7%. The poll was taken in 1976. Witherspoon, on the other hand, cites a 1966
poll showing that 42% of Americans favored capital punishment with 47% opposed
and the rest undecided. 391 U.S. at 520 n.16. See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181
n.25. Some polls have phrased the question differently, asking the respondent:
"Do you believe in capital punishment (the death penalty) or are you opposed?"
without mentioning a crime. V CmnME.T OPINION 41 (1977). In 1977, the year
showing the greatest support for capital punishment and the last year for which
figures are available, 67% of the respondents indicated that they did "believe in"
the death penalty, 25% were opposed and the balance unsure. In 1965, the year
with the greatest opposition, the results showed 38% "believing in" the death
penalty, 47% opposed and the rest unsure. This poll also gave respondents examples
of actual crimes and asked whether "all" or "no one" who commits those crimes
should be executed or whether it "should depend on the circumstances of the case
and character of the [defendant]." The number of persons answering "no one" to
the more serious crimes is substantially smaller than the number who say they are
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third of the population from which the jury is drawn consider
themselves death opponents, or a majority of ten if one-sixth do.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it is unlikely
that the jury will actually mirror the population. Using my ex-
amples, if one third of the population is opposed to death, there
is only a 23.8% chance that one third of the jury will be. If one
sixth of the population are death opponents, there is only a 29.6%
chance that one sixth of the jury will be. In each case, it is more
than twice as likely as not that a randomly selected jury will con-
tain a percentage of death opponents different from the percent-
age in the general population.426  Second, even persons who in
"opposed" to capital punishment. The question produced the following results in
1973 and 1977 for the following two crimes:
Killing a policeman
or prison guard All No one Depends Not sure
1977 49% 14% 33% 4%
1973 41 17 38 4
First-degree murder
1977 40% 13% 44% 3%
1973 28 16 53 3
The 13% to 17% of the samples answering "no one" are our best:indicators of
the size of the segment of the population excluded by a rule permitting challenge
for cause of death opponents. It is true that some of the people in this category
may be prepared, if asked, to "subordinate" their views and consider the death
sentence nonetheless, but I make no deduction for this contingency for two rea-
sons. First, it seems to me unlikely that jurors will appreciate what is being asked
of them by this question. Second, the few who do and who also agree to perform
the mental feat involved will almost inevitably be challenged peremptorily by the
prosecutor. See note 391 supra.
This conclusion on the percentage of death opponents is confirmed by the
work of Professor Zeisel, who has studied what people mean when they say they
have "scruples against the death penalty." In a 1968 poll, 34% of respondents
answered "yes" when asked if they had "conscientious or religious scruples against
the death penalty." Of these, 53% (or 18% of the entire sample) indicated that
their nffrmative answer meant that they would never vote for the death penalty
"under any circumstances." These were the death opponents. Thirty-eight percent
of scrupled jurors (or 13% of the entire sample) indicated either that they would
vote for death for the "most terrible murderers" or that they would vote for death
in cases in which "there were no mitigating circumstances." H. ZzmsE., SomE
DATA ON JurtOR ATTrrrEs TowAans CAPITAL Puiqs mENT 7-9 (1968). See gen-
erally Davidow & Lowe, Attitudes of Potential and Present Members of the Legal
Profession Toward Capital Punishment-A Survey and Analysis, 30 MERca L.
REv. 585, 594 (1979).
426 1 thank my colleague Lewis Komhauser for his assistance in determining
the probabilities contained here. Further analysis, also benefiting from Professor
Kornhauser's aid, shows that for each of my hypothetical populations the chance
of obtaining a jury with the indicated number of death opponents, where the popu-
lation consists of the indicated fraction of death opponents, is as follows:
one-third one-sixth
the chance of a 12 person the chance of a 12 person
jury with jury with
2 death opponents is .13 0 death opponents is .11
3 death opponents is .21 1 death opponent is .27
5 death opponents is .19 3 death opponents is .20
6 death opponents is .11 4 death opponents is .01
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response to a poll describe themselves as having a particular posi-
tion on the death penalty may, after hearing the evidence and the
arguments of their peers, change their views. Polls cited earlier
show that views do change.427  Those who identify themselves
as death opponents in polls may, in the jury room, faced with
opposing arguments and the facts of an actual crime, give a dif-
ferent answer. The opposite is also true: those who say in polls
that they are willing to consider the death penalty may, faced with
that responsibility, conclude that they are opposed to it. The
recognition that general views may alter in the face of real facts
underlies both Woodson and Lockett, which found execution too
critical to leave to categorical legislative determination with no or
little individual consideration. A death penalty decision that leads
to an actual penalty of death tests "standards of decency" in a way
that a decision to favor or oppose the idea of a death penalty does
not.
In short, it is not possible to know, except roughly, that part
of the population that is truly opposed to the death penalty or to
expect that the sentencing jury will mirror it. It is therefore
futile to choose the level of majority support solely by reference
to what the polls tell us is the number of people who consider
themselves unalterably opposed to capital punishment. While
this number may inform our decision to some extent, its elusive-
ness makes it an inadvisable determinant. The wiser course would
seem to be to ask: What majority will give us an abiding feeling
that the jury has reliably and reflectively spoken for the com-
munity whose retributive sentiment we expect it to convey?
Although the "bright line" that eluded the Court in Burch v.
Louisiana428 and Ballew v. Georgia,4 29 is consistently absent here,
there are some guides. Resolution of the minimum majority ques.
tion lies at the intersection of judgment and the statistical jury
studies the Justices have recently appraised.430  In other cases
427 See note 425 supra.
428 441 U.S. at 137.
429 435 U.S. at 231-32 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. 245-46 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
430 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231 n.10 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). See also Burch,
441 U.S. at 138 (citing "same reasons" as contained in Ballew). Judgment may
be substantially more important than the statistical jury studies. One recent article
takes a narrow view of the utility of empirical studies in determining appropriate
jury size in criminal cases. Whether a jury of a particular size can afford a de-
fendant the right to jury trial, it concludes, is a legal-not an empirical-question:
"Because the Court cannot offer a definition of the rights that juries exist to pro-
tect in terms of variables that social scientists are capable of studying, social scien-
tists cannot effectively use their techniques to determine whether the use of smaller
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pondering jury size and majority minimums, the Court has been
guided by what states have actually done.431 It has also used this
practical guide in divining the content of the eighth amendment.
432
So should it for the question here, which incorporates both sub-
jects-the jury and the eighth amendment. As I have shown, the
states, even after Witherspoon limited their power to control jury
composition, increasingly required unanimity before the sentencing
juries could vote for a penalty of death.433 Every post-Furman
statute providing for jury sentencing does so, too, most of them
explicitly.4
34
A second guide for the Court is the respective interests of the
parties in avoiding an unreliable sentence. There is some ques-
tion whether the constitutional interest in reliability is intended
to protect the state at all. Although Lockett, Woodson and Green
fashioned rules to protect the defendant's interest in reliability,435
I assume the Constitution recognizes a state interest in execution,
if that is the community will.436 Unreliability on the side of mercy
is less consequential to the state, however, than an unreliable sen-
tence is to the accused. From the defendant's perspective, the con-
sequences of a death sentence are enormous and self-evident. From
the state's perspective, if the minimum majority is not met, the
defendant does not go free, as he would at trial, but receives a
prison sentence as long as the state may wish to impose.
A third influence is the fact that death sentencing statutes
routinely require consideration of aggravating circumstances. 437
The Constitution grants the right to introduce all relevant miti-
gating circumstances. 438 Proof of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances will generally raise factual questions, the resolution
of which will determine whether the defendant lives or dies. In-
sofar as death sentencing involves not simply a decision about
retribution and mercy, but the finding of facts as well, it is
juries adversely affects those rights." Lermack, No Right Number? Social Science
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 951, 972 (1979).
431 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Blaclamun, J.). Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-72 (1970). Burch, 441 U.S. at 138.
432 See notes 186-207 supra & accompanying text.
433 See notes 75-76 supra & accompanying text.
4 34 See notes 72 & 73 supra & accompanying text.
4 35 See notes 144-66 supra & accompanying text.
436 See notes 117 & 344 supra.
437 See Appendix I, infra.
438 See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
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analogous to the factfinding process at the guilt trial.439 Research
does not reveal that any state permits a finding of guilt of a cap-
ital charge on less than unanimity. Although in Johnson v.
Louisiana the Supreme Court permitted as not inconsistent with
due process a nine-twelfths jury verdict, Johnson was a noncapital
case. 440 The ubiquitous state laws requiring unanimous jury
agreement on the factual predicates for capital conviction should
therefore be instructive.
441
A majority of nine, drawing from Johnson v. Louisiana, seems
the starting point of an attempt to fix a minimum, but I reject a
three-fourths floor as too low. The ratio acceptable for imposing
death should, I suggest, be higher than the ratio minimally 442 ac-
ceptable for finding the existence of an element of a noncapital
crime. In addition, it does not seem to me to be necessary to permit
a twenty-five percent dissent in order to compensate for the non-
exclusion of death opponents, who on the average are thirteen to
seventeen percent of the population. 44 A three-fourths majority
would also fail to assure the reflective and deliberate assessment
that the jury must perform if its decision is going to honor the
demand for heightened reliability in capital sentencing. Given
current unanimity requirements, a three-fourths minimum would
be an unacceptable overreaction.
This leaves ten or eleven jurors as the constitutionally com-
pelled minimum before a twelve person jury could impose execu-
tion. Other than my mention of the several considerations listed
above, I do not attempt to resolve whether the lower number would
satisfy the constitutional interest in reliability. Indeed, this dis-
cussion must remain tentative because one primary informant, as in
other jury line-drawing cases, 44 will be what states actually do
should the Court accept the arguments in this Article. If an over-
whelming number of states choose continuation of the unanimity
439 See note 320 supra, suggesting that when factual issues are involved in death
sentencing, there may be a right to a jury on these. See also note 100 supra, on
burden of proof on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
440406 U.S. at 358 (armed robbery).
4
4 1 It is possible that unanimity was required in post-Furman statutes precisely
because the sentencing process involves not only the application of a moral standard,
but the determination of facts as well. It may be that juries will continue to have
to be unanimous on factual predicates for a death penalty even if a smaller number
may sentence.
442 See note 424 supra.
443 See note 425 supra.
444 See notes 428-29 supra & accompanying text.
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requirement or establish an eleven person minimum, that would be
instructive on the unacceptability of statutes permitting execution
on the vote of a lesser number.44 5
E. The Effect on Peremptory Challenges and Voir Dire
Permitting the death opponent to add his voice to the jury's
consideration of the appropriate authorized penalty obviates the
need to inquire about the death penalty view of prospective
jurors. 446 There would be no need to elicit death attitudes because
there would be no legitimate use of the information.44 7 This con-
445 See text accompanying note 431 supra. Cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S.
at 138 & n.12 (in invalidating nonunanimous six person jury verdicts, the Court is
"buttressed . . . by the current jury practices of the several States"); Balew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. at 244-45 & nn.42 & 43 (plurality cites to practices in other states
in invalidating provisions for unanimous five person jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (Court states that its decision invalidating jury selection
procedures which systematically exclude women from jury panels "is consistent with
the current judgment of the country, now evidenced by legislative or constitutional
provisions in every state and at the federal level").
4461 earlier suggested that this inquiry is confusing to prospective jurors. It
identifies scrupled ones, who can then be peremptorily challenged. See note 391
supra. Forbidding such inquiry 'will end this backdoor evasion of Witherspoon.
Evasion can be ended in another way worth mention. Voir dire on death penalty
attitudes can be conducted by the trial judge with the lawyers absent but with a
reporter present. The trial judge would exclude death opponents but not scrupled
jurors. The prosecutor would then not know the jurors in the second group. At
an appropriate time, defense counsel would have an opportunity to review the
transcript of the judge's voir dire and argue the validity of his exclusionary rulings.
Jurors, of course, are routinely queried about qualification for jury service, often by
a clerk, with no counsel present. This additional inquiry would simply recognize
an additional qualification in a particular kind of case. I realize that from the
defendant's point of view, there might be a right to be present at this judicial voir
dire, either personally or through counsel. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S.
35, 38-41 (1975); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975); FED. R.
Ca. P. 43(a). Since the purpose of the process is to blindfold the prosecutor,
exclusion of the prosecutor alone might be acceptable. Compare Hovey v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, -, 616 P.2d 1301, 1354, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 181
(1980), where the court, under its supervisory powers, instructs that in all "future
capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals
with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually
and in sequestration." The court reaches this conclusion after considering psycho-
logical studies indicating that open-court death-qualification has a tendency to
encourage capital sentences.
447 In Witherspoon, after the Court concluded that a prospective juror could
not be excluded because of scruples against the death penalty, it held that he could
not "be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the
extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded of a
venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties pro-
vided by state law ... ." 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. In other words, once It was held
that the existence of scruples against the death penalty could not lead to a challenge
for cause, prospective jurors could no longer be asked about such scruples, regardless
of whether the prosecutor may have wanted to learn this information as a basis for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Unfortunately, scrupled jurors may reveal
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clusion is not affected by the separate debate over the proper scope
of voir dire at guilt trials, where elicited information will be used
to exercise peremptory challenges." 8 It has been suggested that to
enable the wise exercise of peremptories, a court should permit in-
quiry "into any area connected with (1) a significant legal or factual
aspect of the case, or (2) a conspicuous characteristic of a party or an
important witness." 449 Courts have generally been more restric-
tive.4 0 The present inquiry raises different questions. Voir dire at
guilt trials attempts to learn about actual or possible states of mind
of prospective jurors with regard to the issues or the litigants or the
law sought to be enforced. Based on this information, a party may
seek to have a juror challenged for cause or, failing that, challenge
him peremptorily. Peremptory challenges are used when bias is
not proved sufficiently to win a challenge for cause.451 In either
case, the mechanism is intended to eliminate bias, real or perceived,
against the challenger or for the adversary.
Perhaps uniquely in the death sentencing area, we expect jurors
to come to court with an attitude toward the issue to be decided.
It is their collective attitude (standards of decency, retributive
wishes) that the Constitution requires be applied to the offender's
life and offense. Unlike already formed attitudes at the guilt stage,
which are targets of the traditional challenge system, attitudes
toward capital punishment are an expected ingredient in capital
sentencing. There is no reason to assist the exercise of a challenge
based on the existence of these attitudes. There is consequently no
their scrupled views during the effort to eliminate death opponents. See note 391
supra.
A parallel area, though not exactly so, is obscenity. There the jury may be
expected to determine the community standard with regard to the allegedly obscene
material. Nevertheless, in a federal obscenity trial in Iowa, it was held not error
for the court to refuse to ask prospective jurors "about their understanding of
Iowa's community standards . . ." Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 308
(1977). "A request for the jurors' description of their understanding of community
standards," said the Court, "would have been no more appropriate than a request
for a description of the meaning of 'reasonableness."' Id. See also Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138-40 (1974) (within court's discretion not to ask how
educational, political, and religious beliefs affect juror's view of obscenity).
448 See generally Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27
STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to
Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. Rr~v. 1493 (1975).
449 Note, supra note 448, at 1515.
450 Id. 1505 n.48.
451 Id. 1502-03. Cf. Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation
of Groups on Petit juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1716-24 (1977) (acknowledging
elimination of bias as a proper use of peremptories but suggesting limitations when
they are used to exclude certain groups from petit juries).
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corresponding need to elicit information from each juror about
them. 5 2
CONCLUSION
So long as there are nonmandatory capital punishment laws,
we will need a way to select those we execute. Furman expressed
an unfocused and unsupported (though not necessarily unsupport-
able) belief that the selection process was haphazard and unprin-
cipled. States appeased Furman's process qualms with substantive
changes: they narrowed, by appending aggravating circumstances,
criminal acts that could be capitally punished, and they allowed
consideration of evidence supporting mercy. The retreat from
Furman began with the 1976 death cases. The Court recognized
that evenhandedness in judging whole lives was illusive, that dis-
cretion was inherent and largely unreviewable, and that arbitrari-
ness could be met only when the fact or risk of it was egregious.
Lockett's emphasis on uniqueness and individualization shifted the
eighth amendment focus still further away from arbitrariness, in
effect rejecting it as a useful doctrine at the selection stage of
capital punishment administration. Godfrey, in turn, reasserted
that arbitrariness would continue to be a focus in Court review of
a statute's operation at the definition stage.
Lockett's idea of reliability echoes a sentiment voiced a decade
earlier, but not pursued, in Witherspoon. Lockett's premise should
encourage us now to reconsider Witherspoon to avoid its artificial
distinction between scrupled and death-opposed jurors. Likewise,
45 2 See note 447 supra. Cf. Note, The Defendant's Right to Obiect to
Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HAnv. L. RFv. 1770, 1781
(1979) (arguing that the sixth amendments guarantee of an impartial jury pre-
cludes the prosecutorial exercise of a peremptory challenge solely upon the ground
of the prospective juror's "group affiliation"); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 170 (1979).
If death penalty opponents may not be challenged for cause nor their views
elicited on voir dire, what about the prospective juror who will automatically vote
for death regardless of mitigating evidence? See Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d
297, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1968) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970), cited in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521 n.20. On the one hand, since that
view may reflect a not insignificant community position, it may be argued that it
must not be excluded if the jury is to be reliable. On the other hand, the Court
has said in Woodson that legislatively mandated death sentences are unconstitutional,
see note 3 supra, and in Lockett that a capital defendant is entitled to individualized
consideration of his life and offense. A jury composed of persons who would vote
automatically for death despite instructions otherwise would seem to undercut the
goals of Woodson and Lockett. If so, and this is an issue I do not resolve here,
then challenges for cause of such persons might be proper, as would voir dire
inquiry, possibly shielded from defense counsel, see note 446 supra, so the court
could identify them.
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we should acknowledge what Witherspoon foresaw as the increased
capital sentencing reliability if juries sentence. Reliability is in-
creased because the only purpose of each capital sentencing hearing
is to measure the offense and offender against a dual retributive
standard, which in turn draws content from community values.
The gravity and finality of capital punishment requires the greater
reliability that jury sentencing provides, no less than reliability and
its appearance in death sentencing required the results in Gardner,
Lockett, Green v. Georgia and Beck v. Alabama. The rules for
which I argue here also have, I believe, the salutary effect of giving
capital sentencing power to members of the same society whose
evolving standards of decency are a test of its legality.
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APPENDIX I
ANALYs*s oF CuRRENT STATE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
The following chart summarizes certain provisions of the capi-
tal punishment laws of thirty-five states. The provisions chosen for
summary amplify arguments or observations made in the text. In
addition to these thirty-five states, capital punishment laws exist in
Vermont, New York, the District of Columbia, and the United
States Code, which are not summarized here. The text, note 48
supra, contains a discussion of the reasons for these omissions and
of the status of the Alabama and Massachusetts statutes, which are
summarized, and of the former Ohio and Rhode Island laws, which
are not. In some places the summary incorporates judicial inter-
pretation. See, e.g., note 153 supra, discussing cases in Mississippi
and Nebraska.
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State ALABAmA1  ARION.A
ALa. Code tit. 13, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Statute §§ 11-1 to -9 § 13-703
(1977) (Supp. 1978)
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0 Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
' For the current status Alabama's death penalty law, see Article notes 48
& 288, supra.
2 Guilty and no contest pleas not permitted in capital cases. ALA. CoDE tit.
15, §§ 15-20 (1977).
3 This result was accomplished after Lockett by the state supreme court's
decision to save the statute's constitutionality by severing the portion of it that
would have required a negative answer to these two questions. State v. Watson,
120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). Sub-
sequently, the state legislature amended the statute to bring it into compliance with
Lockett. 1979 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 144 (West).
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State AKANSAS CALIFORNIA
Ark. Crim. Code Cal. Penal Code
Statute §§ 41-1301 to -1309 §§ 190.1 to .6
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
4 If death is possible, the defendant must be tried and sentenced by a jury.
Aim. R. Ca. P. 31.4 (1977).
5 While the Arkansas statute says the jury "shall" impose death if aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating ones, it also contains an unusual provision re-
quiring the jury to find that the "aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of
death beyond a reasonable doubt." Aim. CIM. GoDE § 41-1302(1) (c) (1977).
6 The judge must empanel a new jury. If it cannot agree, he may empanel
another new jury or impose a life sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West
Supp. 1980).
7 The unusual structure of the California statute calls for judgment here. See
id. § 190.2-.3.8By implication. See id. § 190.4(a).
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Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh' the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
9 Colorado has a two-tiered structure for mitigating circumstances. If a mit-
igating circumstance listed in COLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5) is present, the
sentence must be life whatever aggravating circumstances are also present. If a
mitigating circumstance listed in § 16-11-103(5.1) is present, the "trier of fact"
must decide if it is "sufficient to justify a sentence of life imprisonment." Id.
§ 16-11-103(4) (Supp. 1979). If it is not, death "shall" be imposed.
10 Connecticut's capital punishment law is unique in one regard. It enumerates
five mitigating circumstances. But it states that the sentence shall not be death,
if any mitigating factor exists, whether statutorily defined or not. In other words,
unlike the practice in every other state (except to some extent Colorado), a
Connecticut jury, once it finds a mitigating fact, whether enumerated or not, does
not have the power to balance or weigh the mitigating fact against any aggravating
fact that may be present. The very existence of a mitigating fact precludes a
death sentence. An Act Revising the Sentencing Procedures for Imposition of the

















































Del. Code tit 11, Fla. Stat Ann.
Statute § 4209 § 921.141
(1979) (West Supp. 1980)
Effective date 1977 1972
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
" There is provision for jury waiver if conviction follows bench trial or plea,
but it is not clear if the same is true if conviction follows jury trial. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(b)(l)-(2) (1979).
'2The trial judge decides sentence in Florida, but there is a provision for
jury recommendation whether conviction follows a plea, or a jury or bench trial.
The judge may ignore the recommendation, within limits. See note 52 supra. The
defendant may waive the advisory jury. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West
Supp. 1980).
13 This is not clear on the face of the statute, but it has been so construed by
the Supreme Court, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978), no doubt to
justify upholding its constitutionality following Lockett.
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State GEORGA IDAHO
Ga. Code Ann. Idaho Code
Statute §§ 26-3102,27-2503 to § 19-2515
-2514, -2528, -2534, -2537 (1979)
(1972, 1977 & Supp. 1977)
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances"outweigh' the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
14 See note 72 supra.
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State Iiumors INDIANA
Il. Ann. Stat ch. 38, Ind. Code Ann.
Statute § 9-1 § 35-50-2-9
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, It has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.15 Illinois requires life unless the jury decides unanimously that there are "no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
16 There is a provision for a non-binding jury recommendation to the judge
where guilt was determined by a jury trial.
17 There is an ambiguity here. If there is a jury recommendation, the statute
says the jury "may" recommend death if a statutorily defined aggravating circum-
stance exists and it is not "outweighed" by mitigating circumstances. The court
then makes the final determination. But if there is no jury, the judge "shall"
impose death if aggravating circumstances exist and there are no mitigating ones
or if the aggravating ones outweigh the mitigating ones.
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State KENTucKy LOuisxANA
Ky. Rev. Stat La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann.
Statute §§ 532.025 to .075 arts. 905-905.9
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0 Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it In each such case, I assume the state has it.
18 Kentucky's Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.82(1) requires a jury's verdict to
be unanimous. Ky. R. CGav. P. 9.82(1) (1972).
j9 Jury trial may not be waived. LA. CODE CauM. PNo. ANN. arts. 557, 780,




Md. Ann. Code Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 279,
Statute art. 27, § 413 §§ 53-56
(Supp. 1980) (Michie/Law Co-op. 1980)
Effective date 1978 1979
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
20 Massachusetts does not permit guilty pleas or jury waiver in capital cases.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 263, § 6 (West Supp. 1979). The Massachusetts law
cannot take effect until the state constitution is amended. Opinion of the Justices,
372 Mass. 912, 364 N.E.2d 184 (1977); District Attorney for the Suffolk District
v. Watson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2231 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1980).
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Miss. Code Ann. Mo. Ann. Stat
Statute §§ 99-19-101 to 99-19-107 §§ 565.006 to .016
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-




Mont. Rev. Code Ann. Neb. Rev. Stat.
Statute §§ 46-18-301 to 46-18-404 §§ 29-2519 to -2525
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reasonable doubt 2 '
* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
,s that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
21 Nebraska has a procedure under which three judges may sentence. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 29-2520 (Supp. 1978). The requirement that an aggravating circum-
stance be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt is in case law. State v.
Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
22 Nevada provides for sentencing by a panel of three judges, if the defendant
was not convicted by a jury or if the jury cannot unanimously agree on sentence.
NEv. Rs v. STAT. §§ 175.552, 175.556, 175.558 (1979).
23 New Hampshire does not permit jury waivers on guilt of capital offenses.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANNmr. § 606:7 (1974).
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N.M. Stat. Ann. N.C. Gen. Stat.
Statute §§ 31-18-14, 31-20A-1 to -6 §§ 15A-2000 to -2003
(Supp. 1979) (1978 & Supp. 1979)
Effective date 1979 1977
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
24 New Mezico has a provision allowing either party to request a jury to
sentence where conviction follows plea. There is no other jury waiver provision.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1(B) (Supp. 1979).
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State OXLAHOMA OREGON
Okla. Stat Ann. tit 21, Or. Rev. Stat.
Statute §§ 701.10 to .15 § 163.116 (1979)
(West Supp. 1979-80)
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
25 Oregon's law copies the Texas statute approved in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976), except the findings are made by the judge. If the three specified
aggravating circumstances are present, death is mandatory.
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State PERMsVA SoUrT CAROLINA
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S.C. Code
Statute § 1311 §§ 16-3-20 to -28
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (Supp. 1979)
Effective date 1978 1977







Judge's power if jury sentences
Proportion of jury that
must agree on sentence:
-for death
-for other
































































* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
26 Pennsylvania permits the defendant and state to waive the jury only if the
culpability trial was before a judge or there was a plea. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 1311(b) (Pardon Supp. 1980-81).
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State SoUTH DAKOTA TENNnsSEE
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Tenn. Code Ann.
Statute §§ 23A-27A-1 to -47 §§ 39-2404 to -2406
(1979) (Supp. 1979)
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-




Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Utah Code Ann.
Statute art. 37.071 §§ 76-3-206 to -207
(Vernon Supp. 1979) (1978)
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.2 7 Apparently, a capital defendant in Texas may not waive a jury on culpability
or sentence. TEX. CODE Caim. PRoc. ANN. arts. 1.13-.14, 26.14 (Vernon 1966 &
1977); Ex parte Dowden, 580 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
2 8 See note 152 supra.
2 9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1978).
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State VmnIa WASmINGTON
Va. Code Ann. Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
Statute §§ 19.2-264.2 to .5 §§ 9A.32.040 to .047,
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0 Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, it has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
30 Virginia's unique law does not permit the jury to impose death unless it
finds that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" or that the
defendant's "conduct in committing the offense . . .was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE § 19.2-264.2 (Supp. 1980).3 1 Once a jury finds an aggravating circumstance and no outweighing mitigating
ones, it must affirmatively find (a) beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
"would commit additional criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing threat to society" and (b) that guilt was established "with clear certainty."
WAs REv. CODE AxN. § 10.94.020(10) (Supp. 1980-81). If it so finds, death is
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* Most of the capital punishment laws also contain instructions for when both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found. Generally, the sentencer is
instructed to "consider" or "weigh" the two and to impose death only if the
aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigating ones. Consequently, since the
sentencer does the weighing, It has complete power to choose the sentence. This
is so even if the statute contains the word "shall." In other words, a statute that
says that the sentencer "shall" impose death if the aggravating circumstances
"outweigh" the mitigating ones, cannot fairly be said to be a mandatory death
statute since the sentencer has the weighing authority. Consequently, I do not
analyze the statutory provisions where both aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are present.
f In some cases, statutes which provide for a burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt do not say who has it. In each such case, I assume the state has it.
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APPENDIX II
SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DECISIONS
SINCE Witherspoon v. Illinois
I provide here, for readers less familiar with the sequence of
United States Supreme Court death penalty decisions, a chronology
and brief summary of each of the major and some of the minor
ones. I begin with Witherspoon v. Illinois,' the first case in the
modern era of capital punishment litigation.
Witherspoon held that when states use juries to decide penalty
in capital cases, the sixth and fourteenth amendments prohibit
challenges for cause of people who, while opposed to the death
penalty, are willing to "consider" it though not necessarily in the
case about to be tried. On the other hand, jurors who are un-
alterably opposed to capital punishment could be challenged for
cause.
In McGautha v. California,2 the last major death penalty case
in the Supreme Court to have an opinion subscribed to by a major-
ity, the Court rejected two arguments of condemned people. First,
the Court rejected the fourteenth amendment argument that a state
could not give a jury power to sentence in capital cases unless it
also provided the jury with standards to guide its discretion.
Second, the Court rejected the due process argument that when the
state used a sentencing jury, it was required to have a bifurcated
trial.
Furman v. Georgia3 is probably the most famous of the
Supreme Court's capital punishment decisions, although only part
of its reasoning may have survived later cases. In Furman, five
Justices (Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall), writing
five separate opinions, invalidated every death penalty and death
penalty statute in the nation. All five Justices relied on the eighth
amendment. Three rested on the manner in which death laws
were administered. The other two (Brennan and Marshall) thought
capital punishment unconstitutional under all circumstances. Four
Justices (Chief Justice Burger, and Blackmun, Powell and Rehn-
quist) dissented.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided five death penalty cases.
The leading one, Gregg v. Georgia,4 held that the death penalty
1391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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was constitutional under the eighth amendment if administered in
the proper way. The principal plurality opinion, by Justices
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, concluded that Georgia had passed a
death statute meeting the objections to the statutes invalidated in
Furman. As they had in Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall
maintained that capital punishment was unconstitutional under the
eighth amendment. The remaining Furman dissenters and Justice
White also voted to uphold the Georgia statute. Two companion
cases, Proffitt v. Floridar5 and Jurek v. Texas,6 upheld the Florida
and Texas death penalty statutes largely based on the reasoning in
Gregg and by the same division of votes. On the other hand, two
state laws were invalidated. Both North Carolina and Louisiana
(among other states) had responded to Furman by passing death
laws that mandated execution of any person found guilty of certain
offenses. In challenges to these statutes, the principal plurality in
Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, with the assist of Justices Brennan and
Marshall's substantive position, struck down the mandatory laws in
Woodson v. North Carolina 7 and Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts
1).8 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and
Rehnquist dissented.
A year later, the Court invalidated a narrower portion of the
Louisiana mandatory death statute in Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts
II).9 The same Justices who had dissented in Roberts I dissented
again. This time, Justices Brennan and Marshall, while adhering
to their views in Gregg, joined the Roberts I plurality on the au-
thority of that case. The state had argued that since the homicide
in Roberts 11 was substantially more egregious, a mandatory death
law was permissible. Although a majority of the Court disagreed,
it continued to hold open the question of whether a mandatory
death law might be permissible if a prisoner or escapee serving a
life sentence commits a murder.
Also in 1977, a plurality of four Justices invalidated a Georgia
statute providing a discretionary capital sentence for rape of an
adult woman. The plurality in Coker v. Georgia said that the
penalty was disproportionate to the offense.10 Justice White wrote
the plurality opinion, in which Justices Blackmun, Stewart and
Stevens joined. Justice Powell concurred. Justices Brennan and
5428 U.S. 242 (1976).
6 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
7 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
8 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
9 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
10 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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Marshall concurred based on their positions in Gregg. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
In 1978, the Court, again with a plurality of four, decided
Lockett v. Ohio." Lockett invalidated an Ohio statute that limited
the mitigating circumstances the capital defendant was permitted
to ask the sentencer (a judge) to consider. The particular mitigat-
ing fact in Lockett was the alleged absence of an intent to cause
death. The plurality did not, however, limit itself to this circum-
stance. The Lockett plurality was composed of the Gregg plurality,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the opinion. Exclusion
of mitigating facts was seen to create an unacceptable "risk" of an
unreliable sentence. Justices Marshall, White and Blackmun each
concurred in the decision to reverse the death penalty, but each
wrote a separate opinion and each had a different theory, though
part of Justice Blackmun's reasoning was akin to the plurality's.
Justice Brennan did not participate. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Bell v. Ohio,12 a companion case to Lockett, involved the same
statute. Lockett is discussed extensively throughout this Article.
In Green v. Georgia,'3 a majority of the Court, in a brief per
curiam opinion, invalidated a death sentence when the defendant
was not permitted to introduce certain mitigating information on
the issue of penalty. Although Lockett established the right to
introduce this evidence, the state relied on an otherwise valid
hearsay rule to exclude it. The Court rejected this reliance, citing
Chambers v. Mississippi.'4  Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justices
Brennan and Marshall adhered to their earlier positions.
In its 1979 Term, the Supreme Court agreed to review four
death penalties, one from Georgia, one from Alabama, and two
from Texas.' Three of the cases were argued and decided during
the 1979 Term.'6 All four cases concern procedures for deciding
who dies.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the state supreme court had affirmed a
jury finding that the defendant's homicides were "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman," within the meaning of an
"1438 U.S. 586 (1978).
12438 U.S. 637 (1978).
13442 U.S. 95 (1979).
'4 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973).
15 Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct.
2382 (1980); Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 (1980); Estelle v. Smith, 602 F.2d
694 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1311 (1980) (No. 79-1127, 1979
Term).
16 These are Godfrey, Beck and Adams.
[Vol. 129:1
DECIDING WHO DIES
aggravating circumstance in the Georgia capital statute.17 The
Supreme Court reversed for escalating reasons: the jury was not
instructed on the meaning of the aggravating circumstance; I the
state supreme court had not "independently assessed the evidence
of record and determined that" it supported the finding of the
aggravating circumstance; 19 and, in any event, there was "no prin-
cipled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was
imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." 20 Justice
Stewart wrote the plurality opinion in Godfrey, in which Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Stevens joined. Justices Marshall and
Brennan concurred in the judgment based on their opinions in
Gregg. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented.
In Beck v. Alabama, the Supreme Court invalidated two pro-
visions of the Alabama death law. The first provision prohibited
the trial judge from instructing culpability juries in capital cases
on lesser included offenses. The Court held that this provision
created an unacceptable risk that the defendant would be im-
properly convicted of a capital offense. 2' The second provision of
the Alabama death law required the trial judge to instruct the jury
that a finding of guilt of a capital crime "shall" result in execu-
tion.2 2  Although this was not true, because the trial judge was
empowered to send the defendant to prison instead, the jury's belief
that it was true, coupled with the prohibition of a lesser included
offense charge, "introduce[d] a level of uncertainty and unreliability
into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital
case." 23 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice
Brennan concurred and Justice Marshall concurred in the judg-
ment. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented on the ground that
the issues had not been raised below.
2 4
In Adams v. Texas, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice
White with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, that because prospec-
tive jurors at a capital trial were excluded for cause on a basis in-




21100 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
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consistent with Witherspoon, the resulting death sentence was
invalid.2
The Supreme Court has agreed to review a decision of the
Fifth Circuit, Estelle v. Smith, holding that the prosecution may
not, at a capital sentencing hearing, use evidence obtained in a
psychiatric examination of the defendant, unless the defendant had
been warned of his right to remain silent and to stop the examina-
tion whenever he wished, and unless the defendant had been assisted
by counsel in deciding whether to submit to the examination. The
case was argued in the 1980 Term of the Court.
Finally, the Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision
in Bullington v. Missouri.2 6 There are four certified questions.
Three of these go to the constitutionality of subjecting a defendant,
who was sentenced to life imprisonment at his first trial, to the
risk of death on retrial. But although the case arises in a retrial
situation, the nature of the issues may make their resolution im-
portant to capital sentencing generally.
25 100 S. Ct. at 2528.
26 Bullington v. Missouri, 594 S.W.2d 908 (1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70
(1980).
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